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Presiding CommissionerTERMS OF REFERENCE
Terms of Reference
I, Peter Costello, Treasurer, under Parts 2 and 3 of the Productivity Commission Act 1998,
hereby:
1.  refer for inquiry and report the question of whether safeguard action is warranted
against imports of meat of swine, frozen, falling within tariff sub -heading 0203.29 of
the Australian Customs Tariff. The Commission is to report within 140 days (or
earlier) of receipt of this reference and is to hold hearings for the purposes of the
inquiry;
 
2. specify  that:
(a)  in accordance with the WTO safeguard investigation procedures published in
the Gazette of S297 of 25 June 1998, the Commission report on whether the
circumstances are such that safeguard measures would be justified under the
WTO Agreement; and
 
(b)  if so, what measures would be necessary to prevent or remedy serious injury
and to facilitate adjustment; and
3. also refer for inquiry and report within 140 days (or earlier) of the receipt of this
reference the question of the factors affecting the profitability and competitiveness of
the domestic pig farming and pigmeat processing industries, specifically examining the
extent to which each  factor influences industry profitability and competitiveness.
PETER COSTELLO
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Overview
This report is about
safeguard action
against imports and ...
This report addresses the question of whether safeguard
action, in accordance with the World Trade Organization
(WTO) Agreement on Safeguards, would be justified
against imports of certain frozen pigmeat — excluding
imports from New Zealand — and implications of such
action.
... the profitability and
competitiveness of the
pig industry.
The report also examines the factors affecting the
profitability and competitiveness of Australia’s pig





Until recently, the Australian market price for pigmeat
fluctuated seasonally, with a pronounced price rise in the
second half of the year, peaking before Christmas, and a
price trough between April and June. This seasonal
pattern has been around a long-term real price decline.
The long-term price trend has been associated with
technological developments in pig farming and breeding
which have increased industry productivity.
... with a price peak for
legs of ham in the
Christmas season.
The Christmas seasonal price peak was driven by the
demand for legs of ham, one of the three ‘primal’ cuts of
pigmeat. Pig producers relied on these seasonally high
leg prices to offset low prices for the other two primal
cuts (shoulders and middles) and lower leg prices for the
rest of the year.
These seasonal price fluctuations developed at a time
when domestic pig farmers were insulated from the
world market by quarantine restrictions on the import of
pigmeat.
Pigmeat processors, in the absence of access to importsXIV OVERVIEW
to supplement domestic supplies for Christmas, tended to
commence buying well in advance of the seasonal price
peak and stockpiled legs for the Christmas market (to the
extent that holding costs and chilling/freezing technology
permitted).
Australia’s seasonal demand pattern for legs of ham does
not coincide with Northern hemisphere demand patterns
— and price relativities between ham and the other
primal cuts also differ, with many foreign markets
placing a premium on middles and loins rather than on
legs. But these differences did not affect a market
protected from import competition.
Ham and fresh pork monthly retail sales








Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec
Ham sales (1991 to 1995) Fresh pork sales (1994 to 1996)
The relaxation of quarantine restrictions
Quarantine restrictions
on the import of
pigmeat were reviewed
in 1990, 1992, ...
Prior to 1990, the only pigmeat allowed to be imported
was canned ham. In 1990, quarantine restrictions were
revised to permit the import of frozen, uncooked pigmeat
from Canada. The restrictions were strengthened in 1992
requiring imported frozen pigmeat to be boned prior to
shipment and to be used for processing (either cooked or
fermented) in Australia.OVERVIEW XV
... 1996, ... In 1996, Canada was given permission to export chilled,
boned pork cuts for further processing in Australia.
... and again in 1997.
Since October 1997, imports of cooked pigmeat from
Canada and uncooked pigmeat from Denmark also have





When quarantine restrictions were first eased, it took
several years for some major processors to respond.
Imports of frozen pork (mainly legs) began in 1990 and
settled at a level of around 3000 tonnes per year until
mid-1996. At these relatively low levels of imports
(about 2 per cent of the market for pork and 8 per cent of
legs) Australia’s seasonal price pattern survived. One
reason was that some of the major pigmeat processors —
Darling Downs Bacon (a producer-owned cooperative),
Chisholm Manufacturing (subsidiary of Woolworths),
Don Smallgoods (a sister company of major pig producer
Bunge), and Watsonia (vertically integrated with pig
farming) — did not use imported pork.
Pressure to import
A cost-price squeeze on
pig farmers in 1995
forced many to leave the
industry.
Australia’s 1994–95 drought had a twofold effect on pig
farmers. Grain prices increased by around 30 per cent,
significantly increasing pigmeat production costs. At the
same time cattle herds were sold and beef prices declined
— effectively preventing pigmeat prices from increasing.
This cost-price squeeze accelerated the rate of departure
of pig farmers from the industry. Between December
1994 and June 1995, the number of producers fell by
more than 1000 (23 per  cent) and pig numbers and
slaughterings declined.
In 1996, with the drought over, grain prices lower, and
pig production down, pig prices increased substantially
in the lead-up to Christmas 1996. Some processors were
already using imported frozen pork. Others had difficulty
filling their orders from domestic supplies and
commenced importing.XVI OVERVIEW



























































































Pigmeat production (RHS) Producers (LHS)
In late 1996, high





With domestic pig prices at the highest real level for the
decade, and volumes of low price imports (mainly legs)
increasing, the policy of some processors of not using
imported pork became very expensive. As a
consequence, in the latter half of 1996, one of the major
pigmeat processors, who had previously agreed not to
import, decided to use pigmeat from Canada.
In the early months of 1997, with the price of domestic
pigmeat remaining high, imports continued at high
levels.
The aftermath of the 1996 surge in imports
Processors responded to the high domestic prices in 1996
by increasing their import orders for the 1997 Christmas
season.
Pig farmers responded by investing to expand capacity.OVERVIEW XVII













































































continued to fall until
June 1998.
As a consequence, while prices throughout most of the
latter part of 1997 were not out of line with pre-1995
prices, the Christmas price increase pig farmers had
anticipated turned into a price fall. Stocks of carcasses
built up in cool rooms/freezers and were carried forward
into 1998. When these stocks were added to an
expanding domestic supply and sold in the early months
of 1998 the usual seasonal softening of prices was
exacerbated. Prices continued to fall until June 1998.
Prices have increased since then but have not reached a
level at which most pig farmers are able to cover their
production costs.
Exports
At about the same time as imports exerted a significant
impact on the domestic market, an important export
opportunity opened up.XVIII OVERVIEW







































































































































Porker contract prices Baconer contract prices Pig saleyard prices
An export opportunity
has opened up in Japan.
Taiwan traditionally supplied a significant share of
Japan’s pigmeat imports. However an outbreak of foot
and mouth disease in Taiwan halted that trade and
presented an opportunity to Australian exporters. As a
result, Australian exports of pigmeat to Japan increased
from $4 million in 1996–97 to $23 million in 1997–98
and are expected to continue growing strongly. The
domestic industry claims that at this time the major
barrier to rapid expansion of this export market is the
lack of suitable export accredited abattoir and boning
facilities in Australia.
By and large, exports are differentiated from imports.
Wild pigmeat accounted for a major share of exports
until farmed pigmeat exports increased significantly in
the last two years. Of farmed pigmeat, the major exports
are of cuts other than legs, while imports are
predominantly legs. The composition of this trade
reflects the bias in demand in Australia towards legs for




Exposure of the domestic market to import competition
has changed the dynamics of the market. While seasonal
peaks in demand and price may still occur, it is unlikely
that Christmas peaks of past magnitudes will recur. The




The industry also agrees that further rapid structural
change within the industry is required in order to take
advantage of the window of opportunity provided by
exports and to compete successfully with imports. A
trade pattern of importing mainly legs and exporting
mainly middles, shoulders and offal may develop.
Exposure to the world market will provide growers with
the opportunity to divert more shoulder and middle cuts
to the export market. In turn this may result in higher
prices for these cuts on the domestic market.
Both domestic and






While much of the future restructuring within the
industry will have an export orientation, many
participants stated that there is considerable scope to
improve the product and its presentation for the local
market. For both markets, pig farmers will need to be
able to supply a consistently high quality product at a
competitive price. The industry believes that it can do so.
New abattoir and boning rooms, accredited for the higher
quality export standard, are already in the advanced
planning and approval stages. Growers and processors






Many pig farmers, both small and large, already have the
capacity or are planning to invest in capacity to increase
production. The success of any one of these plans will
depend to a large degree on the individual grower’s
ability to integrate, either formally or informally, with
activities further along the production chain — such as
slaughter and boning, processing, and marketing.XX OVERVIEW
Successful integration with the world market is unlikely
to be compatible with the current common practice of
incurring a cost of up to $8 per pig (5 to 6 per cent of the
sale price) to transport stock long distances (often
interstate) to slaughter and boning facilities.
Safeguard action
The WTO allows for
temporary safeguard
action against imports
The WTO Agreement on Safeguards allows for
safeguard action against imports of particular products.
The purpose of safeguard action is to provide temporary
assistance, and an opportunity to adjust, to an industry
which is seriously injured (or threatened with serious
injury), as a direct result of increased imports.
Safeguard measures, if imposed, must be liberalised





In responding to the question of whether safeguard
action is warranted against imports of certain frozen
pigmeat, the Commission has been careful to conduct its
inquiry process in accordance with the requirements of
the WTO and to follow the procedures and apply the
criteria specified in the Safeguards Agreement.
... and apply criteria
specified in the WTO
Agreement.
In particular, the Commission is required to:
·  identify products which are like or directly
competitive with the imported product;
·  identify the domestic industry producing those like or
directly competitive products;
·  establish whether or not imports have increased;
·  determine whether the domestic industry is suffering
serious injury or is threatened with serious injury;
·  determine whether imports are the cause of serious
injury; and
·  identify the measures which would remedy serious
injury and facilitate adjustment.OVERVIEW XXI
Like or directly competitive products
The imported products in question are uncooked, frozen,





The Commission has concluded that pork produced in
Australia is like imported Canadian pork and that imports
of frozen pork cuts are directly competitive with dressed
carcasses.
The industry
More than 90 per cent of all pigs grown either are sold
under contract to downstream processors or butchers for
the fresh meat market, or are produced by vertically-
integrated pork producers. When sold under contract, the
processor generally assumes ownership of the pig from





In both cases, there is no identifiable, separate domestic
industry which only produces boned cuts of pork from
purchased live pigs. Either pig growing, slaughtering,
boning and cutting operations are tightly linked in
vertically-integrated firms or independent pig growers
supply carcasses to downstream processors.
In the Commission’s view, imports of boneless pork can
be expected to affect the demand for (and prices of)
carcasses supplied by pig growers to local processors in
much the same way as would imports of live swine or
carcasses.
The Commission therefore has concluded that pig
producers, as well as primary processors of pigmeat (that
is, pig abattoirs, boning and primary cutting operations)
constitute the domestic industry producing like or





In considering the question of whether imports have
increased, the Commission has concluded that an
appropriate period of time is 1995 to the present. Until
1995 imports had little impact on the domestic industry.
Since then imports have increased significantly, both in
absolute terms and relative to domestic production.
... in absolute terms ... Imports of frozen uncooked pork increased from 3130
tonnes in 1995–96 to 8550 tonnes in 1996–97. Pigmeat
imports in 1997–98 were 7990 tonnes.
... and relative to
domestic production.
On a carcass equivalent basis, the market share of
imports increased from less than 2 per cent to 4.4 per
cent over the same time. On a boned leg basis, the share
of imports increased from an estimated 6 to 8 per cent in
1995–96 to 17 to 22 per cent in 1996–97.




































































































Other pigmeat imports Imports of frozen boned porkOVERVIEW XXIII
Serious injury
Although there are no hard and fast rules for determining
serious injury, the Commission considers that for the
first half of 1998, the loss of market share, decline in
price and reduced profitability recorded by the industry
constitute serious injury in terms of the WTO Safeguards
Agreement.
Loss of market share,
decline in price, and
reduced profitability
constitute serious injury
in terms of the WTO
Agreement.
As noted above, the industry as a whole has lost market
share to imports. Pig prices have fallen significantly
since October 1997 and in the June quarter of 1998 were
well below production costs of many — probably most
— pig farmers. Many pig producers reported losses for
1997–98. A Pork Council of Australia survey showed
that for a sample of pig farmers, profitability fell from
7.6 per cent return on capital in 1996–97 to a negative
return of 3.5 per cent in 1997–98. These results are in
contrast to variable but high profits relative to all
agriculture in previous years.
The cause of serious injury
Increased imports have
been the dominant cause
of serious injury.
The Commission has examined a wide range of factors
which may have contributed to the injury described
above and has concluded that increased imports were the
dominant cause of low pig prices and reduced
profitability. While production was increasing, it was
only returning to pre-drought levels. The Commission is
unable to find any other factor capable of explaining the
large fall in demand for local pigmeat and consequent
fall in pigmeat prices since October 1997.
The Commission engaged consultants to try to quantify,
with econometric studies, the impact of imports on the
domestic industry. The results of those consultancies,
and of a separate study submitted by a participant, were
not decisive, but were not inconsistent with the
Commission’s conclusion.XXIV OVERVIEW
What safeguard measure would remedy serious injury
caused by imports and facilitate adjustment?
There are several broad constraints on the form, level,
and duration of safeguard action which may be applied
against imports.
A safeguard measure
can be a quota, a tariff
quota, or a tariff.
Under the WTO Agreement on Safeguards, a safeguard
measure can be applied only to the extent and for such a
period of time as may be necessary to prevent or remedy
serious injury and to facilitate adjustment. The period
should not exceed four years, although measures may be
extended for up to eight years in certain circumstances.
The Australian Government has limited possible
safeguard measures to a quota, a tariff quota, or an
increased level of tariff.
The form, level and duration of a safeguard measure
In considering the form, level and duration of a safeguard
measure, the Commission has taken into account the
current and likely future circumstances of the industry. In
particular, the Commission is mindful of the fairly broad
consensus in the industry that further industry adjustment
is required. There is likely to be further industry
rationalisation in the number of growers and
consolidation of herds. There is likely to be greater
integration of pig farming and processing activities,
improved productivity, quality improvements, and the
development of domestic and export markets and export
capacity.
The peak industry body
and many others
requested a tariff quota.
The peak industry body, the Pork Council of Australia,
has requested that a quota of 4000 tonnes (and no more
than 5000 tonnes) be imposed for four years, with
imports outside quota attracting a specific rate of duty of
$2 per kilogram (at current price levels equating to about
50 per cent). Most submissions received from individual
growers and processors proposed similar measures.OVERVIEW XXV
In effect, the industry requested that a quota be set at
close to the level of imports in 1995–96.
The Commission does not consider that safeguard
measures which reduce imports to such a low level
would be appropriate. Since 1995–96 the industry has
made significant progress towards operating in a more
open trading environment. Turning the clock back to a
time before imports and exports increased would not
help further that process.
A quota would be
inappropriate for this
industry ...
Furthermore, the Commission considers that quantitative
restrictions would be inappropriate in this industry
because of the necessity to keep in touch with the
continually changing world market. In addition, quota
allocation invariably incurs high administrative cost, is
often inequitable, and may introduce distortions within
the processing industry.
... a tariff would be
better.
If safeguard measures are used, the Commission’s
preference is for an ad valorem tariff which would be
simple to administer, which would not completely
insulate the industry from the incentives and disciplines
of the world market, and which has a transparent
protective effect.
If safeguard action is
taken, an initial tariff of
10 per cent, phased out
over two years ...
In seeking a balance between remedying serious injury
and facilitating adjustment the Commission has formed
the view that, if safeguard action is taken, a tariff of 10
per cent, phasing to 5 per cent after one year and to zero
in two years’ time would represent a suitable
compromise. The Commission estimates that at present,
a tariff of 10 per cent would increase the price of a
baconer dressed carcass by about 4 per cent or $6. (This
tariff would not apply to imports from New Zealand.)
... can be justified under
the WTO criteria ...
The Commission considers that a tariff of this magnitude
can be justified under the WTO safeguard criteria. It
would not compensate the industry for market pressures
on pig prices other than imports, nor return it to its
previous state, but would provide a balance between
remedying injury caused by increased imports andXXVI OVERVIEW
facilitating adjustment.
... but may not be the
best means of remedying
serious injury and
facilitating adjustment.
While preferring a tariff over a quota, the Commission
nevertheless seriously questions whether even an ad
valorem tariff is the most appropriate means of
remedying serious injury and facilitating adjustment in
the Australian pigmeat industry.
Industry initiatives to
restructure have been
taken and are supported
by Government
assistance.
Noting that the Terms of Reference (2(b)) do not confine
“measures” to safeguard measures, the Commission is of
the view that remedying injury and facilitating
adjustment is better targeted by a combination of direct
assistance to those forced to leave the industry and
appropriate short-term assistance to facilitate an
expansion in export capacity, a reduction in the
impediments to exporting, and market development. The
Commission notes that initiatives by the industry to
promote adjustment are in place and are supported by
Government assistance. The Commission is not in a
position to address, in this inquiry, the general question
of the adequacy of direct assistance to those who leave
industries or occupations.






The preceding discussion has responded to the Terms of
Reference for this inquiry by addressing the question of
whether the WTO criteria for safeguard measures have
been met and by considering what measures would offset
serious injury caused by increased imports and facilitate
adjustment.
In addition, under Part 2 Section 8 (General Policy
Guidelines) of the Productivity Commission Act 1998,
the Commission is required to have regard to a number
of objectives designed to promote the regional, social,
ecological, and economic goals of the Australian
Government.OVERVIEW XXVII
The Government’s general procedures for safeguard
inquiries also requires the Commission to report on
whether safeguard measures, which may be justified
under the WTO criteria, should be implemented.
The following discussion of the likely effects of
implementing safeguard action is provided in the context
of these broader considerations.
Effects on pig farmers
A tariff would raise
pigmeat prices ...
A tariff on imports of frozen boned pork from Canada
would directly raise import prices and in so doing
indirectly raise the price of Australian produced pigmeat.
... and reduce the
market share of imports.
A tariff would also increase the share of the market
supplied by domestic production and reduce the share
supplied by imports.
These basic effects on an industry-wide basis, would not
necessarily be enjoyed uniformly across individual pig
farmers. The distribution of benefits within the industry
would be determined by a multitude of factors including
competition between domestic producers for market
share, and individual processor demand for various
quantities and qualities of pigmeat.




The pig farming industry already has sufficient capacity
to expand production should that be warranted by market
circumstances. Any individual pig farmer would not
necessarily be able to sell more pigmeat, but all would
benefit from the price effect of a tariff.




A tariff on imported pork, which raised the price of
domestic pigmeat, would increase costs to processors. To
the extent that these costs are transmitted to consumers
through higher end-product prices, the demand for
processed pigmeat would decline, which would in turnXXVIII OVERVIEW
have an adverse effect on processors.
A further implication for processors is that they would be
less competitive with potential imports of processed
product. Such imports can now occur as protocols for the
tariff free import of cooked pigmeat from Canada were
agreed to in 1997.
Effects on employment
A tariff may slow, but
not reverse, the decline
in industry employment.
Employment in pig farming has for many years been
declining in concert with industry rationalisation and
despite increases in production. A tariff may slow that
rate of employment loss, but would not stop or reverse
the decline. A tariff could reduce employment in the
pigmeat processing sector if the demand for processed
pigmeat declines.
Effects on industry adjustment
As in some major pig producing countries, the industry
has a long and continuing history of adjustment. Prior to
1990, that adjustment occurred in an environment
protected from import competition and reflected mainly
rationalisation in response to cost pressures and changes
in pig farming technology.
Integration into the world market, through both imports
and exports, has added a further dimension to those
adjustment pressures. The pressures were evident prior to
the surge in imports and were manifest in plans to
improve slaughtering and boning facilities in order to
service an expanding export market.
A tariff would not
promote an export
orientation ...
A tariff would not facilitate the necessary early
adjustment to an export orientation. Indeed, it could
delay the process by making the domestic market
relatively more attractive than exports, and making those
abattoirs focussing on exports less competitive.OVERVIEW XXIX
... but other measures
might.
While a tariff would provide some marginal producers
with more time to adjust to the new market environment,
measures targeted directly at achieving adjustment
towards enhanced export capacity and competing with
imports are more likely to encourage development in the
form envisaged by industry representatives.
Regional effects
Pig farms are distributed widely throughout Australia but
are concentrated in the major grain-growing areas.
Regional effects of industry adjustment, whether induced
by imports or rationalisation, will in future be
determined mainly by the way in which alliances
between pig farmers, processors, and retailers are
developed, and by the geographic location of major
export accredited abattoir and boning facilities.
Regional adjustment
will occur whether or
not imports are
restrained.
In the context of an industry required to adjust rapidly to
an export orientation, the overall effect of a tariff on
regional adjustment would be small: adjustment will
occur whether imports are restrained or not.
Nevertheless, for those regions which may be adversely




implications need to be
considered.
Safeguard action is consistent with the WTO Agreement.
However, Australia needs to consider implications for its
other international trading arrangements. Three
considerations are important in this regard.
First, the WTO Agreement on Safeguards requires a
Member proposing to apply a safeguard measure to
endeavour to “maintain a substantially equivalent level of
concessions and other obligations to that already existing
between it and affected exporting Members”. If
agreement is not reached on such compensation,XXX OVERVIEW
exporting countries can respond in kind (by withdrawing
access to a concession under the WTO) but only after a
safeguard measure has been in place for three years.
Second, the Queensland Sugar Council and Queensland
Department of Primary Industries expressed concern for
the preservation of Canadian preferences for Australian
sugar. The Pork Council of Australia objected to this
stance. The reduction of existing preferences for trade
between Canada and Australia is not constrained by
WTO agreements, as assumed by some participants, but
by CANATA (Canada-Australia Trade Agreement).
Third, implications for Australia’s open trading
credentials need to be considered in the context of the
next round of WTO negotiations. The Australian
Government has identified agriculture as one of the
principal areas capable of providing benefits to Australia.FINDINGS XXXI
Findings
The Commission finds that, in accordance with the WTO Agreement on Safeguards:
·  the domestic industry producing like or directly competitive products comprises
pig producers as well as producers of primal pork cuts (that is, specialist pig
abattoirs and boning room operators);
·  imports of frozen, boned pork under tariff sub-heading 0203.29 (statistical
code 12) have increased in absolute terms and relative to production;
·  the industry has suffered and is suffering serious injury as the result of producer
prices consistently and appreciably below average production costs during 1998,
leading to significantly reduced profitability for most pig producers;
·  serious injury during 1998 has been caused primarily by increased imports which
have driven down the price of that part of the pig (legs) which traditionally has
delivered a premium to local producers; and
·  safeguard measures can be justified under the WTO criteria. The Commission
considers that an ad valorem tariff (on imports under tariff sub-heading 0203.29,
excluding imports from New Zealand) of 10 per cent, phasing to 5 per cent after
one year, and to zero after two years, if implemented, would achieve a
reasonable balance between the WTO twin requirements of remedying the
serious injury attributable to increased imports and facilitating industry
adjustment. Quantitative measures would not be appropriate for this industry
because they would obscure international price signals, while a higher level of
tariff could slow the required adjustment unnecessarily.
The Commission also notes that:
·  a safeguard measure would not of itself promote adjustment or exports;
·  measures that directly promote industry restructuring and an export focus, while
providing assistance to those leaving the industry, might be more appropriate
than safeguard measures. Various support measures are already in place;
·  import restrictions will raise the price of inputs to the smallgoods manufacturing
sector, with possible adverse effects on that industry, and increase consumer
prices;XXXII FINDINGS
·  any import restriction on imports of frozen pork under sub-heading 0203.29 has
the potential to be undermined by imports of chilled pork cuts from Canada or
Denmark under tariff sub-heading 0203.19; and
·  it has no wish to speculate on the question of any response by the Canadian
Government. However, the reduction of existing preferences for trade between
Canada and Australia is not constrained by WTO agreements, as assumed by
some participants, but by CANATA.
The Commission finds that the following factors will have a significant influence on
the profitability and competitiveness of the pig farming and pigmeat processing
industry:
·  the price of feed – including the effect of single desk selling of grain exports;
·  access to genetic material and vaccines;
·  product quality and presentation on both domestic and export markets;
·  export standard abattoir and boning room capacity;
·  the extent of integration with world markets and with world prices for pigmeat
and by-products; and
·  links between pig farming, pigmeat processing, and marketing.
The profitability and competitiveness of individual pig farmers will depend also on
their access to export standard processing facilities and their links into the pigmeat
processing and marketing chain.INTRODUCTION 1
1 Introduction
1.1 The Australian pig and pigmeat industries
The Australian pig and pigmeat industries consist of a series of linked sectors: pig
farming, which produces pigs; meat processing, including abattoirs and boning
rooms, which produces pigmeat for sale as fresh pork and for further processing;
and the manufacturing sector, which uses pigmeat in the production of bacon, ham
and smallgoods.
Pig farming is a relatively small sector of agriculture in Australia. In 1996–97, value
added in pig farming accounted for just 2 per cent of farm gross product and one
twentieth of 1 per cent of Australian GDP (ABARE 1997). The pig and pigmeat
processing industries as a whole account for about one tenth of 1  per  cent of
Australian GDP.
It is estimated that there were 3340 owner/producers and 2140 full-time, part-time
and casual employees in pig farming in 1996–97. This is estimated to translate to
between 3000 and 3500 full-time jobs, reflecting part-time employment as well as
the mixed nature of many small pig-farming businesses. An additional 3000 people
are employed in pigmeat processing and over 6000 people are employed in bacon,
ham and smallgoods manufacturing (ABS Cat. No. 8221.0).
Unlike many of Australia’s rural industries, pig and pigmeat production has not
been export oriented. However, there is evidence of this changing as the industry
becomes exposed to world markets. In 1997–98, the industry exported around
6 per cent of domestic production, double the previous year.1
The pig farming and pigmeat processing industries have been undergoing substantial
structural change for several decades. Between 1970–71 and 1997–98, the number
of pig producers fell from around 40  000 to fewer than 3200 — about 200
owner/producers left the industry in 1997–98. Over the same period, the average
herd size and productivity of the industries increased significantly, with pigmeat
production almost doubling (see figure 1.1).
                                  
1 Excluding wild pigmeat, on a carcass weight equivalent (cwe) basis.2 PIG AND PIGMEAT
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ABARE revisions ABS pigmeat production (RHS) Producers (LHS)
a 1995-96 to 1997-98 includes ABARE revised figures to correct for apparent under-reporting to the ABS in
those years.
Source: ABS (Cat. No. 7215.0 and unpublished data) and ABARE (1998).
Pig herds are concentrated in Australia’s major grain growing areas. In 1997–98,
New South Wales had the largest number of breeding sows, followed by
Queensland and Victoria (see figure 1.2). Queensland had the highest number of
large producers (over 400 sows per herd) including 10 with over 1000 sows.
However, Victoria had the highest average herd size.
Some of the large producers are vertically integrated, having expanded from a base
of stockfeed manufacturing, or from slaughtering and manufacturing activities.
There is significant foreign investment in these integrated businesses.
Despite ongoing rationalisation in the industry, there remains a large number of
small non-specialist producers. (Producers with fewer than 100 sows are generally
considered to be non-specialist.) The 81 per cent of pig producers that have fewer
than 100 sows have 21  per  cent of Australia’s breeding stock. In contrast, over
40 per cent of breeding sows are owned by the 1 per cent of producers with over
1000 sows (see figure 1.3).INTRODUCTION 3



















Source: APC (unpublished data).





















Source: APC (unpublished data).4 PIG AND PIGMEAT
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1.2 Background to this inquiry
Prior to 1990, the only imports of pigmeat allowed were canned hams. In 1990,
quarantine prohibitions on the import of pigs and pigmeat were revised to permit
imports of frozen,  uncooked pigmeat from Canada. These regulations were
strengthened in 1992, requiring imported frozen pigmeat to be boned prior to
shipment and to be used for processing (that is, either cooked or fermented) in
Australia.
Since October 1997, imports of cooked pigmeat from Canada and uncooked pigmeat
from Denmark (under the same conditions as uncooked Canadian pigmeat) also
have been permitted. Apart from uncooked and cooked pigmeat from Canada,
uncooked pigmeat from Denmark, some uncooked product from New Zealand, and
cooked, canned hams, quarantine restrictions currently prohibit imports of pigmeat.
Imports of uncooked pigmeat enter duty-free, and this zero rate has been bound
under the World Trade Organization (WTO) since 1 January 1995.
In 1997–98, imports from Canada accounted for about 80 per cent of the value of
pigmeat imports. Imports of uncooked pigmeat from the South Island of New
Zealand, and imports of cooked, canned pigmeat accounted for the remaining
20 per cent.
There have been several reports on the industries in recent years including a
research report by the Industry Commission in 1995 (IC  1995a) and an anti-
dumping and countervailing duty investigation by the Australian Customs Service
(ACS 1992), subsequently reviewed by the Anti-Dumping Authority (ADA 1993).
As with the current inquiry, these reports were prompted by industry concerns about
the impact of imports of frozen pork.
Imports of frozen pork began in 1990 and settled at a level of around 3000 tonnes
per year until mid-1996. In 1996–97, imports of frozen, boned pork more than
doubled to 8500  tonnes. Other pork imports (predominantly imports of canned
hams) remained fairly steady at about 1000 tonnes per year until 1996–97 but have
doubled in 1997–98 (see figure 1.4). After lower levels of pigmeat imports during
the first half of 1998, imports increased in June before falling again in August and
September.
This inquiry was foreshadowed on 10 June 1998 by the Deputy Prime Minister and
Minister for Trade, and Minister for Primary Industries and Energy (Fischer and
Anderson 1998), as part of an assistance package designed to improve the
competitiveness of the domestic pig farming and pigmeat processing industry.INTRODUCTION 5
Figure 1.4 Imports under tariff sub-heading 0203.29 and total pigmeat
imports







































































Imports under 0203.29 Other pigmeat imports
Source: ABS (unpublished data).
The package augmented a 1997 initiative to establish a National Pork Industry
Development Program. The program aims to assist the pig production and
processing sectors to meet import competition and to seek new export opportunities.
In addition to the current inquiry by the Productivity Commission, the Government
also announced a benchmarking study of the industry and a survey of export
opportunities.
1.3 Scope of this inquiry and report structure
The Commonwealth Government has asked the Productivity Commission to report
on whether safeguard action, in accordance with the WTO Agreement on
Safeguards, is warranted against imports of certain frozen pigmeat. Safeguard
measures provide temporary assistance (up to four years), and an opportunity to
adjust, to an industry suffering serious injury (or threatened with serious injury) as a
result of increased imports.6 PIG AND PIGMEAT
INDUSTRIES
It should be noted that the Terms of Reference did not ask the Commission to make
a preliminary determination regarding application of provisional safeguard
measures.2
The Commission also has been asked to report on factors affecting the profitability
and competitiveness of the domestic pig farming and pigmeat processing industries.
Chapters 2 to 6 of this report are concerned with the first part of the reference —
that is, the safeguards inquiry. As spelt out in chapter  2, this part of the report
necessarily follows the criteria set out in the WTO Agreement on Safeguards.
Chapters 7 and 8 provide a broader analysis of factors affecting the profitability and
competitiveness of the local industry.
1.4 Conduct of the inquiry
On 26 June 1998, the Commission received the Terms of Reference for this inquiry
into imports of uncooked pork and the profitability and competitiveness of the pig
and pigmeat industries. The reference directed the Commission to report by
13 November 1998.
As required by the WTO Agreement on Safeguards, and in line with normal
Commission procedures, the Commission encouraged maximum public participation
in this inquiry. In early July, advertisements were placed in the national press and a
circular was sent to a range of individuals and organisations thought likely to have
an interest in the inquiry. An issues paper was released in mid-July to assist
participants in preparing their submissions. In total, 67 submissions were received
(appendix A, table A.1). All non-confidential submissions (or non-confidential parts
of submissions) were made available on the internet, at Commission and State
libraries and from Expo Document Copy Centre.
                                  
2 The WTO Agreement on Safeguards (Article  6) allows imposition of provisional safeguard
measures (for up to 200 days) while a full inquiry takes place to determine whether safeguard
measures are warranted. Before provisional measures can be imposed, however, there must be a
preliminary determination that there is clear evidence that increased imports have caused or are
threatening to cause serious injury, and moreover, where it can be shown that “delay would cause
damage which it would be difficult to repair”. The Commonwealth Government’s procedures for
safeguard inquiries (Clause 16 — see appendix B) provide that “a reference can also be made to
the Commission for an accelerated report to determine whether critical circumstances exist where
delay in applying measures would cause damage which it would be difficult to repair”. In other
words, the Commission can be requested to make a determination regarding provisional safeguard
measures. The Terms of Reference for this inquiry did not ask the Commission to make such a
determination.INTRODUCTION 7
The Commission also held informal discussions with organisations, companies and
individuals to seek information and discuss the effects of pigmeat imports. A list of
those visited by the Commission is set out in table A.2.
In August, the Commission held public hearings in Brisbane, Sydney and
Melbourne. Public hearings gave participants an opportunity to foreshadow and/or
elaborate on their submissions. Due to the lateness of the submission from the peak
industry body, the Pork Council of Australia, the Commission considered it
necessary to hold another public hearing in early October. All parties thus were
given an opportunity to respond to this (and some other) late submissions. In total,
13 individuals and organisations gave evidence (table  A.3). Transcripts of the
hearings were made publicly available on the internet, at Commission and State
libraries or through Expo Document Copy Centre.
The Commission engaged two consultants to assist its assessment of the impact of
increased imports on the domestic industry. In addition, an independent academic
referee was appointed to evaluate both studies (as well as econometric analysis
submitted by participants). In October 1998, the Commission held a public
workshop to discuss the results of these two models. More than 20 people attended
the workshop.




2 What is safeguard action?
2.1 The World Trade Organization Agreement on
Safeguards
Article XIX of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT 1994) allows
for emergency action (or safeguard action) against imports of particular products.
Essentially, safeguard measures are designed to provide temporary assistance, and
an opportunity to adjust, to an industry found to be suffering serious injury (or
threatened with serious injury), as a direct result of increased imports. There is no
requirement to demonstrate that the increased imports are dumped or subsidised.
The Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations resulted in a new
Agreement on Safeguards which interprets and elaborates Article XIX (see box 2.1).
A major feature of the new Agreement is its proscription of a range of negotiated
trade restrictions including voluntary export restraints (VERs). Such arrangements
had proliferated in the 1970s and 1980s, contravening the spirit, if not the letter, of
the GATT.
Box 2.1 Article XIX and the 1994 Agreement on Safeguards
The World Trade Organization (WTO) Agreement on Safeguards interprets and
elaborates Article XIX of GATT 1994. Some provisions of the Agreement are worded
differently to the Article. For example, Article  XIX stipulates that emergency action is
permissible only where the increase in imports (and consequent serious injury) is due to
unforeseen developments. The 1994 Agreement is silent on this point.
Where there is conflict between an Article of GATT 1994 and a Uruguay Round (WTO)
Agreement, the provisions of the Agreement take precedence to the extent of the conflict
(Agreement Establishing the WTO, General interpretative note to Annex 1A). The issue
is less clear when requirements specified in GATT 1994 are not altered, repeated or
referred to in a relevant Agreement. The Commission has addressed this matter where it
considers it is appropriate to do so.
The new Safeguards Agreement allows importing countries to take safeguard action
against increased imports in certain circumstances, while outlawing less transparent,10 PIG AND PIGMEAT
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negotiated trade-limiting arrangements, such as VERs. It sets out rigorous and
transparent procedures and criteria for the imposition of safeguard measures,
including a requirement for public hearings and admittance of evidence for
consideration of the public interest. Major provisions of the Agreement are
summarised in box  2.2. As a member of the WTO, Australia is bound by the
Agreement.
In essence, safeguard action is intended to provide a breathing space for industries
and to facilitate adjustment to increased competition from imports. Safeguard
measures, if imposed, must be liberalised progressively in order to facilitate industry
adjustment to import competition. They can be put in place for a maximum of four
years, but can extend for up to eight years if circumstances are such that action is
still warranted.
In order to maintain a substantially equivalent level of WTO concessions and other
obligations to affected WTO Members, a country imposing safeguard measures may
offer “adequate means of trade compensation” to affected exporting countries. If
agreement is not reached on such compensation, exporting countries are given an
opportunity to suspend “substantially equivalent” concessions or obligations under
GATT 1994 either after measures have been in place three years, or immediately if
safeguard action is taken against imports which have not increased in absolute
terms.
Disputes arising from application of safeguard measures are subject to WTO dispute
settlement procedures.
2.2. General procedures for safeguard inquiries
The WTO Agreement on Safeguards states that “a Member may apply a safeguard
measure only following an investigation by the competent authorities of that
Member pursuant to procedures previously established and made public in
consonance with Article X of GATT 1994”.1
The Commonwealth Government has established general procedures for safeguard
inquiries by the Productivity Commission, consistent with Australia’s obligations
under the WTO Agreement. These gazetted procedures are reprinted in full in
appendix B.
                                  




Box 2.2 Summary of the WTO Agreement on Safeguards
·  Safeguard measures may only be applied where a product is being imported in such
increased quantities, absolute or relative to domestic production, and under such
conditions as to cause or threaten to cause serious injury to a domestic industry
producing like or directly competitive products. Measures cannot discriminate
between countries (except where a preferential agreement is in place) unless, where
a quota is imposed, it can be shown that increased imports from one country are
disproportionately high;
·  measures may only be applied after a full investigation by a competent authority.
Reasonable public notice must be given with the opportunity for all interested parties
to attend public hearings or be given other appropriate means of presenting
evidence and views. Interested parties must be given an opportunity to respond to
the representations of other parties, in particular, as to whether or not they consider
application of a safeguard measure would be in the public interest;
·  “serious injury”, “threat of serious injury”, “industry” and factors which must be
evaluated in the investigation to determine whether serious injury has been caused
or threatened, are spelt out;
·  it must be demonstrated that increased imports have caused serious injury.
Moreover, if factors other than imports are causing injury simultaneously, such injury
must not be attributed to imports;
·  safeguard measures, if applied, must only remedy or prevent the serious injury
attributable to imports and facilitate adjustment. Measures must be liberalised
progressively. Measures can include tariffs and quantitative restrictions;
·  safeguard measures are limited to four years, but may be extended to eight years if
it can be shown that continuation of measures is required to prevent serious injury,
and provided there is evidence the industry is adjusting;
·  if measures are applied for more than three years, they must be reviewed mid-term
and, if appropriate, withdrawn or liberalised more rapidly;
·  the country applying the measures must “endeavour to maintain a substantially
equivalent level of concessions and other obligations ¼ between it and the
exporting Members which would be affected by such a measure ¼ Members may
agree on any means of trade compensation for the adverse effects of the measures
on their trade.” If an agreement on this matter is not reached, the exporting country
can unilaterally suspend application of substantially equivalent concessions (in other
words, respond in kind). However, this right can only be exercised by the exporting
nation if a safeguard measure has been in place three years, or if safeguard
measures are imposed against imports which have increased relative to domestic
production but which have not increased in absolute terms; and
·  safeguard measures cannot be applied against imports from a developing country
unless its share of imports of the product exceeds 3 per cent of total imports, or
unless imports from developing countries in aggregate account for more than
9 per cent of all imports.12 PIG AND PIGMEAT
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The Canadian Government (sub. 34, pp. 2–3) has expressed a concern that, because
the gazetted procedures do not replicate in full the provisions of the WTO
Agreement on Safeguards, and because they have not been enacted as law, the status
of the Gazette is unclear, leaving open the possibility of non-compliance with the
Agreement. The Commission notes this line of argument.
While the Gazette summarises some parts of the WTO Agreement and the Terms of
Reference for this inquiry refer to the Gazette, the Gazette also states that the
Commission must comply with the 1994 WTO Agreement when conducting
safeguards inquiries. All the relevant parts of the Agreement therefore are binding
on the Commission.
Under the Terms of Reference for this inquiry, the Commission is required (a) to
report on whether, in accordance with the procedures published in the Gazette, the
circumstances are such that safeguard measures would be justified under the WTO
Safeguards Agreement and (b) if so, what measures would be necessary to prevent
or remedy serious injury and to facilitate adjustment.
As outlined in the Gazette, safeguard measures are justified only after a public
inquiry which demonstrates that increased imports (in absolute terms or relative to
production) have caused, or are threatening to cause, serious injury to the domestic
industry.
Under WTO safeguard procedures serious injury is defined as a significant overall
impairment in the position of the domestic industry while threat of serious injury
means serious injury that is clearly imminent. The domestic industry means the
producers as a whole of like or directly competitive products operating in Australia,
or those whose collective output of like or directly competitive products constitutes
a major proportion of total domestic production.
In determining whether increased imports have caused or are threatening to cause
serious injury to a domestic industry, the Commission must evaluate all relevant
factors of an objective and quantifiable nature, in particular, the rate and amount of
the increase in imports in absolute and relative terms, the share of the domestic
market taken by increased imports, changes in the level of sales, production,
productivity, capacity utilisation, profits and losses and employment. In addition, a
causal link between increased imports and serious injury must be demonstrated.
Part (b) of the reference requires the Commission to determine which measures
would be necessary to remedy serious injury caused, or threatened by, increased
imports, and to facilitate adjustment. Safeguard measures might include tariffs,
tariff-quotas or quotas, though quotas normally should not reduce imports below
their average level for the last three years. It should be noted, however, that theWHAT IS SAFEGUARD
ACTION?
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reference apparently does not limit the Commission’s consideration to safeguard
measures. Thus, the Commission could consider alternative measures which address
the injury issue and promote industry adjustment.
Other views
The reference for this inquiry is made under Parts  2 and 3 of the Productivity
Commission Act 1998 (PC Act). Thus, as in all its inquiries, the Commission is
required to have regard to the general policy guidelines outlined in Part 2 of the
PC Act. These are reprinted in box 2.3. The guidelines give prominence to the need
to improve the overall performance of the economy as a means of raising living
standards for all Australians.
In addition, the WTO Safeguards Agreement requires that interested parties be given
an opportunity to put their views, including “¼ whether or not they consider
application of safeguard measures would be in the public interest”.
Box 2.3 Section 2.8 of the PC Act: general policy guidelines for the
Commission
In the performance of its functions, the Commission must have regard to the need:
(a) to improve the overall economic performance of the economy through higher
productivity in the public and private sectors in order to achieve higher living
standards for all members of the Australian community; and
(b) to reduce regulation of industry (including regulation by the States, Territories and
local government) where this is consistent with the social and economic goals of
the Commonwealth Government; and
(c) to encourage the development and growth of Australian industries that are
efficient in their use of resources, enterprising, innovative and internationally
competitive; and
(d) to facilitate adjustment to structural changes in the economy and the avoidance
of social and economic hardships arising from those changes; and
(e) to recognise the interests of industries, employees, consumers and the
community, likely to be affected by measures proposed by the Commission; and
(f) to increase employment, including in regional areas; and
(g) to promote regional development; and
(h) to recognise the progress made by Australia’s trading partners in reducing both
tariff and non-tariff barriers; and
(i) to ensure that industry develops in a way that is ecologically sustainable; and
(j) for Australia to meet its international obligations and commitm ents.PARTICIPANTS’ VIEWS 15
3 Participants’ views
This chapter briefly summarises the evidence submitted to the Commission by the
industry peak body, the Pork Council of Australia (PCA), as well as submissions
from individual pig growers, abattoir operators and processors, in support of
safeguard action. It also summarises evidence submitted by participants opposing
the industry’s claims.
3.1 Submissions received
Appendix A lists submissions received by the Commission, visits made and those
who participated at hearings. Sixty-seven submissions were received. Of these,
61  put an ‘industry’ view though not all supported safeguard measures. Forty
submissions were received from pig producers and/or processors, nine from
producer organisations, three from input suppliers to the industry, and nine from
State governments or politicians. Six submissions were received from importers,
domestic and foreign exporters and foreign governments.
The industry peak body, the PCA, represents pig producers and processors
responsible for around 75  per  cent of total domestic production. The PCA
commissioned a survey of its members for this inquiry. The survey covered 198 pig
growers representing an estimated 36  per  cent of domestic production. The
Commission received submissions from pig producers of varying size — nine from
producers with fewer than 200 sows, ten from producers with 200–499 sows, two
with 500–999 sows and nine with more than 1000 sows (including four of the
largest pig farming-cum-processing operators in the country). Altogether, the
Commission estimates that submissions (excluding the PCA submission) were
received from producers who own more than a third of all sows in Australia.16 PIG AND PIGMEAT
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3.2 The industry’s case
3.2.1  The Safeguards Agreement
With regard to the criteria required for safeguard action, the PCA submission
(sub. 55) claims that:
·  the ‘industry’ for the purposes of this inquiry comprises producers of pigmeat
and the processors of pigmeat, excluding manufacturers of pork smallgoods. This
definition is justified by the pattern of ownership of pigmeat and the fact that the
price received for boned legs affects the price paid for a carcass;
·  imports have increased both in absolute terms and relative to production since
1995–96. It is also claimed that imports are likely to increase further in 1998–99;
·  the industry has and is suffering serious hardship. The results of the survey are
discussed in more detail in chapter 4, but the main findings were that in 1997–98
profits had fallen substantially while losses had increased substantially;
employment had fallen and indebtedness to feed suppliers had increased
significantly. Poor profitability was due to producer prices below the costs of
production;
·  primary processors (including Auspork, Bunge Meat Industries and Darling
Downs Bacon) also had suffered serious injury;
·  increased imports of frozen, boned legs had been the major cause of lower prices
and thus the major cause of serious injury. Ninety-two  per  cent of survey
respondents considered that import competition was the chief cause of injury.
The impact of imports on domestic pigmeat prices was supported by analysis
conducted by Purcell and Harrison (see sub. 49, appendix 2); and
·  serious injury could not be attributed to domestic over-supply, weather
conditions, changes in consumer preferences, lower productivity, higher costs, or
lower prices for substitute products (especially other fresh meats).
Submissions from individual producers argued along similar lines.
3.2.2 Safeguard measures
The PCA requested immediate application of provisional safeguard measures — a
tariff of 200c/kg. Thereafter, imports (under tariff sub-heading 0203.29) should be
limited to 4000 tonnes per year (at the bound zero rate of duty) for four years,
although a quota of 5000 tonnes would be acceptable. Imports in excess of this
quota allocation would attract a duty of 200c/kg. (This out-of-quota rate, whichPARTICIPANTS’ VIEWS 17
represent an ad valorem tariff of more than 50 per cent for a full leg and around
40 per cent for a higher-valued 3-piece leg, would be prohibitive.)
The PCA based the quota on the level of imports in the period immediately prior to
the increase in the second half of 1996. The Commission estimates that a quota of
4000 tonnes per year would translate roughly to an ad valorem tariff of 25 per cent
at the price of imports extant at October 1998, a quota of 5000 tonnes to a tariff of
around 20 per cent.1
Most submissions from producers supported a quota of 5000 tonnes per year for
four years with an out-of-quota duty rate of 200c/kg. (see, for example, subs 15, 16,
21, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 37 and 48). There were some variations — for example,
some submissions argued that within-quota imports should attract a duty equivalent
to the levy paid by domestic producers to the Australian Pork Corporation and Pig
Research and Development Corporation for pig industry marketing, research and
development (see sub.  14). Very few proposed progressive liberalisation of the
quota (subs 35 and 48 were exceptions). As an alternative, one participant (sub. 51)
suggested a specific rate of duty of 150c/kg to apply to all imports.2 One producer
(sub. 61) did not regard safeguard measures as the most appropriate way of assisting
the industry. Other submissions were noncommittal (for example, subs 57 and 66).
3.2.3 Adjustment proposals
The PCA did not propose progressive liberalisation of safeguard measures. Nor did
it set out a clear picture of how it envisaged the industry would adjust so as to be in
a better position to compete with imports when safeguard measures were removed.
The PCA did claim, however, that safeguard measures were required to stabilise the
domestic industry and to provide a climate of commercial stability, thus allowing
“the industry to become more competitive and export oriented, which is where we
believe the longer term future lies” (sub. 55, p. 33). In particular, the PCA put the
view that market stability was a pre-requisite for investment in export capacity.
Similar arguments were put by several participants (for example, subs 39, 48 and
51). Some participants observed that adjustment would necessitate some producers
leaving the industry (for example, subs  48, 57 and 61). Most submissions from
individual pig producers stressed the need for greater certainty with respect to the
volume of imports in order to facilitate ‘orderly adjustment’.
                                  
1 These estimates are highly sensitive to the market share of imports.
2 This is estimated to translate to an ad valorem tariff of about 40 per cent for full legs and
30 per cent for 3-piece legs at current prices.18 PIG AND PIGMEAT
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3.3 The opposing case
The Canadian Government, the Canadian Pork Council and Canadian Meat Council
made submissions (subs 4, 8, 34 and 43) and presented evidence (trans., pp. 103–
15, 186–93) that claimed that safeguard action was not warranted. Their major
grounds for opposing the industry’s claims were that:
·  pig producers could not be regarded as producers of products which were like or
directly competitive with imports;
·  domestic processors (abattoir and boning room operators) were not suffering
serious injury due to increased imports;
·  while imports had increased somewhat they still represented only a small share
of total pigmeat production and, moreover, import volumes had declined in
1998; and
·  difficulties being experienced by pig farmers were attributable to factors other
than imports including lower beef prices, market power of downstream
processors, high costs, increased domestic production and lower consumption.
3.4 Other interested parties
Under the World Trade Organization Agreement on Safeguards and the general
procedures for safeguard inquiries set out by the Australian Government (see
appendix B) interested parties must be given the opportunity to present their views
including their views as to whether or not safeguard measures would be in the
public interest.
A submission was received from the Queensland Sugar Corporation (sub.  19)
exploring the potential repercussions on Australia’s sugar exports to Canada. (The
views in this submission were hotly disputed by the PCA (see sub. 67).) Some other
participants, though sympathetic to the pork industry’s position (for example, the
NSW Farmers’ Association, sub. 13), raised broader issues relating to Australia’s
position on multilateral trade liberalisation. The Department of Primary Industries
Queensland (sub. 49, p. 11) also urged that any measure imposed “should not put at
risk international trading arrangements for any of our other primary products”.THE EFFECT OF
IMPORTS
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4 The effect of imports on the industry
This chapter addresses part 2(a) of the Terms of Reference for this inquiry.
Specifically, the Commission is required to report on whether, in accordance with
the World Trade Organization (WTO) safeguard investigation procedures published
in the Gazette of S297 of 25 June 1998, circumstances are such that safeguard
measures would be justified under the WTO agreement.
4.1 Goods under reference
The goods under review are frozen pork falling within tariff sub-heading 0203.29
(statistical code 12) of the Australian Customs Tariff (see appendix C). This sub-
heading covers imports of frozen pork other than carcasses and half carcasses, and
other than hams, shoulders and cuts of pork, with bone in. In other words, it covers
frozen, boned cuts (including legs, middles, loins and shoulders) of pork.
From mid-1990 until October 1997, there were only two sources of imports falling
within this tariff sub-heading — Canada and the South Island of New Zealand. In
October 1997, Denmark received approval to export uncooked pork under the same
quarantine conditions as Canada (see appendix F). However, there have been no
imports of frozen, uncooked pork from Denmark. Under the provisions of the
ANZCERTA and as stipulated in the general procedures for the conduct of
safeguard inquiries by the Commission (see appendix B), imports of New Zealand
origin must be excluded from any safeguards inquiry.
Thus, in effect, the imports under consideration in the safeguard inquiry are imports
of frozen, boned pork from Canada, falling within tariff sub-heading 0203.29. This
tariff classification captures virtually all imports of uncooked pork from Canada.1
                                  
1 Between 1990 and 1992 imports from Canada of frozen pork with bone in were permitted.
Quarantine requirements were tightened in 1992 requiring all Canadian imports to be boned prior
to entry and then processed on arrival in Australia. In May 1996, a new protocol was agreed with
Canada to allow imports of uncooked, unfrozen pigmeat provided the meat was subsequently
cooked in Australia. Official data show that around 150 tonnes of pigmeat have been imported
under this protocol in total (under tariff sub-heading 0203.19). In October 1997, Canada was
granted AQIS approval to export cooked pork to Australia (see appendix F). There have been no
imports under this protocol as yet.20 PIG AND PIGMEAT
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Imports of frozen pork enter free of duty and this zero rate has been bound under
the WTO since 1 January 1995.
4.2 Defining ‘like’ and ‘directly competitive’ products
and the ‘domestic industry’
As already noted, there are two sources of imports under tariff sub-heading 0203.29
— New Zealand and Canada. Imports from New Zealand have accounted for
3 tonnes, or around 0.00015 per cent of imports in this category in the past three
years. Imports from Canada comprise mainly boned legs (between 80 and
100 per cent of such imports) which are (and, under quarantine requirements, must
be) subsequently processed to become hams and smallgoods in Australia.2 Any
other parts such as middles and shoulders also must be processed locally.
4.2.1 Interpreting the WTO requirements
The WTO Agreement on Safeguards defines the ‘domestic industry’ as comprising
the producers as a whole of like or directly competitive products, or those whose
collective output constitutes a major proportion of the total domestic production of
those products. Thus the first step in this inquiry is to establish which domestically-
produced goods are like, or directly competitive with, imported pork.
The Agreement on Safeguards is one of a number of Agreements concluded during
the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations. Its stated aim is to “clarify
and reinforce the disciplines of GATT 1994, and specifically those of its
Article XIX (Emergency Action on Imports of Particular Products)”.
The term like or directly competitive is contained in GATT Article XIX. The term
like product occurs in several articles of GATT 1994 in addition to Article XIX.3
These include Articles I, III, VI, XIII, and XVI which relate, respectively, to most-
favoured-nation treatment, national treatment, anti-dumping and countervailing
duties, quantitative restrictions, and subsidies. As noted by Jackson (1969, p. 263), a
leading authority on GATT law, “¼ there is no precise definition of ‘like products’
                                  
2 While the majority of imports comprise boned legs, there are different leg cuts, for example, full
legs or so-called 3-piece legs.
3 GATT 1994 comprises the original GATT (GATT 1947) as amended etc., together with relevant




or similar phrases and that same term, when used in different clauses of the General
Agreement, can have different meanings”.
For example, in the context of anti-dumping and countervailing inquiries, the term
like product consistently has been interpreted as an identical or similar product and,
indeed, was defined thus in the 1994 WTO Agreement on Anti-dumping and
Countervailing Duties (Article 2:6). A similar definition has been included in the
general procedures for safeguard inquiries issued by the Australian Government.
With regard to GATT Article I (most-favoured-nation rule), like products generally
are regarded as those which fall within the same tariff classification (Jackson 1969,
pp. 263–4).
However, Article XIX and the Agreement on Safeguards use the explicitly broader
phrase — like or directly competitive (Jackson 1969, p. 261). Jackson (1997) has
noted that “this inclusion is clearly appropriate, because the objective in the escape
clause is to ascertain when the imports are harming domestic industry, and
obviously competitive products can so harm” (p. 189). On the question of which
products can be construed as competitive with others, he observes “GATT
jurisprudence being so sparse, considerable leeway seems to exist for interpreting
this phrase” (p. 189).4 In some contexts — for example, GATT Article III, which
concerns national treatment on internal taxation and regulation
—  directly competitive has been interpreted as encompassing goods with distinct
physical characteristics but which compete for the same consumer market (for
example, different types of alcoholic spirits).5 Here, the objective is to ensure that
national taxes or regulations, which discriminate between competing goods, do not
act as de facto barriers against imports.
In the context of safeguard action, and as noted by Jackson, the objective is to
permit action against imports which cause serious injury to a domestic industry. In
this context, a narrow interpretation of the term directly competitive, which resulted
in a large group of producers who were experiencing injury as the result of imports,
                                  
4 There is ‘sparse’ legal precedent interpreting safeguard provisions for two main reasons. First,
because safeguards have been little used in comparison with anti-dumping and countervailing
procedures and, second, because safeguard actions under the provisions of Article XIX have not
often been implemented. Instead of invoking the provisions of Article  XIX, voluntary export
restraints (VERs) were often negotiated. This situation may change under the WTO Agreement on
Safeguards because (a) negotiated agreements such as VERs are now proscribed and (b) use will
be encouraged as retaliation by exporting countries is delayed for three years if safeguard
measures have been applied where imports have increased in absolute terms.
5 WTO, Appellate Body, 1996, Japan — Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages, WT/DS8/AB/R,
4 October.22 PIG AND PIGMEAT
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being excluded from the safeguard action, would appear to run counter to the
objective of the Article.
This appears to be the view of the US Congress. The US Trade Act of 1974
interprets directly competitive with in terms of the potential economic effects of
imports:
An imported article is “directly competitive with” a domestic article at an earlier or later
stage of processing, and a domestic article is “directly competitive with” an imported
article at an earlier or later stage of processing, if the importation of the article has an
economic effect on producers of the domestic article comparable to the effect of
importation of articles in the same stage of processing as the domestic article. [US
Trade Act of 1974, Section 201]
Applying this provision, the US International Trade Commission (USITC) has found
in certain safeguard cases involving agricultural goods that producers at all stages
should be included as part of the domestic industry.6 The Canadian International
Trade Tribunal (CITT) adopted the US interpretation in its safeguard inquiry into
imports of boneless beef in 1993 (CITT 1993), and found that the high degree of
economic interdependence between cattle producers and slaughterers and boners
justified inclusion of cattle producers in the ‘domestic industry’.
4.2.2 Views of participants
The Canadian Meat Council and Canadian Pork Council agree that, “whilst there
may be different views as to comparability of the products in terms of the way in
which they are cut, or their quality” (sub. 8, p. 4), there is an Australian industry
producing like products to those imported. However, the Canadian Meat Council,
Canadian Pork Council and the Canadian Government (sub.  34) argue that
producers of these goods are pork processors, not pig growers. While it is conceded
that pig growers might have a legitimate commercial interest in pork processing
(similar to their own interest in this inquiry), the Canadian Meat Council and
Canadian Pork Council argue that this interest should not, “by some ‘bootstraps’
reasoning, qualify them [pig farmers] as members of the industry producing like or
directly competitive products” (trans., p. 105).7
To support this view the submission refers to determinations by the Australian
Customs Service (ACS  1992) and the Australian Anti-Dumping Authority
                                  
6 See, for example, USITC, Inv. No. TA–201–59 (Pub.  1861) June  1986, which found that
producers of apples comprised part of the domestic industry producing apple juice.
7 It may be noted that the appendix to the Canadian Government submission (sub. 34), contrary to
the main body of the submission, argues in favour of a very broad interpretation of the industry.THE EFFECT OF
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(ADA  1993), in the context of an anti-dumping and countervailing inquiry, that
Australian pork processors were producers of like products to the imports. In this
case, producers of pigmeat for processing (that is, pig farmers) also were included
as producers of like products, but only under a provision in Australian anti-dumping
law which allows producers of raw material inputs to initiate anti-dumping actions
against imports of close processed agricultural goods.8 The Canadian Government
considers that recourse to such a provision supports their view that pig growers do
not produce like goods, that is, boned pork (sub. 34, p. 7).
The Canadian Government, Canadian Meat Council and Canadian Pork Council
note that the WTO safeguard provisions extend the ambit of the industry to include
producers of directly competitive products. However, contrary to the determination
of the Canadian International Trade Tribunal (CITT 1993) on boneless beef,
referred to above, they claim that upstream products (that is, pigs) cannot be
considered directly competitive with downstream products (that is, processed pork).
Moreover, it is claimed that the distinction between production stages is not altered
by vertical integration of processes or the claim that pig growers generally sell
carcasses and not live pigs (sub. 34, pp. 10–12). In other words, they contend that
the term directly competitive implies competition between goods at the same stage
of the production process and which compete for the same buyer (sub. 8, p. 5).
Indeed, it is submitted that inclusion of processors of all types of meat would be
more appropriate than inclusion of upstream pig farmers. Hence, the view that, at
most, the definition of the industry should be limited to pig processors and abattoirs,
with these activities being excised from vertically-integrated pig farming and
processing operations. As for the definition of processors, the Canadian
Government seems to include primary processors only, while the Canadian Meat
and Pork Councils suggest that all processors, including smallgoods manufacturers,
should be included.
As outlined in chapter  3, the Pork Council of Australia (PCA), on behalf of
domestic pig growers (representing about 75  per  cent of domestic production),
argues that the domestic industry comprises producers of pigmeat (pig farmers) as
well as processors of pigmeat, excluding downstream manufacturers of pork
smallgoods. The PCA claims that: (a) a high percentage of pork is owned by
growers until it reaches the dressed carcass stage; (b) there is a high degree of
vertical integration in the industry (such that a very significant percentage of
processors of boned meat are also producers of carcasses) and (c) a change in the
price received for boned legs will directly affect the price of carcasses and pigs
(sub. 55, p. 11).
                                  
8 This amendment to the Customs Act (subsection T(4A)) was passed in 1991. It is similar to
provisions in US anti-dumping statutes (see section  4.2.3).24 PIG AND PIGMEAT
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4.2.3 Previous inquiries
As noted, the question of like products was addressed by the ACS (1992) and the
ADA (1993) in an anti-dumping and countervailing investigation into imports of
frozen pork. In that case, the ADA confirmed an ACS determination that primary
pork cuts produced by the domestic pork processing industry were like products
with imports. The fact that imports were frozen was not considered to alter the
nature of the product.
Nor were some minor differences in types of cut considered to constitute a
significant difference between local and imported pork. Domestic producers of like
products were determined to comprise primary processors of pigmeat, that is, to the
stage where processed pork cuts became inputs to downstream smallgoods
manufacture.
In addition, and as noted above, in the anti-dumping and countervailing case,
producers of pigmeat for processing (that is, pig farmers) also were included as
producers of like products under a provision in Australian anti-dumping law which
allows producers of raw material inputs to initiate anti-dumping actions against
imports of close processed agricultural goods. Close processed agricultural products
are defined as products which are derived substantially or completely from the raw
agricultural good, where the raw agricultural good is devoted substantially or
completely to the processed agricultural good, and where there is a close
relationship between the prices of the raw material and the processed good, or
where a significant part of the production cost of the processed good is the raw
material input.
A similar provision does not apply to safeguard actions in Australia. However, the
Safeguards Agreement explicitly broadens the definition of an industry to include
producers of like or directly competitive products.
4.2.4 The Commission’s assessment
‘Like’ or ‘directly competitive’ goods
As already noted, imports under tariff sub-heading 0203.29 comprise frozen, boned
pork cuts and the majority of these imports are boned legs from Canada. The
Commission concurs with the view of the ACS and the ADA that freezing does not
change the nature of the imported product compared with pork produced in
Australia in any way that is significant for this inquiry. Moreover, while there have
been and may still be slight differences in quality and cut, participants haveTHE EFFECT OF
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suggested that the two products are very similar (see, for example, trans., p. 77).
This does not appear to be disputed by Canadian Meat Council and Canadian Pork
Council (see sub. 8, p. 4).
The Commission therefore considers that pork produced in Australia is like
imported Canadian pork.
Moreover, for reasons discussed below, the Commission considers that imports of
frozen pork cuts also are directly competitive with dressed carcasses.
Producers of ‘like’ or ‘directly competitive’ products — defining the industry
Australian pig farmers produce pigs which are used either for processing (mainly
‘baconers’ which are pigs of around 95  kg) or for fresh meat (‘porkers’ around
75  kg). Some porkers are used in processing. Subject to size constraints, pig
producers can switch relatively easily between supplying the processing and fresh
meat markets.
More than 90  per  cent of all pigs grown either are sold under contract to
downstream processors or butchers for the fresh meat market, or are produced by
vertically-integrated pork producers. The remainder are sold at auction.
When sold under contract, the processor generally assumes ownership of, and pays
for, the pig after it has been slaughtered. That is, the pig farmer sells a dressed
carcass, not a live pig. The abattoir does not assume ownership of the pig, but rather
provides a service input, at a fee. Processors, including ham and smallgoods
manufacturers, then either cut and bone the carcass themselves or contract out this
task to boning rooms. These cuts subsequently are sold as fresh pork or frozen meat
or are processed into hams and smallgoods.
This process is spelt out in several submissions including those from Miandetta
Farms (sub. 24), Windridge Pig Farm (sub. 48), Auspork (sub. 51) and the South
Australian Farmers’ Federation (sub.  53), as well as by Bunge Meat Industries
(sub. 39, and trans., p. 74).
Of importance to the definition of the industry, ham and smallgoods manufacturers
make a choice between purchasing imported frozen pork cuts and purchasing
locally-produced pig carcasses or boned cuts. From the processors’ viewpoint, that
the products are at somewhat different stages of processing is largely immaterial
—  carcasses sold by pig farmers are directly competitive with imported cuts.
Moreover, the fact that they are at different stages of processing reflects quarantine26 PIG AND PIGMEAT
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requirements and not fundamental differences between the products or their end-
uses.
Where domestically-produced boned legs and other cuts are offered for sale, these
often are produced by vertically-integrated specialist pig farming and processing
operations such as Bunge Meat Industries. There is extensive vertical integration in
the pigmeat industry. Abattoirs and boning operations responsible for 50 per cent of
the national pig kill in 1996–97 were directly connected to pig farming (see
appendix D, table D.8). Several of these operations also have associated smallgoods
operations. For example, at Bunge Meat Industries, which produces almost
20 per cent of domestic pigmeat, pigs are grown, slaughtered, and boned and then
sold to smallgoods manufacturers, including to Bunge’s sister company, Don
Smallgoods. Auspork and the Darling Downs Bacon Co-operative, which together
account for around 20 per cent of domestic pigmeat production, are slaughtering and
processing operations owned by pig farmers.
In both cases, however — that is, where there is vertical integration or where pig
farmers sell carcasses to smallgoods manufacturers — there is no identifiable,
separate domestic ‘industry’ which only produces boned cuts of pork from
purchased live pigs. Either pig growing, slaughtering, boning and cutting operations
are inextricably linked in vertically-integrated firms or independent pig growers
supply carcasses to downstream processors.
There are some independent specialist pig abattoirs and boning rooms which are not
involved in growing pigs and which do sell like products. B.E. Campbell (NSW),
which processes about 6  per  cent of carcasses produced Australia-wide is an
example. But such operations are the exception. Moreover, the activity, or value-
added, of such operations is slaughtering and boning services, not the production of
pigmeat. Although imported pork embodies these services, and thus competes
directly with operations such as B.E. Campbell (NSW), imports are primarily
pigmeat and pigmeat is produced by pig growers.
The Canadian Government contends that structural and legal arrangements do not
alter the fact that slaughtering and boning of pigs together constitute a separate stage
of processing and, thus, a separate industry (sub.  34, pp.  10–12). Applying this
reasoning, there would be virtually an infinite number of industries in any economy.
And as noted above, this narrow view of the industry would be more appropriate if
Australia were importing only pig slaughtering and boning services from Canada,
not pigmeat.
The Canadian Government submission also argues that inclusion of all meat
processors in the ‘industry’ would be more appropriate than inclusion of pig farmersTHE EFFECT OF
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alone due to competition between meats. While there is competition between meats
in fresh meat markets, imported pork must be further processed in Australia, into
ham or other smallgoods. It is unlikely that meats other than pork compete as inputs
to ham production.
It is the Commission’s view that slaughtering and boning operations essentially are
service inputs (provided in-house or externally) to the pigmeat production process.
Pigs are rarely grown for any other purpose than the production of pigmeat, and pig
production constitutes a major part of the gross value-added of boned cuts (for
example, 80 per cent of a boned leg cut).
Consequently, any changes in the markets for pigmeat will directly affect the
demand for pigs and the price received by pig producers. In particular, imports of
boneless pork can be expected to affect the demand for (and prices of) carcasses
supplied by pig growers to local processors in much the same way as would imports
of live swine or carcasses.
For these reasons, the Commission considers that pig producers as well as primary
processors of pigmeat (that is, pig abattoir, boning and primary cutting operations,
and including vertically-integrated operations which cover all or some of these
activities) constitute the domestic industry producing like or directly competitive
products for the purposes of this inquiry. Downstream processors of pigmeat into
hams and smallgoods — that is, the buyers of imports and like or directly




A necessary condition for the application of safeguard measures is that imports have
increased. Article XIX begins:
If as a result of unforeseen developments and of the effect of the obligations incurred by
a contracting party under this Agreement, including tariff concessions, any product is
being imported into the territory of that contracting party in such increased quantities  ¼
The WTO Agreement on Safeguards stipulates that:
A Member may apply a safeguard measure to a product only if that Member has
determined ¼ that such product is being imported into its territory in such increased
quantities, absolute or relative to domestic production ¼28 PIG AND PIGMEAT
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While the requirement for increased imports, either in absolute terms or relative to
production, is comparatively straightforward, there is a question as to whether the
increase must be due to ‘unforeseen developments’ and be the effect of obligations
incurred under GATT 1994. Article XIX explicitly imposes these criteria, but the
Agreement on Safeguards does not.
The Canadian Meat Council and Canadian Pork Council and the Canadian
Government argue (subs 8 and 34), on the basis of the Vienna Convention,9 and a
1996 decision by the WTO Appellate Body10 that the Article and the Agreement
must be read together — in other words, that the requirements of the Article stand
though the Agreement is silent on these matters.
The Commission does not consider that this is the only interpretation.
Article 1 of the Agreement on Safeguards states:
This Agreement establishes rules for the application of safeguard measures which shall
be understood to mean those measures provided for in Article XIX of GATT 1994.
[emphasis added]
The measures provided for in Article XIX are “to suspend the obligation in whole
or part or to modify the concession”, as a result of which the injurious imports have
increased due to unforeseen circumstances. The Canadian Government contends
that the measures provided for in Article  XIX can only be taken, inter alia, in
response to circumstances which were unforeseen at the time the relevant
obligations were incurred and, hence, the requirements of the Article still apply.
However, Article  1 of the Safeguards Agreement states that the agreement
“establishes rules for the application of safeguard measures”. Article 2:1 then sets
out the general conditions under which a Member may apply a safeguard measure
and these criteria do not include the requirement that the increased imports be due
to ‘unforeseen developments’. The Commission considers that this modification of
the conditions under which safeguard measures (of the type allowed for in
Article XIX) can be applied was deliberate.
This interpretation is consistent with the Vienna Convention (Article 31:1) which
states that:
A treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be
given the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and purpose.
                                  
9 The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaty (1969).
10 WT/DS2/AB/R, 29 April 1996.THE EFFECT OF
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Moreover, this interpretation also is consistent with the General Interpretative note
to Annex 1A of the Agreement Establishing the WTO (see box 2.1). The ordinary
meaning and object and purpose of the Agreement on Safeguards is to establish
rules for the application of safeguard measures. The current inquiry complies with
these rules.
Although the Commission does not accept that the developments which led to the
increase in imports need to be unforeseen at the time that the relevant WTO
obligation was incurred, the nature of ‘unforeseen’ is further explored.
In practice, the requirement that an increase in imports be unforeseen has been very
broadly interpreted. The Canadian Government (sub.  34,  p.  25) cites the GATT
Working Party report on Withdrawal by the United States of a Tariff Concession
under Article XIX, the only GATT precedent on this matter:
¼ the term ‘unforeseen developments’ should be interpreted to mean developments
occurring after the negotiation of the relevant tariff concession which it would not be
reasonable to expect that the negotiators of the country making the concession could
and should have foreseen at the time when the concession was negotiated.
(GATT/CP/106, report adopted on 22 October 1951)
This case concerned imports of hatter’s fur into the United States. While the
Working Party found that a change in fashion — which had led to a surge in imports
of hatter’s fur — was not an ‘unforeseen development’, it was determined that the
extent of change in this particular case could not have been foreseen at the time the
tariff concession was made. On this basis, the Working Party found that the
requirements of Article XIX indeed had been fulfilled. According to Jackson, this
broad interpretation of ‘unforeseen developments’ suggests that “ ¼ the prerequisite
cause of ‘unforeseen developments’ has been essentially ‘read out’ of the GATT
agreement” (Jackson 1997, p. 187).
In relation to the current inquiry, the Australian market was opened to imports of
pigmeat from Canada (under certain quarantine conditions) in mid-1990. Between
1990–91 and 1995–96, import volumes increased to, and stabilised at, around 3000
tonnes per year. A report by the Industry Commission in October 1995 noted that,
despite the fact that Canadian imports seemed to be cheaper than comparable local
cuts, several major manufacturers had given assurances that they would not use
imported pigmeat (IC 1995a, p. 16).
The Commission also observed that imports of pigmeat could increase significantly
if Canadian leg pork remained consistently cheaper than comparable Australian
cuts. However, at the time, it was anticipated that Canadian pork prices would rise,
while Australian production costs would fall when the drought, which existed at the30 PIG AND PIGMEAT
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time, ended. Both of these factors “would help to reduce the incentive to import”
(IC 1995a, p. 18).
Australia’s acceptance of a bound tariff rate of zero on imports of pigmeat under the
WTO Agreement on Agriculture, effective from 1 January 1995, thus had been
taken at a time when (a) the major processors had given assurances that they would
not use imported product, and (b) when it might reasonably be expected that the
price difference between imports and local product would narrow. However, in
1996–97, import volumes (under sub-heading 0203.29) increased to 8550  tonnes
(from 3130 tonnes in 1995–96), and remained at just under 8000 tonnes in 1997–98.
This significant increase arose mainly because a major manufacturer changed its
policy, probably due to the increased differential between domestic and imported
prices, and because some of its competitors were importing. Was this change of
policy foreseen on 1 January 1995? The Commission’s view is that it was not,
largely because the extent of the increased differential between domestic and import
prices was not foreseen. And this wider price gap had not been foreseen because the
effect of the drought on producer numbers and pigmeat production levels had not
been foreseen.
Thus, even if it is accepted that it is necessary to establish that the developments
which led to increased imports were unforeseen in the GATT sense, the
Commission is of the view that they were unforeseen at the time the relevant
GATT 1994 obligation was incurred.
4.3.2 Have imports increased?
As noted by the Canadian Meat Council and Canadian Pork Council:
The Agreement on Safeguards does not define the relevant period over which an
investigation of this type should consider the effect on imports. (sub.  8, p. 5)
The Commission considers that an appropriate period in this case is 1995 to the
present. The tariff on pigmeat was bound at zero in January 1995 and the Industry
Commission (October 1995a) concluded that imports of pork, up to that time,
seemed to have had little impact on the domestic industry. This time period is in line
with that suggested by the Canadian Meat Council and Canadian Pork Council who
argue:
Where imports already have a presence in the market, and that presence has been found
to be non-injurious in earlier periods (as in this case), it is in our view reasonable to
accept the proposition that only a large increase in imports relative to domestic
production during a later period can form the basis for a safeguards investigation.
(sub. 8, p. 6)THE EFFECT OF
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Though the Commission accepts the suggested period for investigation, it does not
agree that the increase in imports necessarily must be large. The Agreement on
Safeguards requires only that “such product is being imported ¼ in such increased
quantities, absolute or relative to domestic production, ¼ as to cause or threaten to
cause serious injury ¼” (Article 2:1).
This section explores the extent to which imports of pigmeat under tariff sub-
heading 0203.29 have increased since 1995. The link between increased imports and
serious injury is discussed in section 4.5 below.
Between 1995–96 and 1996–97, annual imports of Canadian pork (within tariff sub-
heading  0203.29) increased by 173  per  cent (that is, almost tripled), from
3130 tonnes in 1995–96 to 8550 tonnes in 1996–97. In 1997–98, 7990 tonnes were
imported, about 6  per  cent below the level in the previous financial year (see
figure 4.1).
In July 1998, 806 tonnes were imported from Canada, slightly above the level in the
same month of the previous year (792 tonnes). In August, Canadian imports fell to
145 tonnes; in September the figure was 375 tonnes. At this stage, it is impossible to
say whether this recent fall reflects volatility in monthly figures, the impact of the
current inquiry, a fundamental shift in import trends, or some other factor. The
Commission observes, however, that import prices currently appear to be quite low
(the unit value of imports in September was under 350c/kg), suggesting little
diminution in competitive pressure.
Between 1990 and 1995, Canadian imports (12-month moving percentage share)
under tariff sub-heading 0203.29 fluctuated between 0.5 and 2 per cent of domestic
pigmeat production on a carcass weight equivalent basis. In 1996–97 this share
increased to 4.4 per cent of domestic production (see figure 4.2).
Almost all Canadian imports under the sub-heading are boned legs for processing.
Assuming that 100 per cent of Canadian imports are boned legs, imports accounted
for almost 22 per cent of domestic processed leg production in 1996–97. The share
has fallen to 19 per cent in 1997–98, but this is still more than double the estimated
share of around 8 per cent in 1995–96 (see figure 4.2).11
                                  
11 Higher estimates of these shares by the industry and others are due to the use of different
conversion factors and the inclusion of imports of pigmeat other than those falling within tariff
sub-heading 0203.29.32 PIG AND PIGMEAT
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Figure 4.1 Monthly imports of pork, tariff sub-heading 0203.29 and total
















































































































Other pigmeat imports Imports under 0203.29
Source: ABS (unpublished data).
Figure 4.2 Share of production of imports of frozen boned pork
a
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a Imports under tariff sub-heading 0203.29.
Source: ABS (unpublished data) and Commission estimates.THE EFFECT OF
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The Canadian Meat Council and Canadian Pork Council (sub. 43, pp. 20–1) argue
that the conversion factor used by the Industry Commission (IC 1995a) to compare
imported, boned legs with Australian legs overstated the share of imports. The
conversion factors used in this inquiry are discussed in  appendix D.  Although
different conversion factors will affect the magnitude of the share of imports of a
particular production aggregate, the choice of conversion factor should not affect
the movement of the share over time. In other words, whichever conversion factor is
used (provided it is used consistently), it can be shown that imports have increased
(indeed, more than doubled) relative to the domestic production of pigmeat, relative
to the domestic production of legs, and relative to domestic production of legs for
processing.
It also is argued by Canadian Pork Producers (sub.  43, p.  21) that the share of
imports of the domestic production of pork legs is irrelevant if the domestic industry
is defined to include all producers of all pigmeat. However, the Commission’s
assessment that imports have increased is not reliant on this particular measure. It
has been calculated because it is critical to understanding the impact of imports on
the demand for local pigmeat, pigmeat prices and domestic supply, as discussed in
section 4.5 below.
4.4 Evidence of serious injury
4.4.1 Defining serious injury
In the WTO Safeguards Agreement serious injury is defined as a significant overall
impairment in the position of the domestic industry while threat of serious injury is
serious injury that is clearly imminent.
The domestic industry means “the producers as a whole of the like or directly
competitive products” operating in Australia, “or those whose collective output of
the like or directly competitive products constitutes a major proportion of total
domestic production of those products” (Agreement on Safeguards, Article 4:1(c)).
There are no hard and fast rules for determining serious injury (see box 4.1).
Nonetheless, in determining whether increased imports have caused or are
threatening to cause serious injury to a domestic industry, the Commission:
… shall evaluate all relevant factors of an objective and quantifiable nature ¼ in
particular, the rate and amount of the increase in imports of the product concerned in
absolute and relative terms, the share of the domestic market taken by increased
imports, changes in the level of sales, production, productivity, capacity utilisation,34 PIG AND PIGMEAT
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profits and losses and employment. (Agreement on Safeguards, Article 4:2(a) and
Commonwealth of Australia Gazette, No. S 297, reprinted in appendix B)
We now address these criteria.
Box 4.1 What is serious injury?
There is no rigid formula for establishing serious injury, but ‘serious’ injury generally is
interpreted to imply a more stringent test than material injury as required by anti-dumping
or countervailing duty law (see, for example, Jackson  1997, p. 190).
A report by the Anti-Dumping Authority (ADA 1989) addressed the question of the extent
of injury required to meet the lesser material injury test. The ADA concluded that
“‘material’ should be considered in terms of its opposite”, that is, “not immaterial,
insubstantial or insignificant; greater than that likely to occur in the normal ebb and flow
of business”. The ADA also concluded that material injury would require diminution of an
industry’s profits while it was unlikely that injury would be considered material unless
imports comprised or threatened to comprise a significant share of the Australian market.
In the WTO Safeguards Agreement serious injury is defined as a significant overall
impairment in the position of a domestic industry while threat of serious injury is serious
injury that is clearly imminent.
4.4.2 Is the industry suffering serious injury?
Imports and market share
Import data are presented in detail in section 4.3.2. The data show that since late
1996, imports of frozen pork from Canada have increased both in absolute terms
(from a level of 3130 tonnes in 1995–96 to almost 8000 tonnes in 1997–98) and
relative both to production of legs for processing and total pigmeat production.
This increase was significant and rapid. Import volumes more than doubled in one
year. Imports currently account for around 4 per  cent of all pigmeat production.
Although this volume share is not high, as explained in section 4.5, the increase in
imports has been concentrated in a segment of the market that traditionally has
delivered a premium to local pig producers (reflecting a local consumer preference
for leg hams relative to that in major producing countries). In other words, in the
past, pork legs, while accounting for about one-third of carcass weight, have made a
relatively greater contribution to the total value of a baconer carcass (around half).12
                                  
12 For example, it is estimated that a price of 560c/kg for a boned leg translates to around 300c/kg
on a carcass weight equivalent basis (see appendix D). Assuming that 23 kg of a 70 kg baconer
carcass are legs, this yields around $69 per carcass. In 1995, the average carcass price was
205c/kg, or around $140 per 70 kg carcass. In its 1995 report, the Industry Commission estimated
that prices for boned legs ranged between 520c/kg to 600c/kg (IC 1995a, p.15).THE EFFECT OF
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Increased imports appear to have driven down, indeed eliminated, the price
premium associated with legs. Imports of Canadian pork legs for the past 12 months
represent between 16 and 19  per  cent of the production of legs for processing,
compared with between 6 and 8 per cent in 1995–96. (The lower estimates assume
that 80 per cent of imports are legs; the higher, that all Canadian imports are legs.)
The total pigmeat market share of imports (on a carcass equivalent basis) has
tracked the production share. It is estimated to have increased from 2 per cent in
1995–96 to 4.4 per cent in 1996–97, steadying to around 4 per cent in 1997–98.
Any imports of other cuts will have directly affected the demand for local
equivalents. There also is evidence (see Darling Downs Bacon (sub. 52, p. 2), and
Bunge Meat Industries (sub.  39, p.  23), for example)  that imports of legs have
affected the demand for other cuts — as legs have become cheaper they have been
substituted for other cuts in processing (for example, displacing shoulders in ham
production).
Sales volume
Official sales data are not available, but as stocks of pork or pork products in any
form can be stored for no more than about six months, total sales will be closely
related to production plus imports. Carcass sales closely track sales of domestic
pork products plus exports. Trends in production are discussed below.
Sale prices
Historically, pig prices followed a seasonal pattern, falling through the first half of
the year, then rising to peak in November and December as processors increased
demand in anticipation of the Christmas consumption of hams (see figure 4.4). In
1997, prices began their usual upward trend in June, reaching around 223c/kg in
September. However, from the end of September 1997, prices declined, with
average baconer contract prices falling to 156c/kg in June 1998. Prices have risen
since to around 187c/kg in September and just below 190c/kg in October, but these
prices are well below prices normally received at this time of year. Prices for
porkers as well as pig saleyard prices have followed a similar pattern over this
period (see figure 4.3).36 PIG AND PIGMEAT
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Figure 4.3 Pig contract and saleyard prices







































































































































Porker contract prices Baconer contract prices Pig saleyard prices
Source: ABARE (unpublished data) and QPPO (unpublished data).
Figure 4.4 Seasonal contract price patterns for baconers
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Pigmeat production rose steadily from 1990 until 1995–96. In that year, production
declined as a result of substantial rationalisation in the industry following the
drought which had occurred over 1994–95. By the end of 1997–98, production had
recovered to pre-drought levels (see figure 4.5).
Despite lower prices over 1998, production is unlikely to respond for several
months and, indeed, could increase if breeding stock is sold off. Producers appear to
be confused about future price movements and, even if decisions were taken to
reduce production when prices bottomed in June 1998, it will require one pig
breeding cycle before production cuts are visible. There is some evidence of
reductions in herd numbers (see subs 14, 16 and 29) but, on the other hand, some
growers have said that they have increased sow numbers in order to reduce fixed
costs per unit (see, for example, sub. 11). The latter strategy would appear to be
unsustainable unless it is supported by productivity improvements (or unless a
farm’s unit costs decline as output expands).























































































































Monthly pigmeat production (LHS) Moving total of previous 12 months production (RHS)
Source: ABS (Cat. No. 7215.0 and unpublished data).
The survey submitted by the PCA (sub. 55, covering 198 or 6 per cent of producers
and 36 per cent of production) showed that, of the 198 respondents, the majority
(58  per  cent) predict no change in production, while 23  per  cent expected some
expansion and 17 per cent, a contraction. Those expecting no change or contraction38 PIG AND PIGMEAT
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appeared to be mainly smaller pig growers. This response pattern is supported by
evidence received by the Commission. Submissions received from some pig growers
with up to 300 sows (see subs 21, 22, 33 and 41) suggest that repairs, maintenance
and expansion plans have been put on hold.
Productivity and capacity utilisation
There are no official data on labour and capital productivity or capacity utilisation
in the industry and evidence submitted to the Commission is mixed. Some
submissions suggest that lower demand for local pigmeat has created some unused
capacity which indicates lower output per unit of capital stock. For example,
Amitie, (which owns two piggeries with 3500 sows) stated that:
We are presently operating our business at less than potential capacity not only in an
effort to contain costs but because we are not confident that the situation will not be
repeated in 1999. (sub. 31, p. 4)
Pig producers Arthur Stacey, Greenwood Farming and Qld Pork (subs 14, 16 and 29
respectively), also claimed that they had reduced herd numbers.
On the other hand, the survey undertaken for the PCA appears to show an increase
in capacity utilisation. The submission claimed, however, that this is not indicative
of increased demand but rather:
Many producers have increased their output and sow numbers to distribute costs over a
greater number of sales thus endeavouring to maintain gross returns but on a smaller
margin. This has been made possible because many producers have left the industry.
(sub. 55, p. 30)
Labour productivity in pig farming may actually have risen because employee hours
appear to have been reduced (see below).
Profits and Losses
The return on assets and return on net worth provide broad measures of the
profitability of an industry. Historically, return variability has followed climatic
conditions. For example, low profitability during 1994–95 was attributable to high
grain prices caused by drought. High profitability in 1996–97 was largely the result
of low grain prices caused by bumper crops and high pig prices caused by low stock
levels in the aftermath of the drought.
It can be seen from figure 4.6 that ABS data show pig farming profitability, on
average, to be higher (and more volatile) than that for the average agricultural
activity. This reflects the highly-specialised nature of pig farming. In other words,THE EFFECT OF
IMPORTS
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once capital is invested in pig farming (sheds and land) it cannot be used to produce
anything else. If pig prices fall, pig farmers will take a large loss because they have
no alternative that would use the same land and sheds (see sub. 51, p. 28). Several
participants have indicated that banks have written down the value of their piggeries
(see, for example, sub.  12). Moreover, in the short term, production is virtually
fixed because of supply lags and the fact that pigs must be sold at certain weights.
Pigs cannot be put out to pasture to wait for price recovery. These factors suggest
that investment in pig production is relatively high risk.
Figure 4.6 Profitability measures for pig farming and all agriculture
Return on assets




































































Pig farming All agriculture
a Cash operating surplus/average total assets. b Cash operating surplus/average net worth.
Source: ABS (Cat. No. 7507.0).
While official data on profitability are unavailable for 1997–98, evidence for this
period was submitted by participants.
The PCA survey showed that, across the sample, profitability fell from a
7.6  per  cent return on capital employed in 1996–97 to a negative return of
3.5  per  cent in 1997–98 (sub.  55,  p.  21). Total profits of $15.2  million were
reported for the sample in 1996–97, with some producers recording losses totalling
$0.83 million. In 1997–98, reported profits fell to $2.24 million (down by
85 per cent) while reported losses increased to $9 million.40 PIG AND PIGMEAT
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The survey also reported an increase in indebtedness of pig producers, especially to
feed suppliers. Ridley Corporation, which supplies feed to a significant proportion
of the local pig industry, gave evidence that average debt per customer had
increased in Queensland and South Australia where production units tended to be
smaller (sub. 57, p. 4).
Industry data for 1996–97 estimate that the average cost of production (live weight)
was around 170c/kg (see appendix D, table D.16). This translates to about 224c/kg
for a dressed carcass. This figure includes depreciation and a return on capital,
which the PCA estimated add about 10c/kg and 30c/kg respectively (see sub. 55,
p. 22). These are average figures (for an ‘average’ quality) and some producers’
costs are lower (and some higher) but very few, if any, it seems would cover even
variable costs at a price of 160–170c/kg (dressed carcass).
The Department of Primary Industries Queensland (sub. 49, p. 5) provided data on
the financial performance of 15 pig herds in Queensland. They consider that this
group is representative of a larger group (comprising 35 herds) monitored by the
Department. The data show that over the June quarter 1998 each of the 15 farms
made a loss, though it is worth noting both the range of prices received — 150c/kg
to 208c/kg — and losses — 5c/kg to 79c/kg. The average price received was
170c/kg and the average loss 39c/kg, implying an average cost of about 210c/kg.
That losses have been widespread over 1998 is borne out by numerous submissions
from individual pig producers (both large and small) as well as primary processing
operators. Even pig producers who claim to be among the most efficient reported
substantial losses in the first half of 1998 (see sub. 61).
Abattoir and boning operations also claim to be experiencing reduced profitability
due to lower demand and prices for local pork legs and other parts of pigs
(especially shoulders) which are substitutable with legs in processing (see subs 39,
 46, 51 and 52).
Figure 4.6 shows that profitability in the pigmeat industry has been subject to wide
swings in the past while average prices appear to have fallen below average
production costs in the June quarter in several of the most recent years (see
figure 4.3). This raises the question whether low profitability over the second half of
1997–98 and in the first quarter of 1998–99 is within the ‘normal course of
business’.
Monthly prices for pigs over 1998 (for the 9 months to September 1998) have been
consistently lower than average monthly prices received for the years 1990 to 1996
(see figure 4.4). Recent price recovery (to around 185–190c/kg for baconers) will
mean that the most efficient producers are covering costs, though not the ‘average’THE EFFECT OF
IMPORTS
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pig producer. Moreover, while feed grain prices, at least over 1997–98, were much
lower than during the drought, they were somewhat higher than prices over the
period 1990–91 to mid-1994 (see appendix  D, figure  D.5). In other words, the
impact of low pig prices is not being cushioned by low input costs. Although pig
producers usually experience a period of poor prices (and profitability) in the first
half of the year, the Commission considers that the pattern, depth and duration of
the recent fall in price and profitability is not within ‘normal’ bounds.
Employment
The PCA estimated that there were 3340 producers and 2140 full-time, part-time
and casual employees in the industry in 1996–97. By June 1998, it is estimated that
200 producers (6 per cent) had left the industry while estimated staff numbers had
declined by 7 per cent (approximately 200 people) (sub. 55, p. 21).
Submissions received by the Commission indicated that many farms were operating
with the bare minimum of staff. These claimed that most casual labour had been laid
off in early 1998 and many permanent staff had been cut.
The submission from B & L Dahlheimer is representative of submissions received
from relatively small pig farmers:
During 1997, when prices for pork was fair to good, we employed one full time staff
and one casual. We have since retrenched our casual labour and had it not been for our
stud cattle enterprise, would have been forced to retrench our permanent. (sub. 22, p. 1)
Large producers, such as Amitie, also indicated they had made extensive lay-offs:
This company, which owns and operates two piggeries, had a combined herd of some
3500 sows, and was in expansion mode, until June 1997.
Since that time, and due to the impact of ever increasing imports from Canada ...
staffing levels have been reduced by fourteen people over the last twelve months. This
has been done with great reluctance. (sub. 31, p. 1)
Overall, 13 submissions were received from individual growers who said they had
reduced staff numbers.
The Commission received no evidence regarding employment in specialist pig
abattoirs and boning rooms.
4.4.3 The Commission’s assessment
Based on official data as well as the evidence submitted by participants, the
Commission is of the view that the domestic industry (defined as those whose42 PIG AND PIGMEAT
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collective output of the like or directly competitive products constitutes a major
proportion of total domestic production of these products) has suffered and is
suffering serious injury caused by pig prices lower than average production costs for
most of 1998. This has resulted in financial losses across the entire spectrum of pig
growers. Reduced demand for local boned legs and other cuts by smallgoods
manufacturers also appears to have affected profitability of specialist pig abattoir
and boning operations (see, for example, sub. 52).
While losses or, at least, lower profitability in the early months of the year, appear
to be part of the normal pig cycle, losses in 1998 appear to be far more pronounced
and prolonged than in previous years, causing a significant overall impairment in the
position of the domestic industry.
Lower profits have been driven by lower prices. The industry normally would
expect lower prices in the first six months of the year. However, the recent price fall
began during the traditional high demand period for legs (in October 1997) and
continued until mid-1998. Since July 1998, prices have risen, reaching just under
190c/kg for baconers in September and October. However, this price is around
25c/kg below the average September/October price received between 1990 and
1996, 20c/kg below the average September/October price received between 1990
and 1995 (thus excluding the 1996 peak) and 30c/kg below the price received at the
same time last year. The flatness of prices over September and October suggests that
there will be no ‘Christmas premium’ this year.
There is some evidence of reduced employment in piggeries and patchy evidence
regarding production levels. However, the Commission considers that, given the
nature of the industry, production effects inevitably will lag lower prices and
reduced profitability.
4.5 Attributing serious injury to imports
Safeguard measures may be imposed only if it can be demonstrated that increased
imports (in absolute terms or relative to production) have caused, or are threatening
to cause, serious injury to the domestic industry.
It is also a requirement of the WTO Safeguards Agreement that, if other factors have




4.5.1 How imports might affect the domestic industry
Before attempting to quantify the impact of increased imports on the domestic
industry, this section examines how imports in just one segment of the pigmeat
market might affect producer prices and output.
It has been suggested by some participants (see subs  34 and  43) that, because
imports are allowed to compete in only one market segment, and represent only a
comparatively small share of the total market for pigmeat in Australia, it is unlikely
that they are causing serious harm to domestic producers.
However, this appears not to be the case. Given the joint nature of supply of
pigmeat (that is, legs cannot be produced without shoulders, middles, loins etc.),
and the existence of different consumer markets for pigmeat (ham, bacon, fresh
pork) it is possible that the introduction of imports into a high-value consumer
market could affect pig prices significantly. For example, if hams are relatively
highly-valued by consumers, processors will be willing to pay more for a kilogram
of leg meat than other parts of the pig. As the price of a pig reflects a weighted
average of demands (and prices paid) for the various parts of the pig, if the price of
legs is driven down by the availability of imported legs, a comparatively large
portion of the value of a pig could be depressed, even though the volume of imports
relative to total pigmeat production is quite low.
In particular, with import competition, an increase in demand for hams, or other
processed products which use importable pigmeat, will not translate into an increase
in the domestic price of legs and pigs. If imported leg pork is highly substitutable
with local leg pork, seasonal premiums for hams, for example, could be eliminated
altogether. Imports thus effectively impose a price ceiling on the price of pork legs,
with the height of the ceiling determined by international prices rather than local
market conditions.
There is evidence that Australian consumers have a strong preference relative to
other countries (that is, value more highly) leg hams over other pigmeat products
including other processed pigmeat (for example, bacon) and fresh pork. This
preference appears to be especially strong over the Christmas season. The extent of
this preference is revealed by the relative prices for legs and other pork cuts in
Australia and overseas. In Australia, legs (and hams) have attracted a premium
relative to other cuts, while overseas, where consumers’ preference is biased
towards middles and loins, this pattern is reversed. While cheaper prices of
imported legs may to some extent reflect lower pig production costs in Canada, it is
unlikely that the entire price difference (which, in 1995, the Industry Commission
(1995a, p. 15) suggested was of the order of 15 to 30 per cent) can be attributed to44 PIG AND PIGMEAT
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relative production efficiency. In other words, Canada’s apparent comparative
advantage in pork legs may reflect a different consumption pattern as much as a
production advantage.
The degree to which imports actually affect pig prices will depend on the price of
the imports relative to the price that would prevail in the absence of imports (which
will be determined by a range of factors which are discussed below), the supply
response by pig producers to price changes, the strength of consumer demand for
other parts of the pig, and the substitutability of imported pork for the local product.
For example, if import prices are not much lower than domestic prices, the impact
of imports on pig prices will be slight. And, while import competition would be
expected to drive the local price towards the import price, comparable local pork
may continue to attract a premium reflecting differences in quality or other
characteristics (including availability).
Moreover, it is likely that a fall in leg prices due to imports of legs leads to a
reduction in pig supply, which in turn could lead to a rise in the prices of other
parts, tempering the overall fall in pig prices. To the extent that legs are directly
substitutable with other parts of the pig, however, the price of these other parts will
tend to fall along with leg prices.
Of course, the impact of imports on an industry is not just measured by lower
prices. Lower prices, eventually, will induce lower output. In the short run,
production of pigmeat is probably relatively inelastic, that is, it cannot be altered
very much. This is due to supply lags caused by breeding and growing cycles
(around 39 weeks), as well as the very short selling opportunity for pigs when they
mature (as short as one week before size penalties are incurred). This means that, in
the short term, prices could overshoot their long-run level, and impose large losses
on owners of the specific or ‘sunk’ capital in the industry — that is, pig farmers.
Over time, production will be cut back in response to lower prices and some
growers could be expected to leave the industry. As a result of this longer-term
adjustment, the price of pigs will rise, but the equilibrium price is likely to remain
lower than the price without imports.13
4.5.2 The role of other factors
There is a range of other factors that might affect pigmeat prices, including changes
in domestic supply, changes in costs (for example, grain prices), other meat prices
                                  
13 This assumes that the long-run industry supply curve is upward sloping, reflecting the presence
of a factor specific to the pig industry.THE EFFECT OF
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(which can affect consumer demand for pork), and changes in demand, including
export demand.
Likely effects of changes in these other factors include:
·  to the extent fresh pork and other fresh meat are substitutable in consumption, a
fall in other meat prices will tend to reduce demand for fresh pork, and thus
reduce pig prices;
·  an increase in the domestic supply of pigs due to cost reductions (for example,
due to lower feed prices or higher productivity) will tend to reduce pig prices
without affecting long-term profitability;
·  a fall in demand for pork (whether fresh or processed, unless it is for cuts that
are competing directly with imports) will tend to depress pig prices and supply;
·  any factor (other than imports) that depresses pig prices will tend to lead to a
reduction in imports;
·  any rise in pig prices due to a rise in feed or other costs of growing pigs will be
moderated by the availability of imports — more of the adjustment will occur
through a reduction in domestic supply than without imports; and
·  exports provide scope to increase pig prices provided export markets command a
higher price than the domestic market for equivalent pork cuts. Indeed, if
Australian producers were to increase exports of cuts other than legs, and
expanded production on this basis, the domestic supply of legs would increase
and crowd out leg imports.
4.5.3 Evidence of causation
Imports of frozen pork from Canada have been allowed since mid-1990. The
Industry Commission in 1995 (IC  1995a) concluded that imports had had little
effect on the domestic industry, though it observed that, if Canadian imports
remained consistently cheaper that local pork legs, imports could increase
substantially (p.  18). The Commission also noted that four major pork
manufacturers — Darling Downs Bacon, Chisholm Manufacturing (associated with
Woolworths), Don Smallgoods (a sister company of Bunge) and Watsonia — had
given assurances that they would not use imported pork (p. 16). Three of the four
also had large pig farming interests. In practice, these assurances had the potential to
act as a de facto restriction on imports, particularly if there was upward pressure on
domestic prices.14
                                  
14 Manufacturers may have benefited from lower import prices even though they did not import.
This would occur if their combined demand did not exceed domestic supply of boned legs, at the46 PIG AND PIGMEAT
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In 1994–95, drought pushed up grain prices by around 30 per cent, significantly
increasing pigmeat production costs. This increase in costs could not be fully passed
on to consumers because the drought also encouraged selling of cattle herds,
keeping retail beef prices flat (see figure D.4). This cost-price squeeze reduced the
number of pig producers — between December 1994 and June 1995, over 1000
(mainly small) producers left the industry (producer numbers fell from 4683 to
3615). Sow numbers fell by almost 10  per  cent over the same period.15
Rationalisation of this absolute magnitude was not unprecedented — the number of
pig producers had fallen from around 40  000 in 1970–71 to around 4500 by
1994–95 (see appendix D, table D.4). However, it was unprecedented in relative
terms — almost one quarter of producers left the industry in six months.
In 1996, with the drought over, feed costs were lower. With pigmeat output lower
due to the rationalisation in the preceding year, pigmeat prices rose substantially,
attaining very high prices (about 260c/kg for baconers (dressed carcass)) in the
second half of 1996 (see figure  4.3). Lower costs and high prices produced
significant profits for those left in the industry, enabling a reduction in debts
accrued during the drought.
It appears that in this situation of high domestic prices and an increased differential
between domestic and import prices of leg meat (in particular, in the lead up to the
traditionally high-demand Christmas period), one of Australia’s largest
manufacturers decided to change its policy and to import pigmeat from Canada.
This is supported by evidence from participants (see sub. 52, p. 19) as well as the
official data. As figure  4.1 shows, from July 1996, monthly imports of pigmeat
jump significantly. While domestic prices still reached record levels, the increase in
import supplies would have tempered the rise somewhat.
This shift appears to have changed the dynamics of the market for leg pork for
processing. The de facto import restriction imposed by the tacit agreement by
several processors not to use imported product, which had kept the domestic leg
price above the import price, disappeared and the market began to operate in the
same manner as any market subject to effective import competition. World prices of
legs now set the market price. Thus, in the second half of 1997, when demand for
legs expanded, the expected rise in local prices due to excess demand was curtailed
by the availability of imports. In the short term, with producers unable to reduce
domestic supply quickly, this led to excess local supply in both the processing and
                                                                                                                                       
import price. However, these companies account for a large part (40 per cent) of domestic ham and
smallgoods production and they may have forgone the benefit of cheaper imports in order to
sustain domestic pig prices, especially if also involved in pig farming.
15 The sale of sows over this period appears temporarily to have boosted pigmeat production.THE EFFECT OF
IMPORTS
47
fresh pork markets and a build-up of stocks by processors.16 When these stocks
eventually were sold in the early months of 1998, the usual seasonal softening of
prices was exacerbated.
Evidence from participants suggests that the price paid for locally-produced legs
(and other leg cuts) in September 1998 was about 5 per cent above the comparable
import price. (This comparable import price is based on the cif import price plus a
margin of around 8 to 10 per cent to allow for importers’ margins and the additional
cost incurred thawing imported frozen cuts.) The 5 per cent or so domestic premium
might reflect more timely delivery of local product or other ‘local’ advantages. But
it appears that the estimated price margin of between 15 to 30 per cent in 1995 has
all but disappeared (see trans., p. 77).
Thus, whereas local boned (full) legs are estimated to have sold at an average
520c/kg to 600c/kg in late 1995 (IC 1995a, p. 16), they now must compete with
imports which, converted to a comparable basis, currently cost manufacturers
around 400c/kg to 420c/kg. The Commission estimates that, all else constant, a fall
in the domestic price of boned legs from around 560c/kg to around 440c/kg would
roughly convert to a 20c/kg fall in the price of a baconer (dressed carcass).17 In
addition, to the extent legs are substitutable with other cuts, import prices will also
tend to drive down the price of these cuts and the price of pigs.
A fall in price is, of course, the immediate impact of import competition — over
time, domestic output will tend to fall, restoring pig prices to a sustainable, albeit
lower, long-run level. It is impossible to say by how much production might fall.
This will depend on the strength of demand for other parts of the pig by processors,
consumers of fresh pork and export demand, the long-run elasticity of pig supply
and the ability of the domestic industry to improve productivity.
So far, it seems, and not unexpectedly given supply lags, most of the reaction to
import competition (and thus most of the serious injury) has been in the form of
lower prices rather than reduced production. However, several participants have
                                  
16 Supply to the fresh market increased because growers diverted pigs away from the processing
sector.
17 In 1995 the Industry Commission (IC1995a) estimated that domestic legs price ranged between
520c/kg and 600c/kg. This calculation assumes an initial average price for domestic legs of
560c/kg, while evidence from participants suggests that the current price is about 5 per cent above
the import price. The estimated fall in the baconer price of 20c/kg assumes that one-third (23 kg)
of a 70  kg dressed carcass is legs. The conversion of boned legs to a carcass equivalent is
discussed in appendix D. It also is assumed that there are no market adjustments which affect the
pig price, such as supply adjustments or changes in prices of other parts of the pig (due to
substitution effects), or changes in demand for fresh pork.48 PIG AND PIGMEAT
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indicated they will cut back production and investment or will be forced to leave the
industry if current conditions persist.
The role of other factors
Broadly-speaking, other factors can be grouped into two categories — factors that
affect the demand for pork and factors that affect the domestic supply of pork. Some
other factors have also been suggested by participants. These also are considered.
Demand factors
Consumer tastes
The most recent official data show a reduction in pork consumption per head since
1994–95 (see appendix D, figure D.1). This figure is ‘apparent consumption’ which
is calculated as domestic production plus imports minus exports minus the change in
stocks (divided by population). Given that the ABS production figure appears to be
underestimated (see appendix  D, table  D.4), the apparent consumption figure
likewise will underestimate consumption. If consumption data are revised to correct
for the estimated under-reporting of production, consumption per head has remained
reasonably stable and suggests that total consumption of pigmeat has grown in line
with population growth.
Of course, the ex post consumption figure does not reveal whether consumer tastes
have changed such that a large fall in price was required to maintain consumption
levels. Retail prices for pork appear to have fallen in the June quarter 1998, but this
fall has lagged rather than led the fall in producer prices. There does not appear to
have been any recent event (such as a health scare or a large fall in the price of
substitute products in 1998) which would explain a collapse in the demand for pork
(at constant prices).
Other meat prices
Analysis by ABARE (1995) and the Commission’s consultants suggests that prices
of substitute meats (especially beef) have a strong influence on the domestic price of
pigs — consumers of fresh meats appear to be sensitive to changes in relative prices
of the various meats. Thus, it is feasible that lower beef, lamb or chicken prices may
have reduced demand for pork, especially fresh pork, driving down the price of
porkers. This, in turn, may have switched pig supply to the baconer market,
depressing baconer prices.THE EFFECT OF
IMPORTS
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ABS retail price data for pork and beef are presented in appendix D, figure D.4.18
Beef retail prices have been relatively stable since June 1996. There was a slight
softening in retail beef prices in the first half of 1997 but the data suggest that retail
beef prices firmed in early 1998. In June 1998, retail beef prices were estimated to
be higher than in late 1996. Retail lamb prices also have been reasonably steady
over this period. These data do not suggest that consumers have had a strong
incentive to switch to consumption of other meats in recent months.
Beef retail prices have tracked movements in beef saleyard prices, albeit with
substantially less volatility. Beef saleyard prices fell sharply in 1996, with some
recovery in late 1997 and early 1998. Beef saleyard prices are unlikely to affect pig
prices directly because pig and beef production are not highly substitutable. Falling
beef saleyard prices early in 1996 did lead to lower beef retail prices, but this fall
was accompanied by high pig producer and consumer prices.19 Recovery in beef
prices in 1998 (although beef saleyard prices remain at low levels) occurred at the
same time as pig prices fell significantly.
The Commission accepts that prices of other meats influence the demand and
therefore prices for fresh pork (and demand by meat processors for some pork cuts
substitutable with beef and other meats). However, the Commission does not
consider that the evidence sustains the argument that falls in the price of other meats
have been the major cause of the recent fall in pig and pigmeat prices.
Export demand
Exports as well as imports can transmit world prices to the domestic market. Thus it
is possible that lower domestic prices reflect lower world prices for pork received
by exporters. Lower prices would be transmitted via a reduction in exports (or lower
than anticipated exports), and increased supply to the domestic market.
Australian exports of farmed pork more than doubled over 1997–98 (see
appendix D, table D.9) and there is no evidence that export sales have been lower
than anticipated. Exports of pigmeat in May and June 1998 were at record levels
(1800 tonnes and 1600 tonnes respectively). Indeed, several participants (see, for
example, from Bunge Meat Industries (sub. 39) and Auspork (sub. 51)) have told
the Commission that they could export significantly more with additional processing
                                  
18 Fresh meat, in supermarkets in particular, often is discounted. The Commission understands that
such discounting is incorporated in ABS price data.
19 These price changes could be due to consumers suddenly preferring pork instead of beef,
possibly because of the ‘mad cow’ scare. Such a shift occurred in Europe but there is no evidence
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capacity.20 This suggests that producers have been responding to higher prices on
the export market compared with the domestic market. If exporters can find higher-
valued markets for parts of the pig (other than legs), exports of pork will limit the
price depressing effect of imports of pork legs on pig prices. Therefore it would
appear that higher exports of farmed pigmeat may have eased the decline in pig
prices rather than caused or exacerbated it.
Supply factors
Domestic production
A fall in domestic pig prices might be caused by domestic over-production rather
than increased import competition.
As discussed above, since the drought in 1994–95, domestic production has
gradually increased to pre-drought levels (see figure  4.5). Given fairly steady
consumer demand (see above) and increasing export opportunities, the re-building
of sow numbers and production levels and new investment in late 1996 and early
1997 does not appear, ex ante, to have been misplaced. Independent analysis
undertaken for this inquiry by the Institute for Research into International
Competitiveness (IRIC) suggests that there has not been domestic over-production
compared with the past 5 to 6 years. It might be argued that local producers should
have taken more heed of the potential impact of increased imports, especially given
the large increase in import volumes in late 1996. But given that producers appear to
respond principally to price signals, their investment and production decisions in
late 1996 and early 1997 probably were not unreasonable.
That said, however, the substantial fall in producer prices early in 1998 was
exacerbated by a supply overhang from the Christmas period. These were mainly
legs stored by processors for sale over the summer months, the demand for which
was lower than expected due to increased imports. These stocks could have been
sold at a lower price in 1997 but, it seems, their sale was delayed until 1998. While
at the time it was planned the expansion of domestic production may not have
seemed unreasonable, it is clear that when combined with the increased imports, it
contributed to the price fall.
Productivity
                                  
20 However, this begs the question why pigmeat was not diverted from the domestic to the export
market by those processors with export certification, particularly as domestic prices were low.THE EFFECT OF
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Recent poor profitability in the industry does not appear to have been caused by a
decline in productivity. Indeed, evidence suggests that long-term productivity in pig
production (in terms of pigs per sow) and processing has been steadily improving
(see chapter 7). It is possible that the recent slump in pig prices may have caused a
short-term decline in capital productivity in some farms due to under-utilisation of
capital, but it also appears that labour productivity has increased due to shedding of
paid staff.
Input costs
Feed is the major cost of pig production, accounting for around 60  per  cent of
variable costs. As shown in appendix D, figure D.5, the slump in pig prices and
profitability has corresponded with a period of moderate, though not historically
low, feed costs. Thus while the ratio of grain prices to pig producer income is at a
high level, the decline in profitability is due to low income, not abnormally high
grain prices.
Nor does it appear that other costs are the cause of low profitability over 1998. For
example, interest rates in Australia have been at historically low levels, wages
growth has been modest and producer costs in general, as measured by the GDP
deflator, grew by less than 2 per cent over 1997–98.
Other factors
Exchange rates
The Canadian Meat Council and Canadian Pork Council (sub. 43) have suggested
that appreciation of the Australian dollar against the Canadian dollar may explain
the increase in imports in late 1996. As shown in figure 4.7, the Australian dollar
appreciated by around 15 per cent against the Canadian dollar between 1993 and
1994. Between December 1994 and December 1995 there was a slight depreciation.
Between January 1996 and December 1996 the Australian dollar appreciated by
about 7 per cent reaching a high of about A$1 = Can$1.09 in December 1996. Since
then, there has been a substantial depreciation, at least up until October 1998.
While there was some appreciation of the Australian dollar over 1996, this was not
large enough to explain the rise in imports in the second half of 1996. Moreover,
imports did not fall along with currency depreciation over the course of 1997.
It is also suggested that changes in cross-rates with the US dollar might explain
Canadian export patterns. While it may be the case that the attractiveness of export
destinations for the Canadian Meat Council and Canadian Pork Council will be52 PIG AND PIGMEAT
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affected by relative exchange rate movements, and thus is relevant in predicting
trade flows, the fact that a sudden increase in exports to Australia is caused by a
more attractive Can$/A$ rate compared with the Can$/US$ rate is immaterial to the
question whether those imports have seriously injured the Australian industry.

































































































































Source: Reserve Bank Bulletin (various).
Market power of user industries
A view expressed in appendix  2 to the Department of Primary Industries
Queensland submission (sub.  49) as well as by the Canadian Meat Council and
Canadian Pork Council (sub. 43) is that lower producer prices for pigs are the result
of market buying power of downstream processors and retailers. An apparent
stickiness (downwards) in retail prices is cited as evidence of market power.
There are several reasons why retail prices might be less volatile than producer
prices. For example, retailers tend to smooth short-run price fluctuations in order to
contain the transaction costs associated with changing prices, incurred both by
sellers and buyers. Thus retail prices tend to move in line with producer prices but
with a lag and with far less volatility. The most recent data (for the June quarter
1998 — see appendix D, figure D.4) show a decline in pork retail prices.
The issue discussed here is whether buying power of downstream processors, rather
than imports, might be the cause of lower producer prices for pigs.THE EFFECT OF
IMPORTS
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If the domestic market were of the simplest textbook form of perfect competition,
import prices would have set the domestic leg prices from mid-1990, that is, when
restrictions were lifted. However, it takes time for importers to develop relationships
with overseas suppliers, to ensure quality and delivery etc. Moreover, it seems that
vertical integration in the industry and the fact that there are relatively few large
ham and smallgoods manufacturers actually delayed the full impact of imports. This
was because vertically-integrated operations (with pig farms) had an interest in
sourcing domestic supplies. Even those operators who did not have pig farming
interests apparently were keen to be seen supporting the Australian industry.
However, in late 1996, when domestic prices rose, some downstream manufacturers
not importing found it increasingly difficult to compete with processors who were
using cheaper imported pork. It was at this point that, more than six years after the
market had been opened, imports began to drive the domestic price of legs in a way
that standard competitive trade theory predicts. The fact that some processors-cum-
retailers may have had ‘market power’ in fact supported the domestic price between
1990 and 1996. Far from depressing the domestic market it appears that they
sustained it, that is, until competitive pressures and the differential between
domestic and imported leg prices made their position untenable.
It has been suggested that the availability of imports has given manufacturers and
retailers market power because they can force domestic producers to reduce their
price to the import price. As noted, this would happen anyway (and, moreover,
immediately) in a perfectly competitive market. Indeed, if downstream
manufacturers had exerted monopsony power over pig producers before import
restrictions were lifted, the availability of imports at a given price, would effectively
remove this monopsony power.21 If processors cannot affect the world price of
pigmeat it makes no sense for them to attempt to reduce that price by restricting
their purchases.
In addition, whatever power retailers might have in consumer markets, this is
irrelevant to the quantity of local legs purchased. This amount will be determined by
the competitiveness of local legs vis-à-vis imports.
Quantitative evidence of the impact of imports
Two consultants were commissioned to analyse the effect of imports on the
domestic industry, namely the Institute for Research into International
                                  
21 That is, assuming Australia is a price taker. As Australian imports of pigmeat account for
around 0.5 per cent of world exports, and about 2 per cent of Canadian exports, this assumption
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Competitiveness (IRIC) (at Curtin University of Technology) and Dr Garry Griffith
(NSW Agriculture, Armidale). Both consultants used time series modelling
techniques. In addition, the Department of Primary Industries Queensland
(subs  49,  56, and  63), Darling Downs Bacon (sub.  52) and Ingoldsby Piggery
(sub.  3) presented econometric analyses of the impact of imports. The analysis
conducted for Department of Primary Industries Queensland was cited by the PCA
(sub. 55) and Primary Industries and Resources (SA) (sub. 58) as evidence of the
effect of increased imports on producer prices.
The Commission also appointed an independent referee, Dr Brett Inder, a Senior
Lecturer in Econometrics at Monash University, to assess both of the studies
undertaken for the Commission as well as studies conducted for the Department of
Primary Industries Queensland by Mr Tim Purcell and Associate Professor Steve
Harrison (sub. 49) and Mr Tim Purcell and Mr Rodney Beard (sub. 63).
Extracts from the studies undertaken for the Commission, and Dr Inder’s report, are
reprinted in appendix G. Full copies of these reports are available on request or on
the Commission’s website (http://www.pc.gov.au).
Overall, the econometric analysis failed to produce clear-cut results, in some cases,
it would appear, due to the use of inappropriate methodologies, but also because
most of the events of importance (that is, increased imports and lower prices)
occurred at the end of the data series. It seems there were insufficient observations,
at the end of the series in particular, to produce robust statistical conclusions.
Dr Garry Griffith analysed the impact of pigmeat imports on the NSW pig industry,
essentially updating evidence prepared for the 1995 Industry Commission report
(IC 1995a). Dr Griffith used Granger and Sims (pairwise) causality models as well
as a more general Vector Autoregressive (VAR) model designed to capture the
effects of several key factors. Analysis of the period 1990 to 1998 suggested no
consistent causal effect of imports on farm, wholesale or retail pigmeat prices in
NSW, though some results suggested that imports had a causal effect on wholesale
prices. Different results emerged when a shorter period — 1993 to 1998 — was
examined. VAR analysis found a significant effect of imports on retail prices though
no significant effect on farm prices, while effects on wholesale prices and
production were mixed. Dr Griffith surmised that “other prices may have been
influenced by imports in recent months, but the data are not available in sufficient
quantities to allow that to be shown in the statistical analyses”.
The IRIC also used VAR techniques but with a different model of the industry and a
different data set (Australia-wide for the period 1984 to 1998). Their results
indicated no casual relationship between imports and prices for pigmeat. However,THE EFFECT OF
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the consultants noted that data limitations may have affected the theoretical
specification of their model, a point also noted by the referee. They also observed
that “most of the action in the data is at the end of the sample. This places severe
restrictions on the econometric models ability to make sensible statements about the
effects of the changes occurring in the market … it is our view that, at this stage the
econometrics must remain somewhat agnostic about the events at the end of the
sample”.
Various studies conducted for the Department of Primary Industries Queensland and
Darling Downs Bacon by Tim Purcell, Steve Harrison and Rodney Beard
consistently found that imports of pigmeat had affected pig saleyard prices
significantly. For example, the study forming appendix 2 to sub. 49, found that an
additional 1000 tonnes of imported pigmeat would push down producer prices by
just under 11c/kg (plus or minus 5c/kg). A re-working of this analysis (sub. 56) in
response to a submission from the Canadian Government (sub. 34, attachment 1)
found a slightly higher effect on producer prices, as well as some counter-intuitive
effects on other variables. For example, the model found that an additional kilogram
of imported pigmeat would increase domestic production, while an increase in
import prices would reduce domestic production. A subsequent study using Kalman
filter techniques (sub. 63) seems to attribute the fall in producer prices from October
1997 to a sudden fall in exports (even though official data suggest that exports of
pigmeat continued to grow to record levels in 1998).
Given the conclusions of the Commission’s two consultants, and fundamental
concerns about the methodologies employed in the various studies conducted for the
Department of Primary Industries Queensland and Darling Downs Bacon (see
appendix G), the Commission has relied more on its understanding of the industry
and economic analysis to assess the probable effect of imports. Nonetheless, the
conclusions drawn are not inconsistent with the econometric analysis. As the
independent referee appointed by the Commission to assess the econometric studies
observed, imports “… do show up as significant a number of times — too often for
this result to be entirely spurious”.
4.5.4 Are increased imports threatening to cause serious injury?
Import levels in 1998 are below the levels for the same months in 1997.
Nonetheless, they remain at substantially higher levels than in 1995–96 and it seems
clear that import prices now constrain the price of domestic legs for processing as
well as the price of substitute cuts. This suggests that, while import prices and
domestic consumption of pigmeat remain near current levels, the domestic supply of
pigmeat to the domestic market will need to be reduced (whether through56 PIG AND PIGMEAT
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production cuts or increased exports), and/or costs reduced substantially, in order to
restore profitability. This adjustment will require extensive rationalisation of the
industry, probably including a reduction in grower numbers. ‘Serious injury’ is
being experienced and is likely to continue for a large section of the industry during
the adjustment process.
4.6 Have the WTO criteria been met?
The Commission considers that increased imports from Canada since mid-1996
have caused serious injury to the industry as defined above. Moreover, the
Commission considers that increased imports were the primary cause of low pig
prices and negative rates of return (lower than could have been expected given
rebuilding of domestic production over 1997–98) in 1998 which, in turn, caused a
significant overall impairment in the position of the domestic industry. There does
not appear to be any other factor capable of explaining the large fall in demand for
local pigmeat and consequent prolonged and pronounced fall in pigmeat prices




Part 2(b) of the Terms of Reference for this inquiry is addressed in this chapter.
Having found that increased imports have caused serious injury to the domestic
industry, the Commission is required to consider what measures would be necessary
to prevent or remedy serious injury and to facilitate adjustment.
5.1 WTO and Australian Government requirements
5.1.1 WTO requirements
Under the World Trade Organization (WTO) Agreement on Safeguards, a
safeguards measure can be applied only to the extent necessary to prevent or remedy
serious injury and to facilitate adjustment. Although the Agreement does not specify
the particular measures that may be used, Article XIX:1 of GATT 1994 states that a
Member is free “ … to suspend the obligation in whole or in part or to withdraw or
modify the concession” where the concession or obligation referred to is that which
has resulted in increased imports, which have caused or threatened serious injury.
However, while Members may reimpose measures which had been in effect prior to
incurring the obligation, safeguard measures are not limited to such action. In other
words, Members can, and have, imposed a variety of tariff and quantitative
measures under Article XIX (see WTO 1995, pp. 522–3). The WTO Agreement on
Safeguards proscribes some measures (voluntary export restraints and other orderly
marketing arrangements, for example) and constrains to some degree the application
of quantitative measures (normally, a quantitative restriction should not be below
the level of imports in the last three representative years). It also states that
“Members should choose measures most suitable for the achievement of these
objectives [that is, preventing or remedying serious injury and facilitating
adjustment]”.
The Agreement also specifies that:
·  safeguard measures must be applied to a product irrespective of its source,
though some exceptions are allowed (Articles 2:2, 5:2(b), and 9);58 PIG AND PIGMEAT
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·  safeguard measures may be applied only to the extent and for such a period of
time as may be necessary to prevent or remedy serious injury and to facilitate
adjustment (Articles  5:1 and  7:1). The period should not exceed four years,
though measures may be extended for up to eight years if it can be shown that
continuation of the measures is required to prevent serious injury and provided
there is evidence the industry is adjusting (Article 7:1 and 2);
·  in order to facilitate adjustment where the expected duration of a safeguard
measure exceeds one year, the measure shall be progressively liberalised at
regular intervals during the period of application (Article 7:4); and
·  if duration of the measure exceeds three years, the Member is required to review
the situation by the mid-term of the measure and, if appropriate, withdraw it or
increase the pace of liberalisation (Article 7:4).
5.1.2 The Terms of Reference
The Terms of Reference for this inquiry require the Commission (a) to report on
whether the circumstances are such that safeguard measures would be justified
under the WTO Agreement and (b) “if so, what measures would be necessary to
prevent or remedy serious injury and to facilitate adjustment”.
The Australian Government (in the general procedures for safeguards inquiries
gazetted on 25 June 1998 — see appendix  B) has limited possible safeguard
measures to a quota, a tariff quota or an increased level of tariff. In addition, under
the terms of the ANZCERTA, safeguard measures cannot be imposed against
imports from New Zealand.
5.2 Safeguard measures which remedy or prevent
serious injury and facilitate adjustment
5.2.1 The industry’s proposal
As outlined in chapter 3, the peak industry body, the Pork Council of Australia
(PCA), requests that a quota of 4000 tonnes (and no more than 5000 tonnes) be
imposed for four years. Imports outside quota would attract a specific rate of duty of
200c/kg. Most submissions received from individual growers and processors
proposed similar safeguard measures, although the suggested quota volume varied
somewhat, ranging from 3000 to 6000 tonnes per year. The Western Australian
Ministry of the Premier and Cabinet (sub. 65) endorsed a non-transferable monthlySAFEGUARD
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quota limit, a requirement that only whole, boned carcasses be imported and not
selected cuts, and tariffs set bilaterally to match other countries’ tariffs on
Australian pork exports.
The PCA has not given the Commission a clear idea of how it envisages the
industry must adjust in order to be in a better position to compete with imports in a
few years’ time. Nor has it spelled out how it envisages safeguard measures will
facilitate that process, except to state that such measures would “allow for the
industry to become more competitive and export oriented, which is where we
believe the longer term future lies” (sub. 55, p. 33 and trans., pp. 159–62).
The Commission does not support the safeguard measures proposed by the PCA.
·  A quota of 4000 tonnes per annum (supported by a tariff of 200c/kg for out-of-
quota imports) in effect would almost halve the current volume of imports (under
tariff sub-heading  0203.29), setting a limit close to the level of imports in
1995–96. This level of restriction does not take into account the adjustments to
imports which have already taken place in the industry, especially the
development of export markets and structural changes which have reduced costs.
WTO safeguard measures are not intended to be used to compensate for
adjustments already undertaken by the domestic industry.
·  In the world pigmeat market, as in many agricultural activities, large supply and
demand shifts and price volatility are part of the normal course of business. The
Australia pigmeat industry will need to become attuned to changes in world
prices if it is to become internationally competitive, which is the stated objective
of industry participants. Tariffs and quotas have different effects on protection
levels as market conditions change. For example, if domestic demand increases
over time, a binding quota (on the volume of imports) will provide higher
protection because the domestic price will rise with the higher demand. On the
other hand, if an ad valorem tariff were applied, the rate of protection afforded
the local industry would remain unchanged and additional demand could be met
from additional imports. In other words, with a fixed import quota, any change
in the market which increases domestic demand will lead to a higher rate of
protection for the local industry. In effect, at the margin, the good becomes non-
tradeable. While it would be possible to allow for quota expansion over time in
line with market expansion, this would be practically infeasible, while a tariff
allows some of this demand to spill over to imports automatically.
·  The PCA has given no indication how a quota should be allocated. Should
quotas be auctioned or allocated to processors based on their importing history?
How quotas are allocated is critical in determining who appropriates the windfall
gains which quotas deliver (that is, the margin between the import price and the60 PIG AND PIGMEAT
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domestic selling price). In addition, as Australia does not have quota
arrangements in place for any other products, the task of establishing and
allocating a quota could be time-consuming. Auspork suggests the quotas should
be allocated to exporters, but this would give the benefit of higher prices to
foreign exporters by allowing them to charge a higher price for their exports to
Australia than to other markets (see trans., p. 182).
·  The PCA has not proposed any liberalisation of the quota over time and yet
progressive liberalisation of measures at regular intervals is a requirement of the
WTO Safeguards Agreement (where safeguard measures are in place for more
than 12 months).
5.2.2 Nature of serious injury and industry adjustment
An appreciation of the nature of the serious injury and the adjustments required if
the industry is to be better placed to compete with imports is critical to determining
appropriate safeguard measures.
The nature of serious injury
As discussed in chapter 4, low domestic prices and profitability over 1998 as a
result of increased imports have been the principal manifestation of serious injury to
the industry. While prices and profitability could have been expected to be lower
over 1997–98 compared with 1996–97 due to rebuilding of production levels after
the drought, the size and duration of the fall in prices cannot be explained by
increased production.
In 1995, Canadian pork legs were estimated to be 15 per cent to 30 per cent cheaper
than equivalent Australian legs but, also at that time, the quantity of Canadian
imports effectively was restricted by the decision by some major local processors
only to buy local pigmeat. Over 1996, the price difference between imports and
local pigmeat increased, leading to more than a doubling of imports of boned legs in
the 1996–97 financial year. This increase in imports would have moderated price
rises but did not cause serious injury over 1996–97 because of an apparent domestic
supply shortage (following the drought which had led to around 25  per  cent of
producers leaving the industry). But as domestic production came back on stream to
‘normal’ levels over the course of 1997 (see chapter  4, figure  4.5), reflecting
increased investment by remaining pig producers, the price-depressing effect of
increased import levels was exposed. There has been some easing of import
quantities over 1998 but imports remain at least double their level in 1995–96 and
there is no indication that import levels will return to their pre-1996 level. Indeed,SAFEGUARD
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evidence from participants suggests that prices for Canadian legs have fallen,
despite recent depreciation of the Australian dollar relative to the Canadian dollar.
Official data show that the unit value of Canadian imports under tariff sub-heading
0203.29 fell from 355c/kg in August 1998 to 333c/kg in September.
The nature of the adjustment
The Australian pigmeat industry comprises over 3000 pig producers and more than
270 processors. From evidence submitted, it is clear that performance is not uniform
across the industry and that the extent of serious injury largely has been a function
of relative efficiency.
If imports continue at or close to present levels, the domestic industry will continue
to feel the pressure of increased import competition though the nature of the effect
is likely to change. In the absence of a significant fall in world prices, domestic
prices are unlikely to return for any lengthy period to the low levels reached in early
1998 for two main reasons:
·  local and export demand for fresh pork and other parts of the pig (for processing)
which cannot be imported (and which are not directly substitutable with pork
legs) will place a floor under the price of pigs; and
·  such lower prices will induce a reduction in domestic supply.
Thus, some part of the local pigmeat industry will survive import competition but
how large that industry is and what form it will take will depend on the industry’s
ability both to develop new markets and to reduce its overall cost structure.
The inevitability of further rationalisation in pig production was recognised in
several submissions. For example, Socom Piggery observed that:
… the whole Australian pig industry has to restructure very rapidly and that many of the
current players will not be able, for different reasons, to be part of the new arrangements
… Those who have large, functional and well located facilities who are prepared to
accept change and lock into contract growing arrangements with large breeding
organisations, survival is likely. Those who do not have this type of facility and/or
attitude will be forced to leave the industry. (sub. 61, p. 2)
Windridge Pig Farm (sub. 48) saw the industry responding in a similar way, with
some producers leaving the industry, though it considered that safeguard measures
were a pre-requisite for orderly adjustment. Bunge Meat Industries (sub.  39),
B.E. Campbell (NSW) (sub. 46) and Auspork (sub. 51) stressed the need to expand
export capacity.62 PIG AND PIGMEAT
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At first blush it might appear unusual to have an agricultural industry that is
simultaneously import-competing and exporting. But, to a large extent, exports and
imports comprise different parts of the pig — Australia has a high demand for legs
relative to other cuts as compared with many other countries.
In view of the submissions, hearings and visits, the Commission considers that there
is fairly broad recognition in the industry that adjustments are required and,
moreover, that these adjustments will require some producers to leave the industry.
In addition to a reduction in the number of growers and a consolidation of herds,
adjustments are likely to include greater integration of pig farming and processing
activities, improved efficiency, quality improvements and the development of
domestic and export markets and export capacity.
The critical question is whether safeguard measures will promote or impede these
adjustments. A majority of participants claimed that safeguard measures were
required to:
·  restore confidence and certainty to the industry so that investment plans
(especially plans to expand export capability) could proceed;
·  ensure that efficient producers were not forced to leave the industry; and
·  allow those who did leave to receive better prices for their sows and capital — to
‘leave with dignity’.
Another view is that import restrictions, by raising domestic prices, could slow the
adjustment process by encouraging some marginal producers to remain in the
industry and, arguably more importantly, by discouraging exports. If domestic
prices rise as the result of import restrictions, the opportunity cost of exports will
rise and thus reduce the incentive to export. This possibility has been raised by
Socom Piggery:
I do not want to see tariffs and/or quotas used at this or any other time. They will simply
make the exportation of pork more difficult and I am sure I do not need to lecture the
commissioner on this matter. With Australia on the threshold of developing its own
export sector it will long regret any tariff action …
If you were to impose tariffs I believe you would slow the rate of change to such a pace
that we might fall so far behind the Canadians and Americans that we will never recover.
(sub. 61, pp. 3–4)
5.2.3 The Commission’s assessment
The Commission does not consider that safeguard measures which reduced the level
of imports to that which prevailed before the increase in imports would beSAFEGUARD
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appropriate. As noted above, this would fail to take into account market growth
(including exports) over the past two years and, most importantly, the adjustment
already undertaken by many domestic producers, in particular the recent
development of export markets, in response to pressure from imports.
In addition, the Commission considers that quantitative restrictions would be
inappropriate for this industry because of the necessity to keep in touch with the
world market, on which prices are continually changing. The importance of keeping
attuned to market signals was stressed by the Department of Primary Industries
Queensland:
The provision of such [safeguard] measures should recognise the need for market
signals to continue to flow to the industry … (sub. 49, p. 11)
In addition, the allocation of the quotas would be a difficult administrative exercise
and could introduce distortions within the processing industry. On the other hand,
an ad valorem tariff is simple to administer, affects all industry participants in the
same way, transmits changes in import prices and its protective effect is transparent.
Compared with a specific tariff, it provides a constant degree of protection in the
presence of changing import prices.
While preferring a tariff over a quota, and an ad valorem tariff over a specific tariff,
the Commission nevertheless has strong reservations about the ability of a tariff to
remedy serious injury and facilitate adjustment in the Australian pigmeat industry
because:
·  temporary import restrictions cannot protect high cost producers except in the
very short run, and thus may not provide much assistance to those who have
suffered most injury and who, sooner or later, will be forced to leave the
industry; and
·  on the other hand, those who remain in the industry will need to become
internationally competitive as quickly as possible in order to be able to develop
export markets. But import restrictions generally are not conducive to export
development because they promote a home-market bias by raising prices on the
domestic market.
In other words, while safeguard measures might provide a breathing space it is not
clear that this time necessarily would be used to foster the change that is required.
For some it may simply delay exit, while for those who intend to stay in the
industry, it would be essential that they view any restriction on imports as
temporary.64 PIG AND PIGMEAT
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The Commission thus considers that if a tariff is imposed, the level and duration
must be such as to achieve a delicate balance between remedying serious injury
caused by increased imports and facilitating adjustment. In the Commission’s view,
this would suggest a rate of tariff of 10 per cent, phasing to 5 per cent after one
year, and to zero in two years’ time. Based on participants’ evidence, the
Commission estimates that a 10 per cent tariff applied on the fob value of imports
would raise the price (in store) of an imported full leg by around 35 to 40c/kg and
the price of a baconer carcass by 5 to 10 c/kg or about 4 per cent at current prices.
In considering what level of safeguard measure would remedy serious injury, the
Commission has been mindful of somewhat lower import volumes over 1998 as
well as adjustments already under way in the local industry which have improved or
will improve its competitiveness. It also has been careful not to specify a tariff level
that would compensate the industry for the price-reducing effect of increased
domestic production over 1997–98. In other words, the Commission has discounted
the effects of increased production on prices from its assessment of serious injury
caused by imports.
Importantly, a 10 per cent tariff, phased out over two years, would moderate but not
block international competitive pressure which is essential if the industry is to
continue to adjust. A 10 per cent tariff, phasing to 5 per cent after one year and zero
after 2 years, would provide short-term price relief to relatively efficient producers
but would not provide a fortress for relatively high-cost producers.
Although the Commission considers that a tariff of this magnitude can be justified
under the WTO safeguard criteria, it also notes that:
·  a package of measures designed to enhance export capacity and to assist
producers who wish to leave the industry is in place already. Such schemes may
facilitate expansion of export capacity and promote export market development
and target assistance to those forced to leave the industry more effectively than
safeguard action. The Commission is not in a position to address, in this inquiry,
the general question of the adequacy of direct assistance to those who leave
industries or occupations. As to the adequacy of measures already in place to
assist the pigmeat industry, little evidence was submitted to the Commission on
this issue, though several participants complained that schemes designed to
promote export capacity did not support pig farmers. However, the benefits of
schemes designed to generate additional markets for pigmeat will accrue in the
medium to long term. The Commission also notes that the PCA in its submission
to the Rural Adjustment Scheme Advisory Council (RASAC) in May 1998,
recommended changes to the Farm Family Restart Scheme (FFRS) (whichSAFEGUARD
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provides income support for farmers experiencing financial hardship) to make
the scheme more accessible to pig producers; and
·  it may be feasible for local ham and smallgoods manufacturers to switch to
importing chilled, boned pork cuts from Canada or Denmark. (These cuts, which
fall under tariff sub-heading 0203.19, are outside the Commission’s Terms of
Reference.) Such imports from Canada have been permitted since May 1996 and
from Denmark since October 1997. While volumes to date have been relatively
small (about 150 tonnes from Canada in total), presumably reflecting the higher
costs of transporting chilled pork compared with frozen pork, the additional costs
of importing chilled pork product may set a limit to the practical effect of any
safeguard action on frozen pigmeat falling within tariff sub-heading 0203.29.1
                                  
1 The Commission has been advised that temperature control must be more precise for chilled





The reference for this inquiry is made under Parts 2 and 3 of the Productivity
Commission Act 1998 (PC Act). As outlined in chapter 2, Part 2 of the Act requires
the Commission, when carrying out its functions, to have regard to several general
policy guidelines (see box  2.3). This chapter considers the effects of safeguard
measures against the relevant criteria.
In addition, the World Trade Organization (WTO) Agreement on Safeguards
requires that the evidence and views of interested parties, including importers and
exporters, be admitted to the inquiry, including “ ¼ their views, inter alia, as to
whether or not the application of a safeguard measure would be in the public
interest”. These comments are incorporated in the relevant sections below, in
particular, in section 6.9.
6.1 Safeguard measures and overall economic performance
Trade liberalisation generally increases national income. National income is
increased because capital and labour can move out of protected import-competing
industries into other uses and because competition from imports encourages more
efficient local production and management processes. There may be additional gains
if imports reduce market power of domestic firms or if wasteful rent-seeking
activities (to maintain protection) are discouraged. Adjustment costs must be offset
against the gains from trade, but adjustment costs are likely to be transitory, while
the gains from trade are permanent.
Import restrictions, by reducing trade and import competition, generally will reduce
the potential resource allocation and dynamic gains from trade.
Application of safeguard measures on imports of frozen pork will reduce real
national income on two margins — by raising consumer prices and reducing
consumption, and by encouraging use of higher-cost local pigmeat in the production
of ham and smallgoods.1 While it is possible in principle that these ‘static’
                                  
1 It is highly unlikely that Australian demand affects the world price for pigmeat (Australia’s
imports of pigmeat represent about 0.5 per cent of world trade). Thus, decreasing imports is
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efficiency effects could be offset by other static efficiency considerations, the
Commission has seen no evidence of these. That plant and equipment may be used
that otherwise may be idle is a gain to the owners of these assets but this is an
income distribution, rather than an efficiency, matter.
Because the pig and pigmeat industries are very small in relation to the Australian
economy (less than 0.1  per  cent of GDP in 1996–97), the net loss of national
income due to the static effect of import restrictions on resource allocation would be
barely perceptible in aggregate figures. However, as discussed in section  6.4,
income transfers between producers and downstream users and consumers could be
much larger.
The impact of safeguard measures on productivity within the industry is unclear.
Increased import competition has highlighted the need for accelerated productivity
change in the industry if it is to be internationally competitive. If this pressure is
eased, it is possible that reform efforts likewise will be relaxed. On the other hand,
if safeguard measures do not block world price signals, and provided the industry
accepts that it will be fully exposed to international competition in a few years’
time, efforts to reduce costs and improve quality are likely to continue. For these
reasons, the Commission has argued in favour of limited ad valorem tariffs over a
quota or a specific rate of duty if a safeguard measure is to be imposed (see
chapter 5).
6.2 Safeguard measures and internationally competitive industries
Import restrictions, in general, are antithetic to the development of efficient,
enterprising, innovative and internationally competitive industries. Safeguard
measures, because they are temporary and must be progressively liberalised to
facilitate adjustment, are less likely to foster inefficiency and a home-market bias.
Nevertheless, by increasing the prices received on the domestic market, even for a
short time, safeguard measures could discourage, or at least slow, necessary
rationalisation and undermine export competitiveness by increasing the
attractiveness of domestic sales vis-à-vis exports.
An alternative view put by many in the industry (see, for example, subs 24 and 51)
is that, by giving producers a breathing space (and higher producer prices),
safeguard measures will allow the industry to rationalise, to implement reforms and
to undertake the investment necessary for improving long-term competitiveness.
As discussed in chapter 5, it is the Commission’s view that, if the industry is to
become internationally competitive, it must continue to be exposed to world price
signals. If measures are imposed which block these signals, it is conceivable that theADDITIONAL
CONSIDERATIONS
69
industry will experience another crisis in three or four years’ time when any
safeguard measures inevitably are removed.
In addition, as discussed below, the competitiveness of the ham and smallgoods
manufacturing sector is likely to be harmed by measures which raise the cost of a
major input.
6.3 Safeguard measures and industry adjustment
This issue is discussed in chapter 5.
6.4 Effects of safeguard measures on users and consumers
As outlined in chapter 5, section 5.2, allowable safeguard measures include tariff,
tariff-quotas and quotas. All of these measures, under reasonable assumptions about
international markets, will tend to raise the domestic price of imported pigmeat as
well as the price of domestically-produced pigmeat. The likely impact on the pig
and pigmeat industries is discussed in chapter 5. The focus here is the impact on
related industries and consumers.
Safeguard measures and user industries
The opening of the domestic market to imports of pork for use by pigmeat
manufacturers in 1990, will have increased the effective rate of assistance to the
downstream processing sector.2 At the same time, the effective assistance available
to pig production would have fallen from a virtually infinite level (due to the import
embargo) to close to zero.3 Safeguard measures, if imposed, will tend to increase
effective assistance to pig production while reducing effective assistance to
downstream manufacturers.
The demand for pigmeat by ham and smallgoods manufacturers is directly related to
the quantity and unit value of ham and smallgoods sold. If the cost of a major input
— pigmeat — rises, the cost of supplying ham and smallgoods also will rise. A
higher supply price will tend to reduce consumption and the quantity of ham and
                                  
2 Effective rates of assistance provide a measure of the net assistance given to a production
activity, taking into account assistance on outputs of the activity adjusted for assistance provided
to inputs. If inputs are taxed (or protected) the effective rate of assistance to the user industry will
be less than the assistance given to the output of that industry.
3 The de facto import restriction which resulted from the decision of several large processors not
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smallgoods sold, and lead to a reduction in processors’ demand for pigmeat. With a
safeguards action, imports will bear the brunt of this reduction in demand while
demand for local product will expand. Nonetheless, the local ham and smallgoods
sector is likely to contract, reflecting lower demand induced by higher prices, while
consumers will be worse off, paying higher prices and consuming less.
If imported products compete with local hams and smallgoods, the domestic prices
of these products effectively will be set by the import price. In this situation, a rise
in the price of a major input (due to application of safeguard measures) will increase
domestic production costs but ham and smallgoods producers cannot raise the
selling price because of import competition. These manufacturers will face a price-
cost squeeze that is likely to lead to a reduction in output and, in time, to some of
them leaving the industry. In this scenario, the more similar are imported and local
goods, the more adjustment will be borne by the local processing industry because
consumers can substitute imports for local products at the prevailing world price.
Until October 1997, the only processed pork allowed into Australia was in the form
of canned hams. They attract a general tariff rate of 5 per cent, but also have been
subject to countervailing measures in the past. In October last year, Canada received
approval to export processed, uncanned product to Australia. The Commission
understands that such imports would be chilled rather than frozen and would enter
free of duty. Although there have been no imports in this category so far, the
potential exists for increased competition in the ham and smallgoods market.
If safeguard action were to restrict imports of the pork which is the subject of this
inquiry, it is feasible that Canadian pork producers could switch to exporting final
goods, though this will depend on the cost of exporting. The Commission has been
advised that a limited shelf life and higher costs of transporting processed product
may provide local producers significant ‘natural’ protection against such imports.
Nonetheless, if importing proved to be economically viable, local ham and
smallgoods manufacturers would be hit twice, having to pay higher prices for
pigmeat as well as receiving a lower, import-constrained price for their output.
Output — and employment — would tend to fall due to the combined impact of
imports plus the safeguard restriction on pigmeat.
Several smallgoods manufacturers do not use imported pork (see, for example,
sub.  5) However, the effects described above would be felt by all downstream
processors. This is because the domestic price of pork cuts used in processing,
whatever their source, will tend to be driven by the import price of equivalent cuts.




The Department of Primary Industries Queensland (sub.  49) suggests that
imposition of safeguard measures (in particular, quotas) could reduce the market
power and margins of so-called middlemen and thus improve national welfare.
Specifically, the paper by Purcell and Harrison (which forms appendix 2 to sub. 49)
contends that the benefits of cheaper imported pigmeat are not being passed on to
consumers. This, they argue, is due to ‘middlemen’ increasing their margins.
Moreover, it also is argued that, if consumer prices do not fall and consumption
remains static, while local pigmeat is displaced by Canadian imports, imports
actually may reduce national welfare.
The Commission does not agree that downstream processing and retailing is
uncompetitive in the manner suggested. At any rate, even if market power did exist,
the claim in the submission appears to be based on an incorrect interpretation of the
gains from trade. Replacement of higher-cost domestic production by lower cost
imports represents a gain from trade whether or not there is market power exercised
by processors and/or retailers.
The inference that the availability of imports will increase market power of buyers
of pigmeat is puzzling. If imports are available at a given price, local buyers will
have little scope to exert market power — in effect, they become price takers, albeit
to their advantage, at a lower world price. A tariff or quota, which increases returns
to producers of pigmeat and encourages displacement of imports, will reduce the
gains from trade, not increase them. Indeed, a quota could encourage buyers of
pigmeat to re-exert market power (if they had such power before imports were
allowed). Once the quota has been filled, buyers with market power may try to limit
their demand for local product, thus restraining the rise in the domestic price (which
would otherwise occur as the result of the quota) and raising their selling prices.
Safeguard measures and consumer welfare
As discussed above, if safeguard measures were imposed, consumer prices of
processed pork products would be expected to rise, unless the price of these
products is determined by import prices or, for that matter, export prices. It seems
unlikely that the domestic price of leg hams has been set by the world price in the
past, despite the availability of imported canned hams.4
                                  
4 It would appear that canned hams are not considered by consumers to be a good substitute for
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However, the decision in October 1997 to allow imports of uncanned, processed
pork from Canada (see appendix F) opened an avenue for direct competition with
Australian hams. Subject to the economic feasibility of importing these products,
this opening of the market will limit the extent to which domestic consumers of
hams will face higher prices caused by the imposition of import restrictions on
frozen pigmeat. As noted above, however, such insulation would be obtained
through imports of processed products, at a cost to local smallgoods manufacturers.
Consumers of fresh pork and other processed pork products could also be affected
by safeguard actions. If imports of legs and lower prices of pigs have encouraged a
reduction in local output, the price of some parts other than legs could have risen
(subject to the constraints of competition from other meats). This price effect would
be moderated by safeguard measures. On the other hand, to the extent lower prices
for legs used in processing have encouraged pigmeat producers to divert legs to
other markets (for example, the fresh pork market), prices in these markets may
have fallen. This effect would be reversed to some degree by the introduction of
import restrictions.
6.5 Safeguard measures and employment
As outlined in chapter 4, there is some evidence that increased imports have led to
labour-shedding (especially paid labour) by some pig farms.
It does not necessarily follow, however, that safeguard measures would restore these
jobs. With safeguard measures being imposed in such a way as to facilitate
adjustment (as is required by the WTO Agreement on Safeguards), they might slow
production and employment losses in the pig farming sector, but neither stop nor
reverse the decline.
Moreover, as indicated in section  6.4 above, safeguard measures could reduce
employment in the pigmeat manufacturing sector.
6.6 Safeguard measures and regional development
Some participants (see, for example, subs  7 and 48) have stressed the strong
linkages between pig farming and other rural-based activities, and the potential
detrimental effects of piggery closures on rural businesses and towns.
Pig production is a rural-based activity spread throughout grain-growing regions
(see appendix  D, figures  D.6 and D.7). There is some clustering of producers
(especially larger producers) around large, specialist pig abattoirs and processingADDITIONAL
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operations (for example, Bunge Meat Industries at Corowa (NSW) and Darling
Downs Bacon at Toowoomba (Qld)).
The pig production sector is undergoing rapid structural change, driven in part by
price pressures but also by structural change in the abattoir and processing sectors
(see chapters 7 and 8). Rationalisation of abattoirs, including a shift to specialist pig
abattoirs-cum-boning rooms, is having a profound effect on the viability of some pig
farmers who are no longer in reasonably close proximity to an abattoir. In addition,
pressures by processors to buy pigs from selected suppliers also will have
implications for those farmers not in a position to form alliances with processors
and other farmers. Yet such restructuring appears essential if Australia is to become
an internationally competitive producer of pigmeat. Moreover, as far as the
Commission can gauge from evidence submitted, most producers in the industry
accept the inevitability of such restructuring whether or not safeguard measures are
put in place.
As discussed in chapter  5, safeguard measures have the capacity to slow such
restructuring but will not stop it, nor is it appropriate that they do so. Structural
change necessarily will involve regional adjustment but, given the broad
geographical reach of pig production, and the impossibility of predicting producer
alliances, it is not possible to say in which regions pig farming will survive and
expand and in which regions it will contract. The location of processing facilities
will, however, be a factor.
6.7 Safeguard measures and trade liberalisation by Australia’s
trading partners
The Australian Government has identified agriculture as one of the principal areas
providing greatest potential benefits to Australian exporters.5 Whether or not a new
round of multilateral trade negotiations under the WTO commences in the next year
or so, the WTO Agreement on Agriculture is scheduled to be revisited, starting in
1999.
As noted by the NSW Farmers’ Association and the Pork Council of Australia
(PCA) (see subs  13 and 55 and section  6.9 below), safeguard action is entirely
consistent with WTO rules. However, the NSW Farmers’ Association observes that
it is important that, if Australia wishes to argue for further liberalisation, its free-
trade credentials are not diminished. The Department of Primary Industries
Queensland also urged that:
                                  
5 Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Trade (the Hon. T. Fischer MP), Media Release,
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 ... any such measures should not put at risk international trading arrangements for any
of our other primary products. (sub. 49, p. 11)
6.8 Safeguard measures and ecologically sustainable development
Piggeries and abattoirs are subject to very strict environmental requirements in all
States. The external costs of pigmeat production and abattoir and boning operations
would appear to be included in the private costs of production.
6.9 Safeguard measures and Australia’s international obligations and
commitments
Australia, the WTO and trade liberalisation
As noted by the PCA, application of safeguard measures in accordance with the
WTO Agreement is WTO ‘legal’. Indeed, the PCA (sub.  55, p.  44 and
trans., pp. 133–4) stresses that safeguard action is a mechanism designed to promote
trade liberalisation. Nonetheless, safeguard measures, provide a means for Member
countries to suspend commitments and obligations under the WTO.6
Consequently, member countries are not required (or encouraged) to take safeguard
action even if the criteria justifying such action are met. Indeed, extensive use of
such measures could be regarded as contrary to the spirit, if not the letter, of the
international trading system, a system to which Australia is strongly committed.
The NSW Farmers’ Association submission encapsulates this dilemma:
Australia plays an important role in lobbying for further reform of agricultural trade —
particularly in its role as Chair of the Cairns Group. This role will be increasingly
important in the preparations for and during the WTO round of negotiations on
agriculture scheduled for 1999. It is important that Australia retains credibility as a free
trading nation so that its ability (and that of the Cairns Group) to push for further reform
is not diminished.
The Association recognises this and is convinced that any actions taken to safeguard
any industry must conform with internationally agreed trade rules.  [emphasis in
original] (sub. 13, p. 4)
At the same time, the Association notes:
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conditions for obtaining Article XIX cover for protection reflected the fact that such protection
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However, it is equally important that Australia ensure that it makes full and effective
use of the measures legitimately available under those rules. [emphasis in original]
(sub. 13, p. 4)
Safeguards and bilateral trade relations
The Queensland Sugar Corporation has pointed to the preferential (zero) tariff rate
applied to its sugar exports to Canada under the Canada-Australia Trade Agreement
(CANATA). The submission states:
In the absence of CANATA, Australia would be the only raw sugar exporter in the
world required to pay the full Canadian MFN duty. [emphasis in original]
If by way of retaliatory action the Canadian government sought to exclude sugar from
CANATA (a relatively small step in the context of WTO rules), the impact would be to
effectively exclude Australia from the Canadian import market. This would have flow on
effects to the value of Australian sugar in other export markets. (sub. 19, p. 4)
The PCA responded in the following terms:
The fact that QSC [Queensland Sugar Corporation] has raised the possibility of
retaliation in this way is a clear indication that it does not understand the nature and
purpose of the Safeguard measures to which it is so opposed. The fact is that Safeguard
measures are not unfair trade measures that might legitimately warrant retaliation.
Rather, as this Council’s Submission to the Commission points out, Safeguard measures
as requested by the pigmeat industry are legitimate rights under the WTO Safeguards
Agreement, designed to address a situation whereby serious damage is caused to an
industry as a result of an unexpected import surge. It is for that reason that the
Agreement specifically prohibits retaliation, as Safeguard measures represent the
exercise of legitimate rights under the Agreement. Such measures do not constitute
unlawful action in any respect. (sub.  67, pp. 1–2)
The Commission agrees with the PCA that Australia is entitled to take action under
the WTO Safeguards Agreement, in accordance with the provisions of the
Agreement. In so doing it is required to “endeavour to maintain a substantially
equivalent level of concessions and other obligations to that existing under GATT
1994 between it and the exporting Members which would be affected by such a
measure” (Article 8:1). There is no scope for the affected exporting Member (in this
case Canada) to take retaliatory action within the context of the WTO — that is, to
suspend “the application of substantially equivalent concession or obligations under
GATT 1994, to the trade of the Member applying the safeguard measure”, provided
that the safeguard measure is exercised for three years or less.7
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The Commission does not wish to speculate on the question of any response the
Canadian Government may take. However, as major participants have raised the
question of preferences, it is the understanding of the Commission that while, under
the WTO agreements, Australia and Canada would not be able to increase
preferences for the products of each other (short of forming a free trade area or
customs union), the WTO agreements do not constrain the reduction or removal of
existing preferences. The conditions under which such preferences could be reduced
or removed by either party are a matter for CANATA not for the WTO. The




7 Competitiveness and profitability: pig
farming
In addition to examining possible safeguard action, the Terms of Reference for this
inquiry require the Commission to report on the factors affecting the profitability
and competitiveness of the domestic pig farming and pigmeat processing industries.
This chapter considers these issues for pig farming while chapter 8 examines the pig
processing sector, especially abattoirs. Both chapters are supported by data in
appendix D.
While the safeguards inquiry examines short term issues relating to injury and
adjustment, this chapter focuses on longer term issues that will determine the future
for pig farming in Australia and on what longer term adjustments the industry may
need to make to become competitive and profitable in the international arena.
7.1 Developments in competitiveness and profitability
7.1.1 Recent structural change
Prior to the easing of quarantine restrictions in 1990, the international
competitiveness of the Australian pig farming industry was not critical to its
profitability. But, even without exposure to international competition, significant
structural change continued to occur in pig farming over a long period with the
higher cost (often non-specialist) units, or those farmers with better alternatives,
leaving the industry. Their market share was taken by existing or new lower cost
farmers. Such changes have been accompanied by ongoing price falls, with real pig
prices declining by an average of two per cent a year over the last 25 years.
Many existing producers have invested to improve productivity, thereby establishing
lower real pig prices at which less efficient producers could not compete. Industry
efficiency has also been enhanced by new operators taking over the existing or
abandoned piggeries. Some farmers with particular expertise have been re-employed
by expanding farms.78 PIG AND PIGMEAT
INDUSTRIES
The rate at which such adjustments occur will partly reflect the disparities in costs
between individual producers and partly the rate at which more efficient producers
are able to expand their output. Stringent State government planning and
environmental requirements on new piggeries or expansions of existing piggeries
have placed some restrictions on this process.
7.1.2 Impact of imports
The process by which imports have played a far greater role in setting domestic
pigmeat prices since 1996 has been outlined in chapter 4. Essentially it became
untenable for large non-integrated bacon, ham and smallgoods manufacturers to pay
well in excess of import prices for local pigmeat while their smaller competitors
used significant amounts of cheaper imports. Hence, larger processors not
vertically-integrated with the pig growing sector commenced or increased the use of
lower priced imported product.
In chapter 4, it is argued that the resultant increase in imports of frozen legs in
1996–97 — by moving domestic leg meat prices closer to import parity levels
— was an important factor explaining the significant fall in domestic pig prices
during 1997–98. Once established, this pattern of using imported leg meat if local
prices start to rise significantly above world prices is not likely to be reversed. In
particular, the seasonal pig price increases traditionally observed towards Christmas
should now be minimal because imports are available to meet demand peaks for leg
meat. Significant adjustment is likely to be required if the pig growing industry is to
adapt successfully to this very different market environment.
As Australia is a small market for major pig producers such as Canada, the
competitive pressures are now much greater than when only cost differences
between domestic producers was driving change. Any lack of competitiveness in the
domestic industry, from whatever source, will now have to be borne by domestic
pig producers. Previously these costs would have been largely carried by domestic
consumers in terms of prices higher than those prevailing in overseas markets.
7.1.3 The pig industry’s response to international competition
Although initially quite muted, the Australian pig industry’s response to the more
intense and permanent competitive pressure imposed by the availability of imported
product in the domestic premium market, has been more fundamental than previous
structural adjustment. There is now a greater urgency in the search by firms, at all
levels in the industry, for ways to improve efficiency and restore profitability. These




·  entry to or expansion into export markets to obtain premiums for quality, product
suitability (for example, meat colour) or market (for example, Japan), to seek
(higher) world prices for cuts other than legs, and to export products which have
limited markets (for example, offal and other by-products) in Australia;
·  closer relationships between various links in the pigmeat chain. By developing
closer long term business relationships processors and pig farmers can create
greater certainty, improve quality control and achieve scale economies
throughout the production, distribution and selling systems. Agreements between
processors and major retailers can generate similar benefits. Development of
longer term relationships provides a framework for investing in fundamental
changes such as quality assurance and entry into export markets. These options
may be less accessible to smaller pig farmers because of the higher transaction
costs in dealing with many small operators. Co-operative style ventures such as
Darling Downs Bacon offer a means to achieve greater vertical integration for
efficient small farmers. However, they do not guarantee continuity of operation
for farmers: the rate of decline in Darling Downs Bacon membership between
1991 and 1997 was more rapid than that for Queensland pig farmers as a whole;
·  changed methods of operation and marketing by pig farmers to improve their
efficiency and returns and to diversify their customer base; and
·  processors moving into more value added products with higher returns.
Competition between processors should mean that some of these gains are
returned to pig farmers in higher prices.
In conjunction with the above developments, the traditional adjustments observed in
periods of low prices and poor profitability continue to occur. There has been a
continued decrease in the number of pig farmers, although the rate of reduction in
1997–98 was relatively slow (less than 200, or about 6 per cent) compared to that in
earlier periods of poor profitability.
Benedek Consultancy (an importer of pigmeat) argued that the pig farming
industry’s rate of adjustment has been too slow:
... the local pigmeat industry has had almost 20 years to re-adjust in a manner which
would ensure competitive presence against imported product as well as to become a
significant exporter to world markets. Hence, the solution to existing problems of the
Australian pigmeat industry needs to be rectified within this country first, before looking
to blame others elsewhere ... (sub. 2, p. 4)
There have been indications that the current rate of exit from the industry is
relatively slow due to hopes of improved conditions and the large capital losses that
would be incurred by exiting in the current market environment. The Department of
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Few producers appear to have left the industry in Queensland over this crisis period.
Many are postponing their decision until the traditionally high pre-Christmas pig price
period has passed, in the meantime accumulating huge debt to associated agribusiness
which is similarly affected. (sub.  49, pp. 1–2)
The relatively low level of pig farmers’ net debt at the end of 1996–97 (see
table D.19) would have made staying in the industry somewhat easier.
One factor that delayed the response of the local pig farming industry was the slow
take up of Canadian imports by local processors. This action softened the impact of
North American leg meat prices on the Australian market. Submissions received by
this inquiry indicate that this delay, by encouraging domestic expansion on the basis
of local prices that were not fully reflecting world prices, has made the eventual
adjustment more painful for local pig farmers. Because the increase in imports
occurred at a time of declining world pig prices and followed a sharp upswing in
prices in the Australian market in 1996, they have caused particular financial
difficulty for those Australian pig farmers investing and expanding in response to
those high prices. Lea Newing indicated the rationale for the further expansion of
her family’s farm to 800 sows in 1997:
Pig prices in the 1990’s had always averaged above $2.10 per kilo, the buoyant prices he
obtained in 1996, coupled with the lowering of interest rates gave him the confidence to
expand. He believed now Australia was part of a global market, prices would be
sustained. (sub. 59, p. 3)
The enterprise is now in liquidation. If domestic prices had more fully adjusted to
import prices earlier, some expansions of this nature may not have occurred.
It appears that some lower cost pig farms are closing down or being sold because of
cash flow problems and lack of access to finance, particularly if they have recently
borrowed to fund expansion. Often this investment would have been made to
improve long-term productivity.
Many remaining farmers have indicated in submissions to this inquiry that they have
cut back production in response to prices below avoidable production costs.
Importantly, many also indicated that they had shelved expansion plans or stopped
existing expansions before completion. Some have also indicated that they may
soon be forced to cease pig production or have cited examples of recent departures.
Submissions from pig farmers have also described short-term, cash flow generating
savings in input costs. These include reductions in paid labour (often replaced by
extra hours worked by owners), delays in maintenance expenditure and
improvements in feed efficiency. While such adjustments help ameliorate short-term




efficiency improvements will be needed if the industry is to compete effectively
with imports and on the export market.
7.1.4 Future developments
Discussions with all sectors of the industry, together with submissions from pig
producers and processors, have reinforced the view of an industry in a particularly
dynamic but uncertain environment with individuals and groups of producers testing
many different strategies to improve performance and profitability. While not all
will be successful, the degree of change at all levels in the industry suggests the
emergence of a more productive and lower cost industry with the potential to
receive better returns for its product than at present.
Some of these developments may require smaller producers wanting to succeed in
the new internationalised environment to change their methods of operation in order
to obtain some of the cost advantages available to larger enterprises. This is
particularly so in an environment of emerging production chain relationships.
The existence of a potentially very large supply of imports available at less than two
months notice lessens the incentive for processors to freeze local product for long
periods. In the absence of any other changes, this development suggests that the
domestic pig growing industry would contract somewhat. However, as outlined
above, the industry is already pursuing a number of strategies which would allow it
to continue growing.
There is likely to be much less variability in efficiency and product specification
and quality between individual producers than at present. Only the most effective
producers can expect to survive in an industry closely integrated with the world
market. Socom Piggery observed:
Those who have large, functional and well located facilities who are prepared to accept
change and lock into contract growing arrangements with large breeding organisations,
survival is likely. Those who do not have this type of facility and/or attitude will be
forced to leave the industry. (sub. 61, p. 2)
7.1.5 Exports
Some sections of the industry argue that, with the provision of sufficient export
slaughtering capacity, exports can provide a solution to the industry’s current
difficulties. As there is only limited indication of industry-wide scale economies to
suggest that the industry can become more profitable just by getting bigger, the
major benefits from exports will need to come through price premiums in some82 PIG AND PIGMEAT
INDUSTRIES
markets (particularly Japan) for products carefully targeted on the requirements of
these markets, better prices for local low value cuts, more use of higher value added
branded products, and larger markets for by-products such as offal and trotters.
The significant current and planned investments in processing plants and piggeries
for future exports by major pig producers and processors such as Darling Downs
Bacon, Auspork and DanPork suggest that at least some of the leading Australian
producers expect the domestic pig growing industry to be competitive on world
markets in the future. This implies that in the long term they must also expect to be
competitive in domestic markets for legs and other cuts without depending on a
large Christmas premium price for legs.
However, there remains uncertainty surrounding some of these investments,
reflecting the recent price and production volatility in the Australian and world pig
markets. In particular, the prices of below $1.50/kg being received for a dressed
carcass by some producers during 1998 created doubts among those considering
investments in slaughtering capacity, about the sustainability of much of the
domestic pig growing industry. Hurstbridge Abattoirs commented:
... Hurstbridge Abattoirs has recently undergone a complete rebuilding and refitting
program which has been partially completed. There are still numerous projects in this
program placed on hold caused once again by the uncertainty of the industry.
(sub. 18, p. 2)
Miandetta Farms identified developments required for export growth to extend
beyond the large producers.
For its part, industry will need to continue its export thrust into Asia. It will need to
construct new efficient processing facilities. Pig producers will need to network into
groups, adopt quality systems and continue to improve production efficiencies.
The industry is preparing a plan for an export company to facilitate exports, set and
monitor standards and provide an opportunity for processors to co-brand products and
jointly work together to fill orders. (sub. 24, pp. 2–3)
The concept of an export company to provide marketing and technical support to
producers involved or interested in exporting has support in the industry (including
the Pork Council of Australia (PCA)) but developments are still at an embryonic
stage.
However, other industry participants were less certain about the profitability of
export markets. Ingoldsby Piggery observed:
We have yet to see any objective evidence of substantial export markets being available






I have yet to observe any lasting evidence that our future, as we are regularly informed,
lies in exports. I have yet to see a study that concludes that there is a net benefit to
Australian producers by processors attempting to export unsubsidised product onto
subsidised world markets. It is patently absurd calling for producers to export, as
producers surrender control of their product at the farm gate. (sub. 33, p. 2)
Bunge Meat Industries was ambivalent about the immediate prospects for exports.
... in terms of suggesting there’s a premium for shoulder meat and middle meat out
there, it’s difficult to forecast at this stage. Certainly our exports have in more recent
times provided an improvement over the domestic price ... (trans., pp. 78–9)
Two conditions that must be met if individual pig producers are to be profitable in
the internationalised market they now face, are cost competitiveness with overseas
producers and obtaining international prices for parts of the pig that have returned
relatively low prices in the domestic market in the past. These issues are examined
below.
7.2 Current cost competitiveness of Australian pig
farming
Cost competitiveness of an industry in a particular market is its ability to produce an
item of a given quality for that market at a cost equal to or less than other countries.
Hence, cost competitiveness will be a mixture of productive efficiency, input prices,
transport costs and exchange rates and it will change over time with movements in
these variables. An industry’s relative competitiveness will vary between markets
due to transport costs.
The main focus of the pig industry in recent years has been its competitiveness
against imports in the Australian market. Domestic competitiveness is also
important for the industry’s longer term plans for increasing exports. Only if it is
cost competitive with imports in the domestic market (where it has an advantage in
convenience and transport costs) can the pig industry hope to be competitive on
export markets where it has to incur additional transport costs.
Comparing an industry’s competitiveness with another country (benchmarking) is
often undertaken to identify ways of improving performance. Cost competitiveness
is also of interest to assess the prospects for an industry facing international
competition. In this regard it is important to recognise that competition, particularly
in the shorter term, will usually not be with the costs of the lowest cost producer or
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the longer term as more efficient producers expand the highest costs producers will
cease production. In competing with North American pig producers on the
Australian or world markets, Australian farmers are competing with the prices
available to those producers in North America, not with the costs of the most
efficient farmers in that region.
While cost competitiveness provides the foundation for moving into export markets,
it is not the only factor determining the Australian pig industry’s ability to achieve
sales overseas. Inquiry participants have indicated that other important requirements
include product quality and specification, developing longer-term relationships with
overseas importers and lowering of trade barriers in some export markets.
7.2.1 Productive efficiency
An important part in an industry’s competitiveness is the efficiency with which it
uses its resources relative to other countries. The Australian pig farming industry
has argued that its best producers are among the most efficient in the world.
Windridge Pig Farm commented:
There seems to be a wide discrepancy in methods of calculation of the cost of
production of pigmeat. Nevertheless, information available suggests there is a wide
range of costs of production within the Australian industry and also in other countries.
The balance of the information we have been able to find on Australian and other
pigmeat industries indicates that the more efficient Australian producers are competitive
with producers in other countries at the farm gate. (sub. 48, p. 2)
Certainly Australia has natural advantages which give the domestic pig growing
industry the potential to be highly competitive in both productive efficiency and
cost. The absence of extremely cold weather, plentiful grain production, availability
of water, relatively cheap land and a low level of disease, all provide important
sources of competitive advantage. Canada suffers from severe winters which add to
costs of effluent disposal, shed costs, heating and transport.
The Australian industry also has some disadvantages to productive efficiency in pig
farming. Consumer preferences for leaner meat result in the production of lower
average carcass weight animals than in Europe and North America, hence,
detracting from both farm and abattoir productivity (in a cost per kilogram sense).
Auspork (sub. 51) estimated that each ten kilograms extra in carcass weight saves
15c/kg production costs. Pig farming is less geographically concentrated in
Australia than North America and Europe and, hence, on average farmers need to




The long-term annual average real pig price decline of two per cent since the early
1970s indicates that there have been ongoing improvements in the efficiency of the
Australian pig farming industry. The introduction of imports in 1990 and the recent
further easing of quarantine restrictions has placed even more competitive pressure
on Australian pig producers.
Some participants have observed significant variations between the performance of
domestic pig producers and have speculated that the industry may have a long tail of
less efficient producers. Ridley Corporation submitted:
It is generally acknowledged that in terms of key farmgate performance parameters
(herd productivity, unit cost of production, etc.) the best operators in Australia are
competitive with those overseas, but on average, Australian producers are not. If this
situation does not change it may result ultimately in the industry being dominated by a
small number of large producers. (sub. 57, p. 12)
This confirmed Cresap (1990) findings of 1986 to 1988 average US production
costs of A$1.04/kg (liveweight, at an exchange rate of A$1 = US$0.76), compared
to Australian best practice of 96c/kg and highest cost of 147c/kg. However, it also
reported Canadian average cash costs of production A$0.25/kg below average cash
costs in the United States, suggesting a sizeable gap between Australian and
Canadian total production costs. The Industry Commission (1995a) commented that
many participants and industry sources used in that inquiry held the view that the
most efficient Australian producers were around world cost levels.
Martin et al (1998) estimated costs of pig production (excluding costs related to
marketing, breeding stock, veterinary and medical costs and manure disposal) based
on standardised budgets for specific pig production systems. Differences in costs
between regions were generated by regional differences in factor prices. For a 1200
sow piggery on Canada’s eastern prairies they estimated costs of around
Can$0.80/kg live weight and Can$0.84/kg for the western prairies. On a dressed
carcass basis, at current exchange rates these costs would be equivalent to
approximately A$1.15/kg to A$1.20/kg. A number of other regions of Canada and
the United States were estimated to have costs in the A$1.30 to A$1.40 range.
While these results involved significant assumptions and excluded important cost
elements, they suggest relatively low cost pig production in certain areas of North
America.1
                                  
1  The 26 farms surveyed for PigStats 97 (APC 1998) had animal health costs representing
nearly 4 per cent of total production costs. Australian health costs are generally much lower than
in other countries. Hence, for this cost alone, an increase of close to 10 per cent to the Martin et al
(1998) estimates would seem appropriate for comparison with Australian total production costs.86 PIG AND PIGMEAT
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The cost data cited below are indicative of a wide range of performance levels in the
Australian pig farming industry at present. In addition, a number of the submissions
from individual pig farmers and industry bodies have argued that the industry needs
time to restructure to match international competition in domestic and export
markets. This suggests that they may believe that a good deal of the industry is at
somewhat less than best practice efficiency at present.
Data on production costs of individual farms shows a wide variation. While not all
of this variation will reflect efficiency — some will be due to different input prices,
quality and type of product, treatment of capital costs and individual firm’s scale of
operation  —  it suggests that some producers are performing well below best
practice. For the June quarter 1998, data from 15 farms on the Department of
Primary Industries Queensland’s Sowtel herd performance recording system
indicated weighted average costs of 209c/kg (sub. 49). Five farms reported costs in
the 172–182c/kg range while five returned costs in excess of 230c/kg. However,
unless accrual costing is used, quarterly returns will be influenced by changes in the
stock of pigs and feed. In addition, differences in product type and quality would
influence individual farm costs.
PigStats 97 (APC 1998), provides production cost data for 26 commercial pig
producers with over 28 000 sows in total. Weighted average costs (converted to a
hot standard carcass weight basis) were around 220c/kg. A number of farms were
operating in the 190–200c/kg range while four had costs in excess of 240c/kg. The
PCA’s (sub. 55) survey of 198 pig farmers showed break even costs averaged a little
over 190c/kg, while producers’ assessment of the price needed to provide sufficient
returns to stay in business averaged around 221c/kg.
Information provided by participants, several claiming to be at the more productive
end of the industry, showed less variation in production costs and were suggestive
of costs in the 190–205c/kg range. However, these data need to be treated with
some care as individual farmers may be using different definitions of costs
particularly with regard to costing owner’s labour and returns on capital. Socom
Piggery (600 sows) (sub. 61) suggested that its returns (price less cost) were around
40c/kg to 50c/kg better than most producers and Auspork (trans., p. 172) indicated
that it was just over break even at current prices (around 190c/kg). Edson Piggery
(140  sows) (sub.  30) submitted that its production figures equalled the best in
Australia and generated costs of 190c/kg. The Queensland Pork Producers’
Organisation (QPPO) estimated 175c/kg as the likely most efficient cost of pig
production in Australia (trans., p. 34).
Sunnydale Farms (300  sows) (sub.  33), Miandetta Farms (1500  sows) (sub.  24),




of around 200c/kg while Amitie had production costs excluding administration costs
and financial charges of 198c/kg. R and D Fraser (200 sows) (sub. 32) argued that
their piggery’s performance was in the top 20 per cent in Australia and required
over 200c/kg just to survive. Ingoldsby Piggery (300  sows) (sub.  3) indicated a
break even price required for 1997–98 costs of a little under 205c/kg.
Expansion plans signalled by low cost producers such as Auspork and Socom
Piggery suggest that those at the higher end of the cost scale will find more
difficulty in competing in the future.
Important gaps appear to remain between Australian and North American best
practice. Lean Team Technical Services saw a need for very large investment for the
industry to compete on the world market.
More than 90 per cent of our production units are continuous flow. To compete in the
international market place these units must be converted to multi-site batch flow.
(sub. 26, p. 1)
Socom Piggery (sub. 61) and Bunge Meat Industries (sub. 39) also viewed growing
out or multi-site arrangements as the model for the future.
Benchmarking efficiency of industries across countries based on industry-wide data
is fraught with dangers. Structural and data collection differences can produce
misleading results and it is often difficult to pinpoint causes of observed differences.
Firm specific analysis is likely to yield more useful outcomes, although caution
needs to be used in generalising the results.
The Pig Research and Development Corporation (PRDC) has commissioned a
benchmarking study into the physical and financial performance of around 30
leading pig producers in each of six countries including Australia. The study is due
to report in early 1999 and the results should provide an important indicator of the
productive efficiency and cost efficiency of pig growing in Australia. Because it
focuses on a sample of individual producers rather than reporting industry
aggregates, the study should also highlight the areas in which performance and costs
need to be improved to reach world’s best practice and quantify some of the
impediments to improved performance identified in this report.
7.2.2 Input costs
Even if productive efficiency of the pig farming industry is near world standard, the
industry will not be competitive unless the costs of its inputs are also in line with
those facing overseas competitors.88 PIG AND PIGMEAT
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Feed costs
The major input into pig production is feed. The share of feed costs varies with
grain prices, but PigStats 97 (APC 1998) data indicate that, in recent years, on
average around 60 per cent of total input costs (excluding return on equity) in pig
farming are feed. Grain makes up around 60 per cent of this for a typical cost share
in the vicinity of 35 per cent. Pig producers have indicated that Australian domestic
pig feed prices are often above those paid by Canadian and US pig farmers and were
generally higher than export prices for wheat and barley during the 1990s. The PCA
argued:
Clearly, grains are the key driver to determining the competitiveness and profitability of
pig farming. Unfortunately, although the domestic feed industry has recently been
deregulated, domestic feed prices tend to, on average, be higher than grain prices
charged on the export market. The inability of Australian pig farmers to access feed
grains at export-parity prices has necessarily placed them at a competitive disadvantage
vis-a-vis their North American counterparts. (sub. 64, p. 2)
Sunnydale Farms agreed:
The effect of imports is exacerbated by the gross inconsistency in trade policy expecting
our industry to be internationally competitive (without government assistance) whilst
denying our industry access to international grain markets when we need it most. As a
precondition for international competitiveness this anomaly must be addressed.
(sub. 33, p. 2)
Currently, exports of wheat and barley can only occur through statutory marketing
authorities (single desk selling). While domestic market sales of wheat, and in some
States, barley, are transacted outside these authorities, their size and buying power
provides considerable influence over supply to the domestic market and hence over
domestic prices. The pig industry has argued that at various times these export
marketing arrangements have resulted in domestic grain prices well in excess of
prices obtained for grain exports and above those paid by their overseas
competitors, for the same grains.
The complexity of marketing arrangements for grain makes estimates of the impact
of single desk arrangements somewhat problematic. For barley, the Centre for
International Economics (CIE) observed:
Price formation on the domestic feed barley market is complex and comparisons of
prices between domestic and export sales are difficult to make because of different sales
conditions. At times (around harvest) the pooling system acts to deflate domestic prices
below world prices. At other times the Australian Barley Board’s monopoly on exports





The impact of single desk selling arrangements on domestic feed grain prices varies
over time. Because of plentiful local production, domestic grain prices currently are
close to world prices. However, in times of supply shortage domestic prices have
risen significantly above world prices, most recently in the widespread drought of
1994–95. Larkin and Heilbron observed:
It is widely accepted in the domestic feed using industries that the AWB export
monopoly has the effect of amplifying domestic price spikes in periods of relative
shortage of domestic supply. (Larkin and Heilbron  1997, p. 31)
CIE (1997) estimated that the maximum potential premiums that the Australian
Barley Board could have obtained in the five years to 1996–97 if it had perfect
information regarding demand elasticities, was somewhat under $3 per tonne.
If grain could be freely imported, then even with single desk export powers,
domestic prices would be limited to import parity. However, quarantine restrictions
designed to protect the grain industry from disease mean that imported grains must
be treated before use. Together with storage and transport costs, these restrictions
mean that the effective import parity price is significantly above export prices.
Primary Industry and Resources SA said:
The inability to import feedgrains, because of sanitary/phytosanitary concerns, combined
with an export orientation of grain industries gives rise to a situation where domestic
intensive animal industries are not purchasing cereal feedgrains from an open market at
world price, but from a functionally separate domestic market which may or may not be
supplying feedgrains at world parity prices. This constitutes a competitive disadvantage
to intensive animal industries in Australia, including the pig industry. (sub.  58, p. 11)
Bunge Meat Industries suggested longer term detrimental impacts of single desk
arrangements:
The Government’s continued support of boards such as the AWB inflates the price of
grain on the domestic market which discourages diversification of the grain industry and
prevents value adding to our grains by Australia’s livestock industries. (sub.  39, p. 49)
Reviews of the powers of grain marketing authorities have been scheduled under the
Competition Policies Agreement endorsed by COAG in 1995. In Victoria and South
Australia the feed barley domestic market is to be deregulated but single desk export
arrangements are to remain until at least June 2000. In New South Wales a review
of the NSW Grain Marketing Act is currently underway. A review of the monopoly
export powers for wheat is scheduled to occur in the next two years. In examining
the net national interest benefits of these arrangements such reviews need to
consider their implications for intensive livestock industries such as pig growing.
While domestic regulation appears to have raised wheat and barley prices for
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natural advantages in the production of other sources of pig feed which give North
American pig growers a further competitive edge.  United States producers in
particular have access to large quantities of lower cost feed such as corn (maize) and
soy beans not generally available to Australian producers. Bunge Meat Industries
(sub. 60) indicated that the gap between US corn prices and Australian domestic
wheat prices was around $40 per tonne over the last 18 months, equating to around
9c/kg for a dressed carcass in additional production costs.
Labour
Labour inputs represent around 10 to 15 per cent of the cost of growing pigs. The
Commission received little comment from participants regarding the costs of hired
labour. Sara McClintock (trans.,  p.  97) considered Australian labour costs
comparable to those in Canada, while the PCA (sub.  55) considered real labour
costs had fallen since 1995. However, Windridge Pig Farm (sub. 48) argued that
wage rates and on-costs were excessive and inflexible work practices were difficult
to remove. Bunge Meat Industries (sub. 39), the largest employer of labour on pig
farms in Australia (employing over 400 staff in 1998), had no comments on farm
labour issues.
For smaller farms, a significant portion of labour input is provided by family
members. Many submissions from such farms have expressed satisfaction with the
hired labour that has had to be retrenched due to low pig prices in 1998. For bigger
operators, the existence of a large rural labour force in areas of relatively high
unemployment is likely be an advantage.
Environmental and planning costs
Australia has stringent state-based planning and environmental requirements for the
establishment and expansion of piggeries. Although these requirements add to costs
of production, most participants did not indicate particular concerns in this area.
Ingoldsby Piggery (sub.  3) felt that these requirements may be less onerous for
North American pig farmers, but observed wide variations between jurisdictions in
the United States. Windridge Pig Farm (sub. 48) while not currently incurring large
expenditure for environmental regulation expressed frustration with periodic cost
burdens due to inappropriate application of environmental policies. The PCA
(sub. 64) indicated that its recent survey of 200 producers identified environmental
costs as having a negative impact on viability, particularly for larger producers
(more than 400 sows). It suggested review of the various environmental regulations




With regard to relative international costs Bunge Meat Industries stated:
Whilst significant costs are incurred for EPA and its licences and EIS, Australia
probably compares equally with North America and Europe. However, EPA regulations
and costs vary between States and differ between large and smaller producers.
(sub. 39, p. 56)
More innovative operations such as Miandetta Farms (sub.  24) appear to have
developed effluent control into a profitable by-product. Larger scale farms will
often have some advantages in lower unit costs of use or removal of effluent.
Veterinary costs
Australia’s low disease status provides an advantage over most foreign competitors
in veterinary costs. Windridge Pig Farm observed:
Disease is an enormous cost in intensive livestock operations. Australia does not have
many diseases in pigs which are found on other continents and which increase
production costs considerably. (sub. 48, p. 10)
In addition, the absence of many substances used to treat diseases add to consumers’
perceptions of product quality. Nonetheless, further reductions in disease can
provide added advantages in productivity. Bunge Meat Industries argued:
The pig industry in Australia is very small on a world scale, and like many other
industries must compete globally. We are therefore at a disadvantage if technology (new
vaccines or medications) which are available to our competitors take several years to
become available here. (sub.  60, p. 1)
Animal medications need to be registered by the National Registration Authority
(NRA) prior to use in Australia. Bunge Meat Industries (sub. 60) indicated that the
registration procedure takes at least 15 months. It expressed concern regarding cases
of long and costly delays in registering vaccines for some diseases. The factors
considered by the NRA cover genuine concerns regarding animal welfare,
quarantine and occupational health and safety. However, to the extent that delays
reflect testing effectiveness of products for Australian conditions when their general
effectiveness has already been evaluated abroad, there would seem to be scope to
hasten the registration process by allowing users to make their own decisions on this
matter.
Genetic material
An important determinant of cost competitiveness of modern piggeries is the quality
of genetics of their herds. Improved genetics can result in efficiencies in areas such
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performance. Currently Australian pigs tend to grow slower but are leaner than
those in many overseas countries. The Australian Pig Breeders Association (sub. 38)
submitted that Australia already has top quality breeding stock which is in demand
in Asia.
Because certain diseases can be contained in genetic material, there has been a ban
on its importation since the mid-1980s, with the exception of one importation from
Norway. In particular, Australia is one of only three pig producing countries to be
free of Porcine Respiratory and Reproductive Syndrome (PRRS), a disease which
has only appeared in the last decade and can be carried in genetic material. This
provides an important advantage in productivity and veterinary costs for Australian
producers.
The highly competitive environment in which the Australian pig industry now
operates requires that all avenues for improved productivity be explored. The
Australian Pig Breeders Association indicated:
We believe that the standard of the Australian pure bred pig herd is second to none in
the areas of growth rate and carcass quality. However, we believe there may be
productivity gains to be made in such areas as pigs reared per sow per year.
(sub. 62, p. 1)
Regarding the possibility of importing genetic material, Luxford and Thornton
argued:
In the difficult matter of arriving at what is an acceptable risk, decisions should be
consensual and conservative, particularly in dealing with what may be a newly emerging
disease. (Luxford and Thornton 1995, p. ii)
AQIS has established an import risk assessment panel to examine the efficacy of
varying restrictions on importing porcine genetic material.
Transport and other costs
The relatively large distances between farms and feed supplies, abattoirs and
markets in Australia, creates a disadvantage for many pig producers. Porfect Pigs, a
200 sow unit in the upper north of South Australia, with production figures it
believed were in the top 10 per cent nationally, illustrated this impact.
Because of our location in SA we have extra freight cost on feed and freighting pigs to
slaughter of approximately 25 cents a kilo which at farm gate makes our cost of
production in the top 5 per cent in the country. (sub. 44, p. 2)
Submissions to this inquiry have indicated significant expenditure on transport of




exporter of pigmeat to other states. Processors and smallgoods manufacturers taking
advantage of short term regional pig price differences will always have weighed up
transport costs against price advantages. However, some of this recent activity also
appears to represent short term reactions to market changes caused by imports and
competition between processors. As farmers have lost customers in the current
industry adjustment they have had to seek new markets elsewhere. The long lead
time in adjusting production and the need to sell pigs at a particular weight has
made this task an imperative. However, in the longer term, further rationalisation in
location and operation of farms and abattoirs may be needed to reduce transport
costs in order to maintain industry competitiveness.
The small scale and geographical dispersion of the Australian pig farming industry
creates some natural cost disadvantages for local producers. For example, Sara
McClintock observed:
Much of the equipment in North America is cheaper because it is mass-produced. This
doesn’t happen much in Australia (for instance, the farrowing crates are hand made).
(sub. 6, p. 5)
7.2.3 Exchange rates
In order to assess competitiveness, domestic costs for pig farming in different
countries need to be converted to a single currency. Since the floating of the
Australian dollar in 1983 there have been very large swings in exchange rates. In
1990–91 when Canadian frozen pigmeat imports were first allowed, the Australian
dollar was worth around 90 cents Canadian. Commencing in 1994 the Australian
dollar began to rise against the Canadian currency, reaching a high of close to
Can$1.10 at the end of 1996. This was the period in which Canadian frozen pork
imports started to grow strongly and would have been particularly competitive with
Australian production. Between the end of 1996 and October 1998, the Australian
dollar devalued by around 12 per cent against the Canadian dollar, providing an
important boost to the competitiveness of Australian pig farmers. However, this
improved cost competitiveness may not have shown up in lower import prices
because North American prices of pigs have fallen in the interim.
The price of pigs and pork products in the North American market will be very
much influenced by demand in the US market and supply of product from the US
pork industry. Hence, the pigmeat prices available to Canadian producers will be
strongly influenced by the relationship of the Canadian dollar to the US dollar.
Since the beginning of 1997, the Canadian dollar has devalued by over 10 per cent
against the US currency and this would tend to make pig prices in Canadian
currency somewhat higher than otherwise.94 PIG AND PIGMEAT
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The combined effect on price competitiveness of these two factors is reflected in the
relationship between the Australian and US currencies. Since the start of 1997, the
Australian dollar has devalued by around 20 per cent against the US dollar. For
Canadian pigmeat exporters this substantially increases the relative attractiveness of
the US market compared to Australia.
However, as the prices of many items of pig feed (the major cost of raising pigs) are
broadly linked to world prices, the impact of exchange rate changes on
competitiveness will be significantly muted. While a devaluation of the Australian
dollar would improve competitiveness on the price side it would also add to the
price of feed to the extent that domestic grain prices follow world prices.
The significant fluctuations in exchange rates and the growing exposure of the
Australian pig industry to international markets suggests that exchange rate
movements will be an important influence on future competitiveness and
profitability of pig farming in the short to medium term. In the longer term other
more fundamental factors will be more important.
To the extent that Australian pig farmers and their international competitors are
exposed to world grain prices, there will be a significant automatic hedge of input
price changes due to exchange rate movements offsetting some of the currency
induced movements in competitiveness and final product prices.
7.2.4 Product quality and specification
Cost comparisons require either equivalent quality of output or appropriate
adjustments in costs to reflect quality differences. One of the potential advantages
that Australia has as a pigmeat exporter to Asia is the quality, specification and
disease free image of its product. Such attributes, by providing price premiums, may
allow profitable production at higher cost than in some competitor countries.
Windridge Farms observed:
Our high health status also allows us to produce better quality pigmeat completely free
of substances that may be found in pigmeat produced in other countries. (sub.  48, p. 10)
In addition, the type of pigmeat produced in Australia may have advantages in some
markets. Auspork stated:
... there is now product differentiation, given that particularly the Americans as opposed
to the Canadians use a lot of maize, ... and that creates a different colour of fat - and
again we’re getting feedback that there may be a premium in the marketplace for that
sort of product as opposed to the Americans, who I guess in that Japanese market are




Similarly, Bunge Meat Industries argued:
I think the Canadian pork in fact is a lot more similar to ours, whereas I would say both
types are perceived as better in the Japanese market than the US product but the US are
the major exporter to that region just out of sheer volume. (trans., p. 80)
Proximity to South East Asian markets also gives Australian producers the
opportunity to obtain price premiums for the supply of chilled product with
relatively long shelf life, rather than selling frozen pork. But even in North East
Asia there appears to be an advantage. Bunge Meat Industries (sub. 64) stated that it
was one of the few operations in the world to be able to send chilled product into
Asia by ship and guarantee 45 days shelf life. The PCA observed the potential for
differentiating Australian pork:
This is particularly the case for the lucrative Japanese market, where factors other than
price (such as consistency of quality) are more crucial to securing long term contracts.
(sub. 64, p. 6)
Australian consumers favour relatively light-weight low-fat pigs and the pricing of
pigs in the domestic market contains heavy penalties for excess weight or fat.
However, some export markets prefer somewhat fatter pigs. Opportunities exist for
cost efficient producers to grow heavier pigs (with associated lower per kilogram
costs) to target such markets specifically.
Australian producers are also at a potential disadvantage in export markets because
of the concerns of Asian consumers to the possibility of boar taint in meat from
entire male pigs. Boar taint is also an issue in the domestic market as the Asian
population increases and concerns are raised regarding the impact of tainted pork on
other consumers’ preferences for pork. In discussions with various sectors of the
industry the Commission has heard conflicting views about the significance of boar
taint. Up to now the pig growing industry has largely ignored the issue. However,
widening price differentials between female and entire male pigs and growing
opportunities for export into Asia are likely to see greater importance placed on
dealing with boar taint for both domestic and export markets.
Ridley Corporation suggested that high quality product would be a prerequisite for
the success of pig farmers in the future:
Evidence from our feed operations in the United States and Canada, supports the
contention that only those customers who meet high standards of uniformity and quality
are able to survive in the pig industry which is now globally competitive. (sub.  57, p. 3)
The pork industry has developed a quality assurance program to assist pork
producers wishing to improve the quality of their product and provide consumers
with an assurance of product quality.96 PIG AND PIGMEAT
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Discussions with smallgoods producers have indicated that in recent years there
appears to have been no appreciable quality difference for processing purposes,
between frozen pork imports and Australian produced pig legs. Bunge Meat
Industries (trans., p. 77) concurred with this view.
7.3 Profitability
Productive efficiency and cost competitiveness do not guarantee profitability. Only
if prices obtained by Australian producers are as high as those achieved by overseas
producers, will cost competitiveness result in similar profit performance to
comparable overseas producers.
In addition, as discussed in section 7.2.4, superior product quality may generate
higher returns for producers. In Asian markets, efficient Australian producers, once
established, have the potential to gain premium prices for product quality and
specification. On domestic markets, enterprises which are able to provide consistent
product of a quality required by processors, retailers and customers will be the
producers that retain markets in an industry likely to become dominated by vertical
alliances. Such attributes will be needed for survival in a more competitive domestic
market.
In the case of pigmeat, where different cuts of meat have traditionally attracted
somewhat different prices in Australia to overseas, introduction of lower world
prices for the premium part of the pig (in Australia, the leg) without achieving world
prices for the domestically lower priced portions, would mean that Australian
producers would receive lower prices for pigs than overseas competitors. In this
situation, even if Australian producers are cost competitive, they will tend to not be
as profitable as overseas competitors. These difficulties are further accentuated
because the seasonal price cycle in North America is the reverse of that in Australia.
Hence, at a time when Australian prices are seasonally high because of local
demand conditions, imports will tend to be priced at their lowest levels.
Appendix D  (table  D.18) shows that over the decade to 1996–97, average
profitability of pig farming has been consistently higher than for the rural sector as a
whole. During this period return on net worth in pig farming averaged 6.7 per cent,
compared to 4.8 per cent for all agriculture. Like other agricultural industries, — but
to a greater extent than the average for rural industries — returns to pig farming
have exhibited variability due to fluctuating weather conditions (particularly as they
affect grain prices and availability), movements in input and output prices and




Submissions to this inquiry indicate that the large fall in pig prices in the first half of
1998 led to significant losses for the bulk of the pig industry. The PCA’s survey of
198 pig producers (producing around one third of the industry’s output) indicated
net losses in 1997–98 of $6.8  million on capital employed of $192  million,
representing a return of minus 3.5 per cent (sub. 55). These producers earned net
profits of 7.7 per cent on capital in 1996–97, which was similar to the industry wide
figure of 8.3 per cent return on assets reported in table D.18.
Contract prices prevailing in the second half of 1997 are likely to have provided
small positive returns for the bulk of the industry, while prices in October 1998
appear to be generating break-even results for the most cost efficient producers.
Auspork stated:
We have a situation where currently we’ve risen to a level probably slightly above
break-even and that in the current situation there’s not too much more positive going on
with that. (trans., p. 172)
Socom Piggery observed the depth of the price falls in 1998, but also noted
significant productivity differences between producers:
SOCOM Pty Ltd while a low cost producer, with considerable economies of scale
compared to smaller producers, still suffered losses for a considerable part of 1998. I
realise that if we were losing $3000/week for four months (15–20c/kg) then most
producers at that time would have been losing 60–70c/kg. Furthermore, they would
have been losing money long before we were even aware a problem existed and long
after we were back in the black. (sub. 61, pp. 2–3)
7.3.1 Domestic prices
The prices of direct relevance to the profitability of pig farmers are the per kilo
prices paid for pigs by processors or other users. These prices represent the derived
demand for pigs from the demand for various types of pigmeat (and by-products) in
final markets.
With increased imports of legs, Australian farmers are now competing with lower
world prices for their traditional prime cut, while on the domestic market they are
receiving lower than world prices for middles and shoulders. B.E. Campbell (NSW)
observed the dilemma facing pig processors in trying to obtain higher prices for
these cuts:
If the market for other cuts would allow us to compensate for the reduced revenue from
leg meat the situation would not be as serious. But the demand is quite elastic — if we
raise the price past a point the demand reduces considerably and we are left with huge
quantities of stock in cold storage. (sub. 46, p. 2)98 PIG AND PIGMEAT
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Salkim indicated that:
Canada have different values to Australia for each portion of the carcase. They place a
lower value on the hind leg which allows the Australian importers to take advantage of
this fact, and now command 30 per cent of Australian leg meat sales. (sub.  15, p. 1)
Rather than there being a single Australian pig price, for a variety of reasons there
are variations in pig prices between regions. Transport costs and contractual
arrangements allow such disparities to continue. In Western Australia prices have
been held up somewhat by processors maintaining minimum prices to farmers.
However, this arrangement has been suspended. Similarly, Darling Downs Bacon
has recently paid somewhat above market rates to its members for their pigs as a
way of effectively bringing forward the distribution of profits from processing and
manufacturing activities during a period of very low pig prices.
In addition, per kg prices vary for different sorts of pigs. Salkim observed one of
these differences but also the link between prices.
The pork producers command an extra 20 cents to 30 cents per kg compared to bacon
prices to compensate for the extra cost of producing a smaller pig. Because the cheap
imported product helped to reduce bacon prices in Australia, the pork prices fell [also].
(sub. 15, pp. 1–2)
The price obtained for pigs is largely derived from prices paid by final consumers
less margins of various levels of processors together with transport, wholesalers and
retailers. A number of farmers have raised concerns about the level of retail margins
on pork and have claimed that the major retail chains are in a position of market
power. Others have complained of the power of abattoirs or smallgoods
manufacturers. The failure of retail pig meat prices to fall as rapidly as prices
obtained for pigs, has further added to these concerns. In chapter 4 it is argued that
up until 1996, the combined market power of major processors not using imports,
kept pig prices higher than they otherwise would have been. Prices of leg meat are
now established by import prices and this undermines any market power that
processors or retailers may have had.
7.3.2 Export prices
Now that the Australian pig industry has become part of the international market, a
fundamental requirement for local farmers to be profitable in the long term is that
the prices they obtain for their pigs reflect international prices for the various cuts of
pigmeat. Several participants have observed that Australian producers have
traditionally received relatively low prices from shoulders and middles. This has
been offset by higher than world prices (particularly close to Christmas) for leg




Not surprisingly, legs and leg meat are the premium priced products in the Australian
industry. However, this is not the case in other countries. In Canada and the USA
premium prices are paid for middles and loins. Similarly, the largest importing nation in
the world, Japan places a premium on loins. The Australian leg meat trade is then an
ideal market for the Canadian industry. Seasonal price trends are reversed in the two
countries and the demand and a premium is placed on a lower priced product. Meat
traders have recognised this. An earlier focus on importing carcases has been replaced
by a preponderance of leg meat imports. (sub. 66, p. 2)
The introduction of imports of frozen legs now appears to have permanently
removed most of the premium for local producers. This has focused attention on
export markets to obtain better prices for some parts of the pig. However, world pig
prices have declined in recent years and in the current environment the profitability
of large scale exports is not clear. Miandetta Farms indicated:
The opportunity has arisen since the foot and mouth disease outbreak in Taiwan and
since that time Australian exports have risen significantly. There is an opportunity for
those exports to continue to increase and, as I understand it, they are being supplied to
the commodity market and competing with international commodity prices at this time.
There is a low level of profitability in that export. (trans.,  p. 20)
In seeking safeguard action against imports a number of producers have argued that
the industry needs time to develop export capacity. However, exports will only be
beneficial if they generate higher prices than the domestic market or they enable
scale economies in production to be achieved. Participants have provided some
indication that exports enable them to get higher prices for cuts with lower domestic
value and from parts of the pig that have limited markets in Australia. Bunge Meat
Industries observed:
We do a lot of offal into Hong Kong. We’re doing a considerable amount of product
into Korea right at this stage. What we’re attempting to do is to balance the pig up as to
be able to — where countries have a requirement for a particular primal we'll certainly
try and balance the animal up. (trans., p. 85)
However, current low world prices mean that production for export is often only
marginally profitable. In addition, some participants indicated that initial entry into
export markets often had to be at discount prices. B.E Campbell (NSW) stated:
... while we are exporting as much product as possible we are competing against
countries with a well established client base and reputation. To get a "foot in the door"
we must be cheaper. The Australian pork industry realises we must be competitive on
the world market but this is not done overnight and our margins cannot be continually
eroded on our domestic market while at the same time we are discounting on the
international one. (sub. 46, p. 3)
In the immediate future the ability of much of the local industry to move into export
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location of available capacity. Several abattoirs associated with major food
processors have relinquished their export licenses in the past decade, citing
excessive costs of meeting required standards and limited returns on export markets.
While major producers such as Bunge Meat Industries and Darling Downs Bacon
have the scale and resources to enter export markets, smaller farmers will have to
rely on independent export abattoirs. The PCA is currently examining the
establishment of an export company to provide technical and marketing assistance
for enterprises exploring entry into the export market and to market Australian pork.
If the Australian pork industry becomes successfully integrated into the export
market those local producers not directly involved will still benefit because prices of
various cuts on the local market will tend towards export parity as those involved in
exporting shift supply between the domestic and export markets in response to price
differences. Miandetta Farms observed the remedy for the relatively low price
received for pig loins used for bacon in Australia:
But the export opportunities as they arise will see a demand for Australian pig loins in
the Japanese market, which is a premium product there, and that will change the mix
values and therefore should put us in a more competitive position in time with, say, the
Canadians or the United States in terms of pig leg values. (trans., pp. 23–4)
If such export markets are obtained in any volume, domestic prices for these cuts
will rise thereby increasing local pig prices even with leg meat prices below
previous premium levels. Such developments are important for establishing the
sustained profitability of Australian pig farming in an international environment.
The PRDC plans to undertake a study to benchmark the value chain of pig farming
in Australia against that in Western Canada. This study, which is to report in 1999,
will provide more accurate information on the extent of international price
differences for particular pigmeat cuts and hence potential revenue gains available
for Australian producers on the export market.
7.4 Factors affecting profitability and competitiveness
The above discussion has highlighted a number of key factors influencing the
profitability and competitiveness of the pig farming industry. In general their effects
are not precisely quantifiable from available information. However, two studies
currently being undertaken for the PRDC will provide more detailed data on
productive efficiency, input prices and prices received for different cuts of pigmeat.





·  productive efficiency of Australian pig farmers compared to their international
competitors, particularly North America. Current indications from domestic cost
data are that the best Australian pig farms are efficient producers but that there
appears to be a significant part of the industry which is somewhat below best
practice;
·  Australian farmers receiving lower than world prices on the domestic market for
many parts of the pig (including by-products). Hence even if it were cost
competitive the industry would find difficulty competing with imports of leg
meat. To remedy this situation, at least some producers will need to undertake
significant exports. The resultant impacts on domestic supply should transfer
export parity prices to producers selling only in the domestic market;
·  higher feed prices than paid by North American competitors. Grain makes up
about 35 per cent of the cost of production and single desk selling arrangements
for the export of wheat and barley tend to lead to domestic prices that are higher
than export parity. This is particularly so in times of grain shortages and this can
place the domestic pig farming industry at a serious competitive disadvantage.
Some differences in feed cost reflect the natural advantage that North American
producers have in access to cheaper feeds such as corn;
·  lack of available export processing facilities. With the exposure of the industry
to world markets creating the need to export, the relinquishing of export
accreditation by some abattoirs has left many producers with difficulty in
obtaining access to export slaughtering and boning facilities. Several large export
abattoirs are in the advanced planning stages and if profitable export
opportunities exist these developments would be expected to proceed;
·  exchange rates with the US and Canadian currencies. The devaluation of the
Australian dollar against North American currencies since 1996 has improved
the cost competitiveness of Australian pig farmers. However, the significant
swings observed in exchange rates suggest that farmers should not rely on
current currency parities for their profitability; and
·  disjointed relationships with downstream components of the pork supply chain.
The absence of long term alliances between the farming, processing and retail
sectors has generated inefficiencies and inhibited product development and
quality. The entry of imports into the local market has exposed these
deficiencies. Many producers in these industries have indicated moves towards
developing more permanent business alliances aimed at generating
improvements in efficiency and product quality. This may lead to significant





8 Competitiveness and profitability:
pigmeat processing
This chapter examines available information on the competitiveness and
profitability of the Australian pig processing sector. Because the processing sector
— slaughtering, boning and smallgoods manufacture — has diverse technology
between countries, exhibits important scale economies in some areas and often
undertakes quite different tasks or produces different products, it is not particularly
amenable to useful international comparisons of costs and productivity. In such
cases, benchmarking comparisons will be more useful as indicators of areas where
performance might be improved rather than representing precise measures of cost
and efficiency differentials.
Both the abattoir and smallgoods sectors are characterised by a large number of
small firms and several large producers, none of which are in a dominant market
position. Barriers to entry and expansion are low in both industries, apart from
environmental and planning constraints on the establishment of abattoirs.
8.1 Abattoirs
In 1996–97, there were around 130 abattoirs slaughtering close to 4.6 million pigs,
compared to approximately 140 abattoirs killing 5.1 million pigs in 1992–93. Of the
abattoirs in 1997–98, eight were pig specific, (including six of the top eight
abattoirs killing pigs), and these undertook nearly 40 per cent of the national kill. In
addition, Chapman’s abattoir in South Australia, accounting for about six per cent
of the industry, was predominantly used for pigs. No abattoir accounted for over
10  per  cent of the national slaughter, while the top five abattoirs accounted for
38 per cent of the total kill, compared to 33 per cent in 1992–93. As well as boning
activities attached to abattoirs, significant numbers of unboned carcasses are sent to
specialist boning rooms, butchers, supermarkets or are exported.
The abattoir sector is a key link in the pigmeat production chain. Even if pig farmers
are operating efficiently, poor performance in abattoirs can make final pork products
less competitive on domestic and export markets in terms of both price and quality.
ProAnd Associates (1998) reported slaughtering costs in recent years ranging from
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abattoirs, hence, adding from 8 to 16 per cent to the cost of a $150 pig. Boning costs
vary greatly depending on the process undertaken, with Hassall and Associates
(1994) suggesting best practice Australian costs ranging from $4.40 per pig for a
simple cut to $31.56 for fully boxed pork.
While the domestic market was protected from imports, any excessive costs in
slaughtering and boning would have been shared by domestic consumers and pig
producers. However, with the impact of imports and the expansion of the industry
into export markets, prices for much of the industry’s output are no longer directly
influenced by domestic costs. Hence, excessive costs in the supply chain will tend
to be largely reflected in lower returns to producers.
A number of studies have been undertaken examining the efficiency and
competitiveness of Australian pig abattoirs. Cresap (1990) observed that the major
disadvantages of Australian abattoirs were the relatively low scale of operations,
poor capacity utilisation, aging plant and relatively labour intensive technology.
New investment was being discouraged by poor profitability.
Davidson (1991) reported major differences in costs, productivity and charges
between abattoirs. Relatively small scale, excess capacity and aging equipment all
contributed to poor performance. Multi-species abattoirs were seen as a major area
of high cost. Davidson observed that the pig slaughtering sector had not undergone
the major structural change experienced by the pig farming industry since 1970.
Recent and proposed new abattoir capacity suggest that more fundamental change
may be now occurring in the slaughtering sector.
In 1993, the pig industry commissioned Hassall and Associates (1994) to undertake
an international benchmarking study of pig abattoirs. They compared Australia’s six
largest pig abattoirs (covering nearly 40  per  cent of the annual kill) with best
practice plants in the United States (two) and the Netherlands (three). In addition,
18 medium-sized abattoirs were surveyed to assess differences in scale and
performance compared to the six largest abattoirs.
The study was aimed at benchmarking the best practice Australian performance
against international best practice. It developed model composite plants for the three
countries incorporating the largest scale operations observed in each. The stylised
results indicated that Australian killing costs per pig were around 40 per cent higher
than in the United States with this gap accentuated on a per kg basis by the
15 per cent greater average carcass weight in the US plant.
The major reasons for this gap were the much higher labour costs in Australian
abattoirs, reflecting their lower scale, smaller and older capital stock and lower




in Australian abattoirs, while the taxpayer pays for these services in the United
States. In total, gas, electricity and water costs per pig killed were four times higher
in Australia than in the United States. Recent efficiency improvements in Australian
utilities (see PC 1998a) and reductions in cross subsidies from business to other
users is likely to have narrowed this gap.
Slaughter costs per pig were very similar between the Australian and the
Netherlands’ composite plants. Higher Australian labour (40 per cent) and utility
(double) costs were offset by much higher unspecified other production costs in the
Netherlands. Again the 20  per  cent larger carcass weight in the Netherlands
generated a significantly lower cost per kg than achieved by Australian abattoirs. In
addition, the many smaller abattoirs in Australia were not able to process by-
products economically, hence, requiring higher payments for slaughtering than in
large overseas operations.
Significant differences in the types of operations undertaken in boning rooms within
and between countries made the results of cost comparisons inconclusive.
Australian boning rooms tended to be more limited to low level transformation of
carcasses. As with abattoirs, Australian boning plants suffered from operating at a
much smaller scale than the United States and the Netherlands, but hours worked
were much more comparable.
More recently, ProAnd Associates (1998) undertook a desk study reviewing the
available information on the international competitiveness of the Australian pork
processing sector. They observed that an earlier study for 1988 of eight major US
processors had identified combined costs of slaughtering and boning in the range
US$17 to US$31 per pig, well above the approximately US$13.50 attributed to the
US composite best practice abattoir in the Hassall and Associates’ benchmarking
exercise. This suggests that the productivity comparisons with this composite plant
may be somewhat misleading. The wide range of costs observed in large operations
in the US study (Hayenga 1998) also indicated the difficulty of firm wide
benchmarking of a process with as many potential variations in product and
technology as the slaughtering and boning of pigs.
ProAnd Associates observed the low capacity utilisation (56 per cent) achieved by
pig slaughtering facilities even on a single shift basis and the much smaller scale of
Australian operations compared to those in Denmark, the Netherlands and the
United States. The greater use of multi-shifts allowed economies in the use of
capital. However, depreciation and repairs and maintenance made up only
12  per  cent of the costs in Hassall and Associates’ best practice Australian
composite abattoir and 20 per cent in the more capital intensive US plants. These
shares are smaller for the even more labour intensive boning operations.106 PIG AND PIGMEAT
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The beef cattle industry has long complained about the impact on farm gate prices
of inefficiencies in the abattoir sector. The Industry Commission (IC 1994) found
that despite operating in export markets, Australia’s red meat processing plants had
significantly higher costs than those of most competitor countries. This situation
was able to continue largely because of the relatively low price and disease free
status of Australian livestock and the existence of allocated import quotas in a
number of major overseas markets. Major causes of poor processing performance
were poor labour productivity and low capacity utilisation (sometimes attributable
to award inflexibilities). The Industry Commission reported the wide variability in
performance between red meat abattoirs that has also been found by studies of pig
slaughtering facilities.
A study of work arrangements in the red meat processing industry by the
Productivity Commission (PC 1998b), has identified important productivity
enhancing (both labour and capital) improvements flowing from recent changes in
work arrangements in workplace agreements. While the problems generating high
costs in beef cattle abattoirs, particularly the widespread industrial relations
problems and use of the tally system, have been to some extent specific to beef,
these findings are still suggestive of some performance improvements in the pigmeat
processing industry in recent years. The changes in the industrial relations
framework which helped generate improvements in the red meat sector, in particular
the widespread use of enterprise agreements, also apply to pig abattoirs. In addition,
over half of pig slaughterings occur in multi-species abattoirs which may have been
influenced by the improvements reported for red meat processing. However, the
Commission also observed that the improvements in work arrangements are not
uniform and significant further improvement is likely to be available.
In this inquiry, the Commission received little comment about the overall costs or
efficiency of pig slaughtering and boning operations or specific impediments to
improving this performance. Many of the major slaughtering facilities are operated
by vertically-integrated firms, with over 40 per cent of the pig kill in 1996–97 being
made at abattoirs operated by firms that also had pig farms.
Sara McClintock observed the situation in one Canadian province:
The relationship between the processors and the producers in Manitoba is different to
what it is here. The processors are highly efficient. They will work for three shifts for
instance so the killing line on the one regional abattoir ... may well work for three shifts.
So the equipment is being very well used. (trans.,  p. 95)
In the case of larger boning facilities, competition from boning facilities in butchers,




establishments is likely to have generated relatively efficient operations. Bunge
Meat Industries commented on independent boning rooms:
... this sector serves both manufacturers, retail and food service with a very small
amount going to export. These rooms are essentially family operated and generally are
very efficient. (sub. 39, p. 52)
The geographically dispersed nature of the Australian pig farming industry and the
lighter weight of Australian pigs means that the processing sector could not expect
to attain all of the scale economies available to larger overseas plants. The Industry
Commission (1994) identified similar problems for red meat processing. In these
circumstances a larger number of smaller abattoirs is likely to develop. The trade off
between scale economies and transport costs of both pigs and finished product will
determine the distribution of abattoirs that emerges. Similarly, in the past, lower
labour productivity associated with retaining older capital equipment may have been
appropriate in the slow growing domestic slaughtering market which did not justify
substantial new investment.
Hence, unit slaughtering costs in Australian abattoirs are always likely to be
somewhat above those in best practice large scale overseas abattoirs. However,
capital costs are not a large share of total slaughtering costs. Hassall and Associates
(1994) reported depreciation and repairs and maintenance at around 12 per cent of
total costs for its composite best practice Australian plant and 21 per cent for the
composite US plant. Regarding abattoirs, Bunge Meat Industries observed:
Whilst there are a number of pig specialists where efficiencies are reasonable, Australia
will never get to the huge volumes and hence efficiencies, some USA, Canada and
European plants operate. However, this is not seen as an impediment to our future.
(sub. 39, p. 51)
Similarly Auspork stated (trans., p. 181) that while Australian abattoirs could not
match the scale economies achieved by very large North American plants, its
processing costs would be very competitive (excluding inspection costs). In
addition, a number of processors have indicated that the slower speeds of Australian
abattoirs compared to some of the very large United States operations, provides a
much better quality and consistency of product.
ProAnd (1998) identified greater opportunities for economical by-product recovery
as a major advantage of larger abattoirs. They observed that for the beef sector,
values of offals produced in domestic abattoirs are substantially less than those
achieved through the export market. Hassall and Associates (1994) provided
indicative by-product returns of US$12 to US$16 per head, which was of a similar
order to best practice slaughtering and boning costs. Auspork (sub. 51) indicated the108 PIG AND PIGMEAT
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benefits from greater scale and specialisation in pigs by replacing the previous beef
floor of its Daylesford abattoir with an export grade offal handling facility.
Rationalisation of existing higher cost abattoirs will tend to occur automatically if
most of the currently planned new and more efficient pig specific abattoirs go
ahead. In this regard, any attempts by government to slow the rationalisation process
by keeping higher cost government or privately owned abattoirs open will only
serve to limit the throughput of the new plants. Given the sensitivity of unit costs to
volume in these more capital intensive plants, such policies will delay the benefits
of scale economies and more efficient by-product recovery offered by new and
larger plants. In turn, this would impede the pig farming sector’s push for export
markets and competitiveness with imports.
As well as issues of abattoir efficiency, the pig farming industry has also identified
a shortage of export accredited slaughtering and boning facilities as currently being
an impediment to its competitiveness and profitability. Over the last ten years there
have been a number of export accredited abattoirs slaughtering pigs that have given
up their accreditation due to the high costs involved, limited export opportunities
and the lack of an industry export focus. These include the Darling Downs Bacon
abattoir at Toowoomba and Chapman’s abattoir at Nairne, while Lea Newing
(sub.  59) observed that for various reasons all of Western Australia’s private
abattoirs had over time closed their export boning rooms.
Christine Sapwell argued that:
Currently we would probably be almost at maximum capacity for potential exports. In
other words, we are exporting as much as we can physically kill, and therefore that is a
limiting factor, that we don’t have that infrastructure there. (trans.,  p. 122)
However, if exporting is sufficiently profitable, significant capacity exists in
abattoirs and boning rooms with some form of export accreditation, that could be
switched from killing for the domestic market. While this capacity is only available
to a few pig producers (for example, Bunge’s abattoir only kills for that company),
the diversion of pigs to the export market — if prices are higher there — would
benefit all pig growers by bringing higher prices to the domestic market also. While
some exports are currently made to countries which accept pork from abattoirs
which are not export accredited or from an export accredited boning room not
attached to an abattoir, buyers in the major markets usually require accreditation.
Several significant expansions in export standard slaughtering capacity are now
planned, although there remains uncertainty about the future of a number of these
projects. Darling Downs Bacon (sub.  52) and Auspork (sub.  51) have indicated




respectively, while DanPork has had long held plans to establish significant export
slaughtering capacity in Queensland. In addition, Hurstbridge Abattoirs (sub. 18) is
part way through a major rebuilding and refit program which has taken its capacity
to over 500 000 pigs per year and Bunge Meat Industries (sub. 39) has indicated
plans to expand slaughtering and boning facilities for export.
Most firms involved in these developments have argued that temporary safeguards
measures against frozen pork imports are needed to give time to expand export
capacity and provide greater certainty of pig supply available for export. Bunge
Meat Industries argued that:
Furthermore, should the current profitability crisis continue in the pig production sector,
then the expansion plans of Auspork, DanPork, Darling Downs Bacon, Hurstbridge and
Westons may well be placed on hold or abandoned. This would be a tragedy given the
window of opportunity that has emerged in Japan. (sub. 39, p. 47)
However, to the extent that imports have placed competitive pressure on the
domestic pig farming industry and the industry successfully adjusts to these
pressures, pigmeat imports will have in fact helped increase the long-term viability
of new slaughtering developments. The major determinant of competitiveness of the
output from export plants will be the competitiveness in both cost and quality of
pigs produced by the farming sector.
A number of participants have commented on the costs of inspection for export
works. Auspork observed the cost disadvantages of abattoirs due to different
policies between countries for charging for abattoir inspection:
Despite the fact that our abattoir is accredited under project 2 which allows for company
inspectors we still have costs of approximately 1.75 cents per kilogram that the North
Americans do not have. This is $375,000 per year for our operation. (sub. 51, p. 19)
The Pork Council of Australia submitted:
Under current conditions, Australian exporters have to pay a 100% cost recovery charge
to Government for inspection fees. This is in stark contrast the US, where there are no
fees, and Canada, where there is only a partial cost recovery system in place (recently
implemented by Agriculture and Agri-Food Canada).
Council considers that as export inspection is a health and safety issue, and there are
positive externalities associated with it, there is case for some contribution to be made
by government. This would help in alleviating, to a degree, the overall cost structure
faced by processors. (sub. 64, p. 6)
Bunge Meat Industries (sub. 39) concurred, while Primary Industries and Resources
South Australia (sub.  58) indicated that Denmark and the Netherlands provide
government veterinary meat inspection services without charge.110 PIG AND PIGMEAT
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Charging users for meat inspection services is a government policy for all meat
products, not just pigs, and reflects the government position that the primary
beneficiaries or users of such services should bear the costs. Any change would
need to be made for all of the industries involved.
8.2 Bacon, ham and smallgoods manufacture
In 1996–97 there were around 140 bacon, ham and smallgoods manufacturers with a
turnover of $1240 million. The four largest firms produced 40  per  cent of the
industry’s turnover while the next four held a 25 per cent share. The majority of
producers are small enterprises with 116 enterprises accounting for 16 per cent of
industry turnover. Darling Downs Bacon (sub. 52) indicated that it was the leader in
the branded market with a share of 17.5 per cent.
This is a highly competitive industry structure. ProAnd Associates observed:
Smallgoods represents a significant proportion of the Australian meat processing
industry, characterised by a high level of domestic consumption, low levels of exports
and low volume sales of a relatively large number of product items. It is estimated that
there are approximately 130–150 registered establishments for processing smallgoods, in
addition to numerous butcher shops that make up sausages, saveloys and similar
products on-site. (ProAnd 1998, Vol. 3, p. 1)
The smallgoods industry makes products that are totally pigmeat as well as blended
products. For the six major firms in Hassall and Associates’ (1995) study of the
smallgoods industry, pigmeat represented 80 per cent of meat input, while the 12
medium sized firms surveyed used 63 per cent pork. For blended products, Hassell
and Associates (1994) reported industry estimates of 60 per cent pigmeat input.
The Queensland Pork Producers’ Organisation (sub. 35) indicated that the further
processing sector takes close to 70 per cent of the pig industry’s output. Hence, its
performance is of importance to the sales and profitability of pig growers. Several
participants have observed moves towards more value adding and a greater product
range as means of increasing consumer demand for pork. Conversely the adverse
impact of food poisoning episodes in recent years has demonstrated the effect of
poor performance by the smallgoods industry on pigmeat sales.
There is little information available about the efficiency and competitiveness of
Australian processed pork products manufacture. Few processed pork products have
been imported and hence competition has been with Australian substitute products
rather than imports. The recent and possible future changes in import protocols for
pigmeat suggest that there could be greater competition with imports in the domestic




the quarantine changes in November 1997 allowing the importing of cooked
pigmeat from Canada, have been minimal. Discussions with processors and
importers have suggested that the relatively short shelf life of processed products
will militate against large scale importing.
The efficiency and effectiveness of the final processing sector will also be important
in the highly competitive export market. Recent growth in pork exports have been of
unprocessed frozen or chilled product. Miandetta Farms (trans., p. 25) has argued
that in the future exports will need to be in the higher valued added products rather
than simple frozen and chilled markets where profits may rely on the very low
domestic market prices for pigs observed in mid-1998. This might take the form of
more value adding to frozen or chilled product or branded or generic smallgoods.
The initial impact of the 1998 declines in pig prices will have improved the cost
competitiveness of smallgoods production particularly for those firms and products
using considerable amounts of leg meat. In addition, there are indications that the
now cheaper leg meat has substituted for other cuts, resulting in a higher quality
product.
Hassell and Associates (1995) is the only recent comprehensive analysis of the
smallgoods sector. The very wide range of product mixes and production techniques
in smallgoods manufacture makes benchmarking of this industry highly problematic.
This study compared the performance of six major and twelve medium-sized
Australian smallgoods plants with six best practice plants in Germany, the United
Kingdom and the United States. However, confidentiality requirements and lack of
information precluded publishing cost data for the European plants. The overseas
plants were selected because they were producing similar product ranges using
similar processes but at lower unit costs than the Australian firms.
The study results showed processing costs (excluding raw materials) per kilogram
were 66 per cent higher in the Australian plants than in the United States. This was
almost entirely explained by higher direct and indirect labour costs, despite weekly
direct labour payments per employee significantly below those in the United States.
Some of the difference may have reflected a different product mix but the much
larger scale of operation of the United States plants provided significant economies.
Average employment in the United States benchmark plants was more than seven
times greater than in the Australian plants. Available evidence suggested that costs
per kilogram were broadly comparable between the German and Australian plants,
with higher productivity in the much larger German plant being offset by lower
wage rates in Australia.112 PIG AND PIGMEAT
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8.3 Supply chain relationships
Many participants observed an emerging change in the nature of relationships
between the various levels in the supply chain of pigmeat products. Some forms of
alliances have already developed while others are being actively considered between
some or all of pig farmers, abattoirs, smallgoods manufacturers and major retailers.
This is in line with developments observed overseas particularly in the United
States. The greater use of imported leg meat and the associated falls in local pig
prices, after initially disrupting contractual relationships, now appears to have
focused the industry’s attention on the longer term need for closer relationships to
improve efficiency. Ridley Corporation observed:
... there are a substantial number of smaller, independent pig producers who are very
efficient. The competitiveness of the Australian pig industry is, therefore, enhanced if
such producers can be assisted to form horizontal relationships with like producers and
obtain greater economies of scale and quality through multi-site production. These
relationships, together with the formation of contract production, has been instrumental
in the increase in productivity and output of herds in the United States. (sub.  57, p. 14)
Traditionally, relationships between different levels in the pork industry have been
transitory in nature and focused mainly on the quantity of pigs to be purchased.
Contracts have been short term and usually have not specified price, other than to
establish discounts for excessive weight or fat content.
In periods of relative supply shortage such as 1996 processors paid high prices and
were often unsure of the availability of pigs, while in times of plentiful supply (such
as 1998) pig farmers faced low prices and difficulty in selling their pigs. At least
two processors in South Australia and Western Australia provided minimum prices
in annual contracts but these have now been withdrawn due to the low and uncertain
prices received in 1998. Windridge Pig Farm observed:
Some forward contracts have been available in the past and some are available currently.
The term of these varies between 1 month and 6 months. As the market destabilised in
the latter months of 1997, Windridge found that as its contracts expired buyers refused
to even discuss prices for new contracts. Forward contracts were not available on any
terms. (sub. 48, p. 2)
In the past, the main means of developing closer relationships between different
levels of the supply chain have been various degrees of vertical integration (for
example, Bunge Meat Industries, Chapman, Hurstbridge Abattoirs), cooperatives
like Darling Downs Bacon or pig farmer owned companies such as Auspork. In
some cases these relationships encompassed smallgoods producers as well as
farming and abattoirs, but notably did not include major retailers. While such
vertically-integrated entities were responsible for a significant share of pig




alliance. The South Australian Farmers Federation envisaged more inclusive
arrangements developing in the future:
The South Australian pork industry will be focused on alliances between all groups from
gate to plate. Integration within each section of the industry, facilitating improvements
in production, processing, manufacturing and marketing will be the key to South
Australia’s success. (sub.  53, p. 2)
Macarthur Consulting, in its Business Plan for the pork industry prepared for the
National Pork Industry Development Group, argued that developments required to
significantly improve the industry’s performance include the need to:
Develop vertical or horizontal alliances and promote cooperation between sectors to
create a seamless value chain from conception to consumption in both domestic and
export markets. (Macarthur Consulting 1998, p. 20)
Closer relationships between farmers and between the different levels of the
industry offer a number of benefits to producers and consumers. These include:
·  savings in farmers’ input costs;
·  greater certainty of markets for farmers and of supply for abattoirs, processors
and retailers;
·  higher and more consistent quality of product and better feedback to producers
on product specification and quality;
·  better use of the price mechanism to differentiate between different quality of
product;
·  savings in transaction costs;
·  sharing of the risk of pig price fluctuations; and
·  development of new products.
Various sorts of relationships are likely to develop as producers test alternative
arrangements to improve efficiency and product quality. However, Auspork
highlighted that creating alliances, although potentially very beneficial, did not
guarantee success.
We’re of the view that not all of those alliances, all those people, will survive. Obviously
we intend that we will be one. But that’s the only way we believe that people can
survive, is to bond together and create greater networks and greater, I guess, value
between themselves by strategic alliances. (trans.,  p. 175)
There may not be room for all existing producers in the new arrangements.
Rationalisation is possible at the farming, slaughtering and processing levels as
alliances narrow the supply chains from farm to retailer. In particular, the variations
in efficiency and quality currently observed in the industry will be significantly114 PIG AND PIGMEAT
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narrowed. Farmers surviving in this environment will need to be low cost,
innovative and producing a product of high and consistent quality.
The Australian Government’s three year assistance package to the pigmeat industry
provides funds to support projects focused on improving competitiveness,
developing new markets and expanding existing export markets. Developing
vertically integrated supply chains can be part of such initiatives. The farming sector
already has a number of State and Federal bodies capable of establishing
frameworks for cooperation between pig producers and other parts of the supply
chain. However, while developing alliances is aimed at improving vertical
relationships within the industry, there is likely to be strong competition between
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B General procedures on safeguards
This appendix consists of:
·  the Commonwealth of Australia Gazette, ‘Establishment Of General Procedures For
Inquiries By The Productivity Commission Into Whether Safeguard Action Is Warranted
Under The Agreement Establishing The World Trade Organization’, No. S 297,
Thursday, 25 June 1998;
·  GATT 1994 Article XIX; and
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ESTABLISHMENT OF GENERAL PROCEDURES FOR INQUIRIES BY THE
PRODUCTIVITY COMMISSION INTO WHETHER SAFEGUARD ACTION IS
WARRANTED UNDER THE AGREEMENT ESTABLISHING THE WORLD
TRADE ORGANIZATION
1. In order to comply with the requirements of the Agreement Establishing the World
Trade Organization (WTO Agreement), and in particular the Agreement on Safeguards
(Safeguards Agreement) and Article XIX of the General Agreements on Tariffs and Trade
1994 (GATT 1994), this notice establishes the general procedures for inquiries into
safeguard action by the Productivity Commission (Commission) in respect of a reference
under Parts 2 and 3 of the Productivity Commission Act 1998.
2. A reference under Parts 2 and 3 of the Productivity Commission Act 1998 in respect
of safeguard action will designate the product being imported and request an inquiry and
report by the Commission on:
(a)  whether the conditions are such that safeguard measures would be justified under
the WTO Agreement;
(b)  if so, what measures would be necessary to prevent or remedy serious injury and to
facilitate adjustment; and
(c)  whether, having regard to the Government’s requirements for assessing the impact
of regulation which affects business those measures should be implemented.
3. A  "safeguard measure" means a measure provided for in Article XIX of GATT
1994, the rules for which are established by the Safeguards Agreement. A safeguards
measure would be in the form of a quota, a tariff quota, or an increased level of tariff.
___________________________________________
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Conditions
4. The Commission is to report on whether the product under reference is being
imported into Australia in such increased quantities, absolute or relative to domestic
production, and under such conditions as to cause or threaten to cause serious injury to the
domestic industry that produces like or directly competitive products.
5. Safeguard measures have to be applied to a product being imported irrespective of
its source, except:
(a)  product determined to be of New Zealand origin pursuant to the Australia New
Zealand Closer Economic Relations Trade Agreement, which shall be excluded
from the inquiry; and
(b)  product originating in a developing country Member of the WTO shall be exempted
from such measures as long as its share of imports of the product concerned does
not exceed 3 %, provided that developing country Members of the WTO with less
than 3 % import share collectively account for not more than 9 % of total imports
of the product.
Inquiry
6. Reasonable public notice must be given to all interested parties in accordance with
section  14 of the Productivity Commission Act 1998. The inquiry must involve public
hearings or other appropriate means in which importers, exporters and other interested
parties can present evidence and their views, including the opportunity to respond to the
presentations of other parties and to submit their views, inter alia, as to whether or not the
application of a safeguard measure would be in the public interest.
7. In accordance with section 12 of the Productivity Commission Act 1998 a report
shall be published promptly setting forth the Commission’s findings and reasoned
conclusions reached on all pertinent issues of fact and law. The report will include a detailed
analysis of the case under inquiry as well as a demonstration of the relevance of the factors
examined. All factors specified in these procedures must be considered.
8. Any information which is by nature confidential or which is provided on a
confidential basis shall, upon cause being shown, be treated as such by the Commission.
Such information shall not be disclosed without permission of the party submitting it.
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the reasons why a summary cannot be provided. However, if the Commission find that a
request for confidentiality is not warranted and if the party concerned is either unwilling to
make the information public or to authorize its disclosure in generalized or summary form,
it may disregard such information unless it can be demonstrated to its satisfaction from
appropriate sources that the information is correct.
Determination of Serious Injury or Threat Thereof
9. "Serious injury" means a significant overall impairment in the position of a
domestic industry.
10. "Threat of serious injury"  means serious injury that is clearly imminent,  in
accordance with the provisions of paragraphs 13 and 14. A determination of the existence
of a threat of serious injury shall be based on facts and not merely on allegation, conjecture
or remote possibility.
11. In determining injury or threat thereof, a "domestic industry" means the producers
as a whole of the like or directly competitive products operating in Australia, or those
whose collective output of the like or directly competitive products constitutes a major
proportion of the total domestic production of those products.
12. "Like product" means a product which is identical, i.e. alike in all respects to the
product under consideration, or in the absence of such a product, another product which,
although not alike in all respects, has characteristics closely resembling those of the product
under consideration.
13. In the inquiry to determine whether increased imports have caused or are threatening
to cause serious injury to a domestic industry, the Commission shall evaluate all relevant
factors of an objective and quantifiable nature having a bearing on the situation of that
industry, in particular, the rate and amount of the increase in imports of the product
concerned in absolute and relative terms, the share of the domestic market taken by
increased imports, changes in the level of sales, production, productivity, capacity
utilization, profits and losses, and employment.
14. The determination referred to in paragraph 13 shall not be made unless this inquiry
demonstrates, on the basis of objective evidence, the existence of the causal link between
increased imports of the product concerned and serious injury or threat thereof. When
factors other than increased imports are causing injury to the domestic industry at the same
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Application of Safeguard Measures
15. A safeguard measure can only be applied to the extent necessary to prevent or
remedy serious injury and to facilitate adjustment. If a quantitative restriction is used, such a
measure shall not reduce the quantity of imports below the level of a recent period which
shall be the average of imports in the last three representative years for which statistics are
available, unless clear justification is given that a different level is necessary to prevent or
remedy serious injury.
Provisional Safeguard Measures
16. A reference can also be made to the Commission for an accelerated report to
determine whether critical circumstances exist where delay in applying measures would
cause damage which it would be difficult to repair. The Commission will report to the
Minister on whether there is clear evidence that increased imports have caused or are
threatening to cause serious injury. If the Commission finds that such circumstances exist,
then it will also recommend what provisional measures would be appropriate for up to
200 days. Such measures should take the form of tariff increases unless that would not be
sufficient to prevent serious injury. The provisional measures would be revoked when the
Government reached a decision on the imposition of safeguard measures following the
receipt of the report by the Commission.
Duration and Review of Safeguard Measures
17. The Commission shall also make recommendations about the duration of the
measures up to a four year period. The period is to include any period where provisional
measures have been in place.
18. Where safeguard measures are imposed, the Minister may refer to the Commission
for inquiry and report the question of the extension of the period for safeguard measures
beyond four years and up to eight years.
19. The inquiry by the Commission to advise whether the safeguard measure continues
to be necessary to prevent or remedy serious injury and whether there is evidence that the
industry is adjusting shall be in conformity with the procedures set out above. A measure so
extended is not to be more restrictive than it was at the end of the initial period, and should
continue to be liberalized.
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GATT 1994 Article XIX
Emergency Action on Imports of Particular Products
1. (a) If, as a result of unforeseen developments and of the effect of the
obligations incurred by a contracting party under this Agreement, including tariff
concessions, any product is being imported into the territory of that contracting
party in such increased quantities and under such conditions as to cause or threaten
serious injury to domestic producers in that territory of like or directly competitive
products, the contracting party shall be free, in respect of such product, and to the
extent and for such time as may be necessary to prevent or remedy such injury, to
suspend the obligation in whole or in part or to withdraw or modify the concession.
(b)If any product, which is the subject of a concession with respect to a
preference, is being imported into the territory of a contracting party in the
circumstances set forth in sub-paragraph (a) of this paragraph, so as to cause or
threaten serious injury to domestic producers of like or directly competitive
products in the territory of a contracting party which receives or received such
preference, the importing contracting party shall be free, if that other contracting
party so requests, to suspend the relevant obligation in whole or in part or to
withdraw or modify the concession in respect of the product, to the extent and for
such time as may be necessary to prevent or remedy such injury.
2. Before any contracting party shall take action pursuant to the provisions of
paragraph 1 of this Article, it shall give notice in writing to the CONTRACTING
PARTIES as far in advance as may be practicable and shall afford the CONTRACTING
PARTIES and those contracting parties having a substantial interest as exporters of
the product concerned an opportunity to consult with it in respect of the proposed
action. When such notice is given in relation to a concession with respect to a
preference, the notice shall name the contracting party which has requested the
action. In critical circumstances, where delay would cause damage which it would
be difficult to repair, action under paragraph 1 of this Article may be taken
provisionally without prior consultation, on the condition that consultation shall be




3. (a) If agreement among the interested contracting parties with respect to the
action is not reached, the contracting party which proposes to take or continue the
action shall, nevertheless, be free to do so, and if such action is taken or continued,
the affected contracting parties shall then be free, not later than ninety days after
such action is taken, to suspend, upon the expiration of thirty days from the day on
which written notice of such suspension is received by the CONTRACTING PARTIES,
the application to the trade of the contracting party taking such action, or, in the
case envisaged in paragraph 1 (b) of this Article, to the trade of the contracting party
requesting such action, of such substantially equivalent concessions or other
obligations under this Agreement the suspension of which the CONTRACTING
PARTIES do not disapprove.
(b)Notwithstanding the provisions of sub-paragraph (a) of this paragraph,
where action is taken under paragraph 2 of this Article without prior consultation
and causes or threatens serious injury in the territory of a contracting party to the
domestic producers of products affected by the action, that contracting party shall,
where delay would cause damage difficult to repair, be free to suspend, upon the
taking of the action and throughout the period of consultation, such concessions or





Having in mind the overall objective of the Members to improve and strengthen
the international trading system based on GATT 1994;
Recognizing the need to clarify and reinforce the disciplines of GATT 1994, and
specifically those of its Article XIX (Emergency Action on Imports of Particular
Products), to re-establish multilateral control over safeguards and eliminate
measures that escape such control;
Recognizing the importance of structural adjustment and the need to enhance
rather than limit competition in international markets; and
Recognizing further that, for these purposes, a comprehensive agreement,
applicable to all Members and based on the basic principles of GATT 1994, is
called for;
Hereby agree as follows:
Article 1
General Provision
This Agreement establishes rules for the application of safeguard measures







1. A  Member1 may apply a safeguard measure to a product only if that Member has
determined, pursuant to the provisions set out below, that such product is being
imported into its territory in such increased quantities, absolute or relative to
domestic production, and under such conditions as to cause or threaten to cause
serious injury to the domestic industry that produces like or directly competitive
products.




1. A Member may apply a safeguard measure only following an investigation by
the competent authorities of that Member pursuant to procedures previously
established and made public in consonance with Article X of GATT 1994. This
investigation shall include reasonable public notice to all interested parties and
public hearings or other appropriate means in which importers, exporters and other
interested parties could present evidence and their views, including the opportunity
to respond to the presentations of other parties and to submit their views, inter alia,
as to whether or not the application of a safeguard measure would be in the public
interest. The competent authorities shall publish a report setting forth their findings
and reasoned conclusions reached on all pertinent issues of fact and law.
2. Any information which is by nature confidential or which is provided on a
confidential basis shall, upon cause being shown, be treated as such by the
competent authorities. Such information shall not be disclosed without permission
of the party submitting it. Parties providing confidential information may be
requested to furnish non-confidential summaries thereof or, if such parties indicate
that such information cannot be summarized, the reasons why a summary cannot be
                                  
1 A customs union may apply a safeguard measure as a single unit or on behalf of a member State.
When a customs union applies a safeguard measure as a single unit, all the requirements for the
determination of serious injury or threat thereof under this Agreement shall be based on the
conditions existing in the customs union as a whole. When a safeguard measure is applied on
behalf of a member State, all the requirements for the determination of serious injury or threat
thereof shall be based on the conditions existing in that member State and the measure shall be
limited to that member State. Nothing in this Agreement prejudges the interpretation of the
relationship between Article  XIX and paragraph 8 of Article XXIV of GATT 1994.B12 PIG AND PIGMEAT
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provided. However, if the competent authorities find that a request for
confidentiality is not warranted and if the party concerned is either unwilling to
make the information public or to authorize its disclosure in generalized or summary
form, the authorities may disregard such information unless it can be demonstrated
to their satisfaction from appropriate sources that the information is correct.
Article 4
Determination of Serious Injury or Threat Thereof
1. For the purposes of this Agreement:
(a)  "serious injury" shall be understood to mean a significant overall impairment
in the position of a domestic industry;
(b)  "threat of serious injury" shall be understood to mean serious injury that is
clearly imminent, in accordance with the provisions of paragraph  2. A
determination of the existence of a threat of serious injury shall be based on
facts and not merely on allegation, conjecture or remote possibility; and
(c) in determining injury or threat thereof, a "domestic industry" shall be
understood to mean the producers as a whole of the like or directly
competitive products operating within the territory of a Member, or those
whose collective output of the like or directly competitive products
constitutes a major proportion of the total domestic production of those
products.
2. (a) In the investigation to determine whether increased imports have caused or
are threatening to cause serious injury to a domestic industry under the terms of this
Agreement, the competent authorities shall evaluate all relevant factors of an
objective and quantifiable nature having a bearing on the situation of that industry,
in particular, the rate and amount of the increase in imports of the product
concerned in absolute and relative terms, the share of the domestic market taken by
increased imports, changes in the level of sales, production, productivity, capacity
utilization, profits and losses, and employment.
(b)The determination referred to in subparagraph (a) shall not be made unless
this investigation demonstrates, on the basis of objective evidence, the existence of
the causal link between increased imports of the product concerned and serious
injury or threat thereof. When factors other than increased imports are causing





(c) The competent authorities shall publish promptly, in accordance with the
provisions of Article 3, a detailed analysis of the case under investigation as well as
a demonstration of the relevance of the factors examined.
Article 5
Application of Safeguard Measures
1. A Member shall apply safeguard measures only to the extent necessary to
prevent or remedy serious injury and to facilitate adjustment. If a quantitative
restriction is used, such a measure shall not reduce the quantity of imports below the
level of a recent period which shall be the average of imports in the last three
representative years for which statistics are available, unless clear justification is
given that a different level is necessary to prevent or remedy serious injury.
Members should choose measures most suitable for the achievement of these
objectives.
2. (a) In cases in which a quota is allocated among supplying countries, the
Member applying the restrictions may seek agreement with respect to the allocation
of shares in the quota with all other Members having a substantial interest in
supplying the product concerned. In cases in which this method is not reasonably
practicable, the Member concerned shall allot to Members having a substantial
interest in supplying the product shares based upon the proportions, supplied by
such Members during a previous representative period, of the total quantity or value
of imports of the product, due account being taken of any special factors which may
have affected or may be affecting the trade in the product.
(b)A Member may depart from the provisions in subparagraph (a) provided that
consultations under paragraph 3 of Article 12 are conducted under the auspices of
the Committee on Safeguards provided for in paragraph 1 of Article 13 and that
clear demonstration is provided to the Committee that (i) imports from certain
Members have increased in disproportionate percentage in relation to the total
increase of imports of the product concerned in the representative period, (ii) the
reasons for the departure from the provisions in subparagraph (a) are justified, and
(iii) the conditions of such departure are equitable to all suppliers of the product
concerned. The duration of any such measure shall not be extended beyond the
initial period under paragraph 1 of Article 7. The departure referred to above shall




In critical circumstances where delay would cause damage which it would be
difficult to repair, a Member may take a provisional safeguard measure pursuant to a
preliminary determination that there is clear evidence that increased imports have
caused or are threatening to cause serious injury. The duration of the provisional
measure shall not exceed 200 days, during which period the pertinent requirements
of Articles 2 through 7 and 12 shall be met. Such measures should take the form of
tariff increases to be promptly refunded if the subsequent investigation referred to in
paragraph 2 of Article 4 does not determine that increased imports have caused or
threatened to cause serious injury to a domestic industry. The duration of any such
provisional measure shall be counted as a part of the initial period and any
extension referred to in paragraphs 1, 2 and 3 of Article 7.
Article 7
Duration and Review of Safeguard Measures
1. A Member shall apply safeguard measures only for such period of time as may
be necessary to prevent or remedy serious injury and to facilitate adjustment. The
period shall not exceed four years, unless it is extended under paragraph 2.
2. The period mentioned in paragraph  1 may be extended provided that the
competent authorities of the importing Member have determined, in conformity with
the procedures set out in Articles 2, 3, 4 and 5, that the safeguard measure continues
to be necessary to prevent or remedy serious injury and that there is evidence that
the industry is adjusting, and provided that the pertinent provisions of Articles 8
and 12 are observed.
3. The total period of application of a safeguard measure including the period of
application of any provisional measure, the period of initial application and any
extension thereof, shall not exceed eight years.
4. In order to facilitate adjustment in a situation where the expected duration of a
safeguard measure as notified under the provisions of paragraph 1 of Article 12 is
over one year, the Member applying the measure shall progressively liberalize it at
regular intervals during the period of application. If the duration of the measure
exceeds three years, the Member applying such a measure shall review the situation




increase the pace of liberalization. A measure extended under paragraph 2 shall not
be more restrictive than it was at the end of the initial period, and should continue to
be liberalized.
5. No safeguard measure shall be applied again to the import of a product which
has been subject to such a measure, taken after the date of entry into force of the
WTO Agreement, for a period of time equal to that during which such measure had
been previously applied, provided that the period of non-application is at least two
years.
6. Notwithstanding the provisions of paragraph  5, a safeguard measure with a
duration of 180 days or less may be applied again to the import of a product if:
(a)  at least one year has elapsed since the date of introduction of a safeguard
measure on the import of that product; and
(b)  such a safeguard measure has not been applied on the same product more
than twice in the five-year period immediately preceding the date of
introduction of the measure.
Article 8
Level of Concessions and Other Obligations
1. A Member proposing to apply a safeguard measure or seeking an extension of a
safeguard measure shall endeavour to maintain a substantially equivalent level of
concessions and other obligations to that existing under GATT 1994 between it and
the exporting Members which would be affected by such a measure, in accordance
with the provisions of paragraph  3 of Article  12. To achieve this objective, the
Members concerned may agree on any adequate means of trade compensation for
the adverse effects of the measure on their trade.
2. If no agreement is reached within 30 days in the consultations under paragraph 3
of Article  12, then the affected exporting Members shall be free, not later than
90 days after the measure is applied, to suspend, upon the expiration of 30 days
from the day on which written notice of such suspension is received by the Council
for Trade in Goods, the application of substantially equivalent concessions or other
obligations under GATT 1994, to the trade of the Member applying the safeguard
measure, the suspension of which the Council for Trade in Goods does not
disapprove.B16 PIG AND PIGMEAT
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3. The right of suspension referred to in paragraph 2 shall not be exercised for the
first three years that a safeguard measure is in effect, provided that the safeguard
measure has been taken as a result of an absolute increase in imports and that such a
measure conforms to the provisions of this Agreement.
Article 9
Developing Country Members
1. Safeguard measures shall not be applied against a product originating in a
developing country Member as long as its share of imports of the product concerned
in the importing Member does not exceed 3  per  cent, provided that developing
country Members with less than 3 per cent import share collectively account for not
more than 9 per cent of total imports of the product concerned.2
2. A developing country Member shall have the right to extend the period of
application of a safeguard measure for a period of up to two years beyond the
maximum period provided for in paragraph  3 of Article  7. Notwithstanding the
provisions of paragraph 5 of Article 7, a developing country Member shall have the
right to apply a safeguard measure again to the import of a product which has been
subject to such a measure, taken after the date of entry into force of the
WTO  Agreement, after a period of time equal to half that during which such a
measure has been previously applied, provided that the period of non-application is
at least two years.
Article 10
Pre-existing Article XIX Measures
Members shall terminate all safeguard measures taken pursuant to Article XIX of
GATT  1947 that were in existence on the date of entry into force of the
WTO Agreement not later than eight years after the date on which they were first
applied or five years after the date of entry into force of the WTO  Agreement,
whichever comes later.
                                  






Prohibition and Elimination of Certain Measures
1. (a) A Member shall not take or seek any emergency action on imports of
particular products as set forth in Article XIX of GATT 1994 unless such action
conforms with the provisions of that Article  applied in accordance with this
Agreement.
(b)Furthermore, a Member shall not seek, take or maintain any voluntary export
restraints, orderly marketing arrangements or any other similar measures on the
export or the import side.3,4 These include actions taken by a single Member as well
as actions under agreements, arrangements and understandings entered into by two
or more Members. Any such measure in effect on the date of entry into force of the
WTO Agreement shall be brought into conformity with this Agreement or phased
out in accordance with paragraph 2.
(c) This Agreement does not apply to measures sought, taken or maintained by a
Member pursuant to provisions of GATT 1994 other than Article  XIX, and
Multilateral Trade Agreements in Annex 1A other than this Agreement, or pursuant
to protocols and agreements or arrangements concluded within the framework of
GATT 1994.
2. The phasing out of measures referred to in paragraph 1(b) shall be carried out
according to timetables to be presented to the Committee on Safeguards by the
Members concerned not later than 180 days after the date of entry into force of the
WTO  Agreement. These timetables shall provide for all measures referred to in
paragraph 1 to be phased out or brought into conformity with this Agreement within
a period not exceeding four years after the date of entry into force of the
WTO  Agreement, subject to not more than one specific measure per importing
Member5, the duration of which shall not extend beyond 31 December 1999. Any
such exception must be mutually agreed between the Members directly concerned
and notified to the Committee on Safeguards for its review and acceptance within
90  days of the entry into force of the WTO  Agreement. The Annex to this
                                  
3 An import quota applied as a safeguard measure in conformity with the relevant provisions of
GATT 1994 and this Agreement may, by mutual agreement, be administered by the exporting
Member.
4 Examples of similar measures include export moderation, export-price or import-price
monitoring systems, export or import surveillance, compulsory import cartels and discretionary
export or import licensing schemes, any of which afford protection.
5 The only such exception to which the European Communities is entitled is indicated in the Annex
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Agreement indicates a measure which has been agreed as falling under this
exception.
3. Members shall not encourage or support the adoption or maintenance by public
and private enterprises of non-governmental measures equivalent to those referred
to in paragraph 1.
Article 12
Notification and Consultation
1. A Member shall immediately notify the Committee on Safeguards upon:
(a)  initiating an investigatory process relating to serious injury or threat thereof
and the reasons for it;
(b) making a finding of serious injury or threat thereof caused by increased
imports; and
(c)  taking a decision to apply or extend a safeguard measure.
2. In making the notifications referred to in paragraphs 1(b) and 1(c), the Member
proposing to apply or extend a safeguard measure shall provide the Committee on
Safeguards with all pertinent information, which shall include evidence of serious
injury or threat thereof caused by increased imports, precise description of the
product involved and the proposed measure, proposed date of introduction, expected
duration and timetable for progressive liberalization. In the case of an extension of a
measure, evidence that the industry concerned is adjusting shall also be provided.
The Council for Trade in Goods or the Committee on Safeguards may request such
additional information as they may consider necessary from the Member proposing
to apply or extend the measure.
3. A Member proposing to apply or extend a safeguard measure shall provide
adequate opportunity for prior consultations with those Members having a
substantial interest as exporters of the product concerned, with a view to, inter alia,
reviewing the information provided under paragraph  2, exchanging views on the
measure and reaching an understanding on ways to achieve the objective set out in
paragraph 1 of Article 8.
4. A Member shall make a notification to the Committee on Safeguards before
taking a provisional safeguard measure referred to in Article 6. Consultations shall




5. The results of the consultations referred to in this Article, as well as the results
of mid-term reviews referred to in paragraph  4 of Article  7, any form of
compensation referred to in paragraph 1 of Article 8, and proposed suspensions of
concessions and other obligations referred to in paragraph 2 of Article 8, shall be
notified immediately to the Council for Trade in Goods by the Members concerned.
6. Members shall notify promptly the Committee on Safeguards of their laws,
regulations and administrative procedures relating to safeguard measures as well as
any modifications made to them.
7. Members maintaining measures described in Article  10 and paragraph  1 of
Article 11 which exist on the date of entry into force of the WTO Agreement shall
notify such measures to the Committee on Safeguards not later than 60 days after
the date of entry into force of the WTO Agreement.
8. Any Member may notify the Committee on Safeguards of all laws, regulations,
administrative procedures and any measures or actions dealt with in this Agreement
that have not been notified by other Members that are required by this Agreement to
make such notifications.
9. Any Member may notify the Committee on Safeguards of any non-governmental
measures referred to in paragraph 3 of Article 11.
10.All notifications to the Council for Trade in Goods referred to in this Agreement
shall normally be made through the Committee on Safeguards.
11.The provisions on notification in this Agreement shall not require any Member
to disclose confidential information the disclosure of which would impede law
enforcement or otherwise be contrary to the public interest or would prejudice the
legitimate commercial interests of particular enterprises, public or private.
Article 13
Surveillance
1. A Committee on Safeguards is hereby established, under the authority of the
Council for Trade in Goods, which shall be open to the participation of any Member
indicating its wish to serve on it. The Committee will have the following functions:
(a)  to monitor, and report annually to the Council for Trade in Goods on, the
general implementation of this Agreement and make recommendations
towards its improvement;B20 PIG AND PIGMEAT
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(b)  to find, upon request of an affected Member, whether or not the procedural
requirements of this Agreement have been complied with in connection with
a safeguard measure, and report its findings to the Council for Trade in
Goods;
(c) to assist Members, if they so request, in their consultations under the
provisions of this Agreement;
(d)  to examine measures covered by Article 10 and paragraph 1 of Article 11,
monitor the phase-out of such measures and report as appropriate to the
Council for Trade in Goods;
(e)  to review, at the request of the Member taking a safeguard measure, whether
proposals to suspend concessions or other obligations are "substantially
equivalent", and report as appropriate to the Council for Trade in Goods;
(f)  to receive and review all notifications provided for in this Agreement and
report as appropriate to the Council for Trade in Goods; and
(g) to perform any other function connected with this Agreement that the
Council for Trade in Goods may determine.
2. To assist the Committee in carrying out its surveillance function, the Secretariat
shall prepare annually a factual report on the operation of this Agreement based on
notifications and other reliable information available to it.
Article 14
Dispute Settlement
The provisions of Articles XXII and XXIII of GATT 1994 as elaborated and
applied by the Dispute Settlement Understanding shall apply to consultations and





Exception referred to in paragraph 2 of article 11
Members concerned Product Termination
EC/Japan Passenger cars, off road
vehicles, light commercial
vehicles, light trucks (up to
5 tonnes), and the same
vehicles in wholly knocked-
down form (CKD sets).
31 December 1999GOODS UNDER
REFERENCE
C1
C Goods under reference
Goods under reference fall within tariff sub-heading 0203.29 of the Australian
Customs Tariff (see following extract). All goods under tariff heading 0203 enter
free of duty.
0203 — MEAT OF SWINE, FRESH, CHILLED OR FROZEN.
– Fresh or chilled:
0203.11 – – Carcasses and half-carcasses
0203.12 – – Hams, shoulders and cuts thereof, with bone in
0203.19 – – Other
– Frozen:
0203.21 – – Carcasses and half-carcasses
0203.22 – – Hams, shoulders and cuts thereof, with bone in
0203.29 – – Other
This heading covers fresh, chilled or frozen meat of pigs and other swine, whether
domestic or wild (e.g., wild boars). The heading includes streaky pork and similar
meats interlarded with a high proportion of fat, and fat with an adhering layer of




D Australian pig and pigmeat industries
The pig and pigmeat industry consists of three sectors; pig farming; pigmeat
processing in abattoirs and boning rooms; and secondary processing into ham,
bacon and smallgoods. Some producers undertake activities in more than one sector.
The industry produces fresh pork and various processed pork products.
D.1 The pigmeat processing chain
Pig farming
In Australia, pigs are housed in large sheds where temperature and feed can be
controlled. Shed design and production methods vary as new technology and
improved animal husbandry are introduced into the industry. Stockfeed is the major
component of costs.
Heavier pigs (baconers) are suited to processing into bacon, ham and smallgoods.
Other pigs (porkers) are grown specifically for the fresh pork market.
Most pig producers sell a slaughtered product to processors. This means ownership
changes hands ‘over the hooks’, payment being related to the hot standard weight of
the dressed carcass. Miandetta Farms explained:
It is important to note that the majority of pig farmers produce and sell pork. Nearly all
pigs are sold at the end of the slaughter chain and remain the property of the pig farmer
until the animal crosses the scales. It is eviscerated, trimmed, de-haired and ready for
chilling at this point. (sub.  24, p. 1)
Apart from those pigs which are incorporated in a vertically integrated enterprise
most are sold under customary relationships but without guarantees from purchasers
on quantity or price. The pig producers sell a carcass that must be within a tightly
specified weight range and fat level or heavy price discounts are incurred. As pigs
grow quickly (around 39  weeks production cycle) the pig producer has a small
window in which to sell.
Pig farming is a relatively small sector of agriculture in Australia. In 1996–97, value
added in pig farming accounted for just 2 per cent of farm gross product and oneD2 PIG AND PIGMEAT
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twentieth of one per cent of Australian GDP (ABARE 1997). Pig sales and turnover
have risen over the last ten years while the value of livestock and value added have
fluctuated according to climatic conditions and their effects on input and output
prices (see table D.1).
Table D.1 Key statistics: pig farming
Pig sales Turnover
 a Value added
$m $m $m
1988–89 295.3 366.0 156.1
1989–90 448.3 536.5 199.6
1990–91 521.7 613.6 202.1
1991–92 549.8 643.8 181.5
1992–93 455.8 520.9 144.7
1993–94 571.5 680.6 206.4
1994–95 558.3 666.6 172.6
1995–96 583.6 673.8 168.0
1996–97 628.2 706.8 271.9
a Total revenue for pig farms from the sale of crops, livestock and livestock products, rent and leasing
revenue and miscellaneous other farm and non-farm activities.
Source: ABS (Cat. No. 7507.0).
Abattoirs and boning rooms (primary processors)
Although abattoirs that slaughter pigs vary considerably in size and scope of
operation, the processes undertaken are similar in all. They include stunning the pig,
sticking, bleeding, de-hairing and evisceration (gutting and cleaning). The end
products of these processes are whole carcasses, half-carcasses, edible offal and
other by-products.
In the boning room, the carcass is broken up into primal cuts such as shoulders,
middles and legs. Generally, these processes are labour intensive with the carcasses
broken up by electric saw, and boning and slicing by knife. There is a range of
treatments of each primal cut depending on the end-use of the product — which
either is sold in the fresh pork market, through the food service industry and retail
outlets (supermarkets, butchers, restaurants, etc.), or used in the manufacture of
bacon, hams and smallgoods.
The share of pigmeat entering the fresh pork market is around 40  per  cent, the
remainder being used in secondary processing.
The production of pigmeat represents only a small part of total meat production but
the precise proportion is difficult to determine. Meat processing industry statistics
available from the ABS include all slaughtering and meat production and, therefore,AUSTRALIAN PIG AND
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official disaggregated structural data regarding firms producing and processing
pigmeat are not available.
The Australian Pork Corporation’s (APC) annual PigStats publication has provided
data on the 20 largest pig abattoirs since 1992–93. These data have been combined
with information supplied to the Commission by the processing companies.
The meat processing industry is one of Australia’s largest rural-based industries. In
1996–97, gross product was over $1 billion and turnover was almost $6 billion (see
table D.2).
In 1996–97, the pig farming sector recorded livestock sales of $630 million out of
total livestock sales of $6 billion (11 per cent). An ABS input/output analysis from
1993–94 shows that pigs accounted for around 12 per cent of livestock purchases by
the meat processing sector, including sales within vertically integrated enterprises.
In 1997–98, just over 12 per cent of meat produced by the sector was pigmeat.
These shares have not changed substantially in the 1990s.
This suggests that pigmeat production accounts for around 11 to 12 per cent of total
meat processing turnover. Using this percentage for value added and employment
implies the pigmeat processing industry contributed roughly $130 million to
Australia’s GDP and supported around 3000 jobs in 1996–97.
Table D.2 Key statistics: meat processing
Turnover
 a Gross product
 b Employment Establishments
$m $m No. No.
1984–85 3 586.3 na 29 622 420
1985–86 na na na na
1986–87 4 260.9 na 29 802 379
1987–88 5 164.0 na 30 671 392
1988–89 5 403.9 na 29 500 385
1989–90 5 882.0 na 31 683 408
1990–91 5 474.4 na 27 238 353
1991–92 5 358.7 na 27 086 340
1992–93 6 224.2 1 377.0 30 168 390
1993–94 6 321.8 na 29 533 347
1994–95 6 177.5 na 29 014 345
1995–96 6 091.3 1 200.9 28 351 336
1996–97p 5 733.9 1 314.2 28 874 345
a Total revenue from all activities. b Gross value added. na Not available. p Preliminary data.
Source: ABS (Cat No. 8221.0 and unpublished data).D4 PIG AND PIGMEAT
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Secondary processing (ham, bacon and smallgoods manufacturers)
Secondary processing involves the further processing of the cuts of pigmeat into
bacon, ham and smallgoods through curing, cooking and smoking. Although these
manufacturers use all meats, the majority of meat used is pigmeat. The pigmeat used
in secondary processing can be from local boning rooms or imported.
The vast majority of smallgoods producers use at least some pigmeat. As for the
meat processing industry, there are no official disaggregated data for the secondary
meat processing industry.
There were 147 bacon, ham and smallgoods manufacturing establishments in
1996–97. This figure has fluctuated over the last decade from a high of 169 to a low
of 118 (see table D.3). Although many of these manufacturers are small family-
owned establishments, large companies such as Don Smallgoods (part of Bunge
Meat Industries), Darling Downs Bacon, Watsonia and the operations of the large
supermarket chains dominate total sales.
Table D.3 Key statistics: bacon, ham and smallgoods manufacturing
Turnover
 a Gross product
 b Employment Establishments
$m $m No. No.
1984–85 775.5 na 7 026 120
1985–86 na na na na
1986–87 869.2 na 6 973 125
1987–88 918.9 na 6 956 135
1988–89 1 009.5 na 6 800 118
1989–90 1 008.2 na 6 398 134
1990–91 1 214.6 na 7 149 132
1991–92 1 205.8 na 6 594 129
1992–93 1 251.7 280.2 7 082 146
1993–94 1 302.1 na 7 118 152
1994–95 1 195.0 na 6 454 159
1995–96 1 211.3 331.2 6 690 169
1996–97p 1 240.4 321.4 6 484 147
a Total revenue from all activities. b Gross value added. na Not available. p Preliminary data.
Source: ABS (Cat No. 8221.0 and unpublished data).AUSTRALIAN PIG AND
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D.2 Industry and production trends
D.2.1 Pig production
Until the early 1970s, pig production was associated with dairy farming. The
number of pig herds declined by 10 000 between 1960 and 1970. However, the
introduction of restrictive delivery quotas for wheat in 1969 prompted wheat
farmers to enter pig production as a means of using surplus wheat. This resulted in
the build up of pigs and consequent rapid expansion of pigmeat production in
1972–73. With the removal of quotas, there was a sharp drop in production until
1976. The industry consolidated and 15 000 producers left the industry over this
period.
This began the long transition from a dairy based sideline to a grain based, intensive
farming industry. Between 1970–71 and 1997–98, the number of pig herds declined
by 92 per cent, from around 40 000 to just over 3100 (an average of 1300 herds a
year), while pigmeat production rose by over 94  per  cent (see table  D.4). The
average herd size, which was less than 10 breeding sows during the 1960s, has
increased to almost 100 sows in 1998.
While the number of sows has decreased from its peak in 1972–73, an increase in
pigmeat production was possible because of an increasing number of slaughtered
pigs per sow and an increasing yield of meat from each carcass. Both resulted from
improved genetic stock and animal husbandry. However, meat yield (71 kg/pig) is
still lower than in many of the major producing nations such as Canada (81 kg/pig),
the United States (85 kg/pig), China (76 kg/pig), Denmark (77 kg/pig) and Poland
(75 kg/pig).
Periods of hardship, such as the 1994–95 drought, saw particularly high numbers of
small producers leave the industry. Between December 1994 and June 1995, almost
1000 of these small operations ceased to exist (see table D.5).
Despite ongoing structural change in the industry, there still remains a large number
of small non-specialist producers (producers with less than 100 sows are generally
considered to be non-specialist). The 81 per cent of pig producers that have fewer
than 100 sows have just 21 per cent of Australia’s breeding stock. In contrast, over
40 per cent of breeding sows are owned by the 1 per cent of producers with over
1000 sows (see table D.5).D6 PIG AND PIGMEAT
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Table D.4 Producers, herd size, slaughter and pigmeat production
Producers





No. ’000 ’000 ’000 t
1960–61 49 537 211 na na
1970–71 39 498 338 na 182
1971–72 37 797 367 na 194
1972–73 39 252 460 4 743 236
1973–74 35 432 414 4 170 211
1974–75 na 323 3 454 175
1975–76 24 994 311 3 295 174
1976–77 23 830 308 3 478 185
1977–78 21 962 311 3 693 199
1978–79 20 073 301 3 589 199
1979–80 19 243 312 3 878 218
1980–81 19 279 352 4 216 233
1981–82 17 281 343 4 058 228
1982–83 14 290 329 4 162 239
1983–84 13 548 341 4 401 253
1984–85 12 705 335 4 490 260
1985–86 11 159 333 4 550 271
1986–87 10 661 337 4 736 283
1987–88 8 524 341 4 923 297
1988–89 8 239 349 5 007 308
1989–90 7 593 339 4 942 317
1990–91 6 847 331 4 865 312
1991–92 6 231 307 5 132 336
1992–93 5 828 305 5 032 328
1993–94 4 754 308 5 190 344
1994–95 (December) 4 683 (December) 320 5 120 351
(June) 3 615 (June) 290
1995–96 3 522 290 (5 061) 4 824 (350) 334
1996–97 3 337 299 (4 846) 4 654 (339) 326
1997–98p 3 148 307 (5 018) 4 855 (354) 343
a Number of producers and sows at December for 1960–61 to 1994–95, at June from 1994–95 onwards.
b For 1995–96 to 1997–98, ABARE revised figures are included in parentheses to correct for apparent
under-reporting to the ABS in those years. na Not available. p Preliminary figures.
Source: ABS (Cat. No. 7215.0 and unpublished data) and ABARE (1998).
Around 3100 pig herds remained in 1997–98. These were distributed throughout
Australia but were concentrated in the major grain growing areas (see section D.10,
figure D.6). New South Wales had the largest number of breeding sows, followed
by Queensland and Victoria. Queensland had the highest number of large producers
(over 400 sows) including 10 with over 1000 sows. However, Victoria had the
highest average herd size (see table D.6).AUSTRALIAN PIG AND
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Australia’s average herd size is very high by world standards. In 1994, the average
herd size in Canada was 36 breeding sows, 43 in Denmark and 31 in the United
States.
Table D.5 Pig production, by herd size
Number of sows per producer Total
0–49 50–99 100–199 200–399 400–999 1000+
December 1992
Producers 4 311 801 463 169 56 28 5 828
Sows 57 251 51 715 56 610 41 928 31 717 84 712 323 933
December 1993
Producers 3 344 747 431 148 54 30 4 754
Sows 47 108 49 054 53 933 38 468 29 965 89 722 308 250
December 1994
Producers 3 279 741 419 150 62 32 4 683
Sows 46 098 49 448 53 132 38 304 34 547 98 005 319 534
June 1995
Producers 2 403 608 358 151 59 36 3 615
Sows 35 106 41 095 46 281 38 553 30 928 98 063 290 026
June 1996
Producers 2 348 587 354 136 63 34 3 522
Sows 33 927 40 026 46 272 35 501 34 221 100 082 290 029
June 1997
Producers 2 208 541 345 147 61 35 3 337
Sows 31 147 36 715 45 116 39 413 34 392 112 032 298 815
June 1998
Producers 2 065 504 336 137 69 37 3 148
Sows 27 682 34 474 44 453 37 066 39 365 124 447 307 487
Source: APC (various).
Table D.6 State distribution of pig herds, June 1998
Herds Breeding sows Average herd size
NSW 1 000 93 983 94
Qld 583 65 913 110
Vic 406 60 570 149
SA 644 47 652 74
WA 427 34 690 81
Tas 84 4 332 52
Other 4 347 87
Australia 3 148 307 487 98
Source: APC (1998).D8 PIG AND PIGMEAT
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D.2.2 Pigmeat processing
The considerable structural change in the pigmeat processing sector over the last
decade reflected trends in the wider meat processing industry. The processing of
pigmeat, like other sectors of the meat processing industries, developed from a base
of local processors spread throughout pig farming regions. In earlier periods, the
technical limitations in storing and transporting meat products meant that processors
were restricted to areas within easy reach of production and storage facilities. Over
time, improved transport and storage facilities have meant this constraint has eased
making rationalisation possible (see section D.10, figure D.7).
Between 1992–93 and 1996–97, the number of abattoirs killing pigs fell by
7 per cent to around 130 in 1996–97. Export accredited abattoirs that processed pigs
fell from 16 to 6, largely due to many abattoirs giving up their export accreditation.
However, farmed pigmeat exports have more than tripled over the last two years,
becoming concentrated in the largest operations. Among the top twenty pig
abattoirs, the biggest establishments have become export oriented and concentrated
on pigs. Pigs were the minor species slaughtered at most multi-species abattoirs.
Table D.7 shows the largest 20 abattoirs (by throughput) in 1996–97. (APC 1998)
Industry concentration has increased over the five years to 1996–97. The top five
abattoirs increased their share of the national pig slaughter from 32  per  cent to
38  per  cent, while the top twenty increased their share from 75  per  cent to
80 per cent. However, there were over 100 smaller establishments still operating in
the pigmeat processing sector.
Six abattoirs had an AUS-MEAT export accreditation in 1997–98. However, some
abattoirs have indicated they export without such accreditation.1
The pigmeat processing sector is more concentrated than the meat processing
industry as a whole. In 1996–97, the meat processing industry’s top 4 companies,
which controlled 20 abattoirs, accounted for 25 per cent of kills while the top 20
companies accounted for 56 per cent. (AUS-MEAT 1997)
The level of concentration in the Australian meat processing sector is not high by
international standards. In 1996, the 5 largest companies accounted for 71 per cent
of kills in the United States, 64  per  cent in Argentina and 60  per  cent in New
Zealand.
                                  
1 The Authority for Uniform Specification of Meat and Livestock (AUS-MEAT) has established
standards for abattoirs, boning rooms and storage facilities. Before 1996, export plants had to be
accredited by AUS-MEAT to produce meat for export. However, it is now possible to export
without such accreditation.AUSTRALIAN PIG AND
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Table D.7 Top 20 pig abattoirs by throughput, 1996–97
Abattoir






Bunge NSW 453 635 8 724 9.8 Yes Yes
Hurstbridge Vic 434 813 8 362 9.4 Yes Yes
Watsons WA 317 904 6 114 6.8 Yes Yes
Q Meat Brisbane Qld 282 434 5 431 6.1 No Yes
Chapmans SA 282 257 5 428 6.1 No No
Auspork Vic 256 727 4 937 5.5 Yes Yes
Darling Downs Bacon Qld 219 238 4 216 4.7 Yes No
Castle Bacon Vic 184 800 3 554 4.0 Yes No
Burrangong NSW 162 146 3 118 3.5 No No
Clover Meats WA 150 535 2 895 3.2 No No
Scone NSW 146 536 2 818 3.2 No Pending
Perfect Pork Vic 143 083 2 752 3.1 na na
Swickers Qld 112 753 2 168 2.4 No No
Ralph Vic 110 700 2 129 2.4 No No
Tamworth (Cargill) NSW 94 391 1 815 2.0 No No
Cassino RSM NSW 90 141 1 733 1.9 Yes Yes
Angaston SA 81 508 1 567 1.8 na na
MQF Qld 70 401 1 354 1.5 Yes No
Q Meat Toowoomba Qld 60 742 1 168 1.3 No No
Blue Ribbon Tas 46 391 892 1.0 No No
Top 20 3 701 135 71 176 79.6 8 6
Total industry 4 649 800 89 419 100.0 9 6
a Some abattoirs have changed ownership or closed since 1996-97.
Source: APC (1998), AUS-MEAT (various) and personal communications.
Vertical integration and linkages
There is extensive vertical integration in the pigmeat industry. In some cases links
extend from pig farming through to the processing of pigmeat into bacon, ham and
smallgoods. Abattoirs responsible for 50 per cent of the national pig kill in 1996–97
had associated pig farming operations (see table D.8). For example, Bunge Meat
Industries accounted for around 17  per  cent of the national herd in addition to
operating the largest dedicated pig abattoir, by throughput, in Australia. The extent
of operations in the company included “stockfeed milling, slaughtering, boning,
distribution, wholesaling and manufacturing” (trans., p. 64).
While not directly involved in pig farming, some other companies maintain close
relationships with their suppliers via contracts. Firms, such as Swickers in
Queensland, contract out the growing of their herd to pig farmers in the surrounding
district.D10 PIG AND PIGMEAT
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Table D.8 Vertical integration of large pigmeat processors
Abattoir









Bunge NSW Yes Yes Yes Yes
Hurstbridge Vic Yes Yes Yes
Watsons WA Yes Yes Yes Yes
Q Meat Brisbane Qld Yes Yes
Chapmans SA Yes Yes Yes Yes
Auspork Vic Yes Yes Yes
Darling Downs Bacon Qld Yes (co-op) Yes Yes Yes
Castlemaine Bacon Vic Yes Yes Yes Yes
Burrangong NSW Yes
Clover Meats WA Yes Yes Yes Yes
Scone NSW Yes Yes
Perfect Pork Vic na Yes na na
Swickers Qld Yes Yes Yes
Ralph Vic Yes Yes
Tamworth (Cargill) NSW Yes Yes
Cassino RSM NSW Yes
Angaston SA na Yes na na
MQF Qld Yes Yes Yes
Q Meat Toowoomba Qld Yes
Blue Ribbon Tas na Yes na na
a Some abattoirs have changed ownership or closed since 1996-97.
Source: APC (1998), AUS-MEAT (various) and personal communications.
Larger abattoirs operate their own boning rooms, while a number of independent
boning rooms process carcasses to supply bacon, ham and smallgoods
manufacturers. Woolworths purchases carcasses through its subsidiary, Chisholm
Manufacturing, for processing in their own boning rooms and processing operations.
Eight of the top 20 abattoirs have associated smallgoods operations.
Ownership
Significant foreign investment in the industry exists, most notably in the largest
pigmeat processor, Bunge Meat Industries (Bunge group, Brazil), and also in MQF
Pty Ltd (Nippon Meat Packers, Japan), DanPork (Denmark, Taiwan and Indonesia)
and Chapmans and Watsonia (Associated British Foods, United Kingdom).
Generally, foreign investment can introduce new techniques and inject capital into
the domestic industry, a fact recognised by the Meat Research Corporation:
In some instances, plants moving into the hands of foreign ownership have been
thoroughly upgraded, with new operating principles — such as single species kill,
double shifts, hot boning, etc. — also introduced. (MRC 1997, p. 7)AUSTRALIAN PIG AND
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Foreign investment can also help local producers gain access to foreign markets.
Foreign investors’ downstream operations in other countries can become customers
of their Australian operations, and the effectiveness of overseas marketing is
improved through knowledge of foreign consumers’ tastes and preferences.
The meat processing sector
Many of the trends emerging in the pigmeat processing sector are already well
advanced in the wider industry.
The meat processing sector has undergone significant rationalisation. ABS data
indicate that there were 345 meat processing establishments in Australia in
1995–96 — down almost 12 per cent since 1992–93 and 20 per cent from 1984–85
(see section D.1, table D.2).
The meat processing sector as a whole is more export oriented and more integrated
into world markets than the pigmeat processing sector. For example, in 1996,
60  per  cent of beef production was exported while only 4  per  cent of pigmeat
production was exported.
In the export sector, a trend to larger, single species plants has resulted in much
consolidation. Of the 51 plants controlled by the largest 25 processing companies in
1996, 40 were export accredited and thirty of the 51 plants were single species. A
major study of export establishments by the Meat Research Corporation in 1997
showed rationalisation of export establishments had been occurring since the mid-
1970s. The number of export establishments decreased by over 40 per cent and the
number of operating companies halved between 1976 and 1996. (MRC 1997)
The trend to increased vertical integration and foreign ownership has also been
observed in the wider meat processing industry as it has become integrated into
world markets. In effect, major overseas customers and trading companies, are
vertically integrating their food processing and wholesaling/retailing operations
across national borders.
D.3 Consumption
The major trend in domestic meat consumption over the last 20 years, has been a
shift away from red meat towards poultry and pork.2 Per capita consumption of beef
                                  
2 The large shifts in apparent consumption in beef and lamb during the early 1970s were caused
by the collapse of beef demand in Australia’s export markets. The sudden surplus of beef onD12 PIG AND PIGMEAT
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and veal has decreased by 40 per cent since its peak in 1977. Over the same period,
per capita consumption of lamb and mutton has decreased by 10  per  cent. In
contrast, per capita consumption of poultry and pigmeat has increased by around
80 per cent and 40 per cent respectively (see figure D.1).
Figure D.1 Per capita consumption of meat
a











































































































Beef & veal Lamb & mutton Pigmeat Poultry
a The decline in pigmeat consumption after 1994–95 should be treated with caution. In the calculation of
apparent consumption data, the ABS has used production data for 1995–96 to 1996–97 which could
underestimate production and therefore consumption (see note to table D.5).
Source: ABS (Cat. No. 4306.0).
Demand for some types of pigmeat in Australia is seasonal. Retail sales of ham at
Christmas (November and December) account for almost 40 per cent of annual ham
sales, while fresh pork sales at Christmas are slightly higher than normal (see
figure D.2). Bacon sales are not seasonal.
Like all industries, pork producers have had to adjust to changing consumer tastes.
Purchases of pork by butchers has declined relative to purchases by supermarkets
and food service providers (such as restaurants, fast food outlets and caterers). The
APC (1997) expects this trend will continue as consumers eat more meals outside
the home and shift from specialist butchers to the convenience of all-week shopping
and pre-prepared meals offered by supermarkets.
                                                                                                                                       
domestic markets and resultant low prices caused the large rise in beef consumption and cut in
lamb consumption.AUSTRALIAN PIG AND
PIGMEAT INDUSTRIES
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Australian per capita consumption of meat is amongst the highest in the world.
However, per capita pigmeat consumption is low when compared with much of
Europe, the United States, Canada and many Asian countries (see appendix E).
Figure D.2 Ham and fresh pork monthly retail sales split
 a








Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec
Ham sales Fresh pork sales
a Data for ham sales are averaged over 1991 to 1995, fresh pork sales are averaged over 1994 to 1996.
Source: Bunge Meat Industries (sub. 39, p. 22) and APC (various).
D.4 Exports
Exports have increased over the last two years, from 7000 tonnes in 1995–96 to
over 14 000 tonnes in 1997–98. In the past, a large proportion of exports were wild
pigmeat to Europe but, more recently, exports of farm produced pork, ham and
bacon have increased (see table D.9).
The demise of Taiwan as an international pork exporter, due to an outbreak there of
foot and mouth disease, has seen significant export opportunities created in Asian
markets such as Japan, Korea, Hong Kong, Singapore, the Philippines and China.
Australia exported pigmeat to over 40 countries in 1997–98. The European Union
and New Zealand have traditionally been the major markets for pigmeat exports
from Australia. More recently, exports to Asia have grown, accounting for over
43 per cent of total exports in 1996–97. Major markets in Asia include Japan, Hong
Kong and the Philippines.D14 PIG AND PIGMEAT
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However, exports to the European Union consist mainly of higher value wild
pigmeat (25 per cent of Australian pigmeat exports, by value but only 16 per cent by
volume). Exports to Japan were also of higher value cuts of pigmeat (42 per cent by
value but only 32 per cent by volume), while exports to the rest of Asia and Russia
have tended to be lower value pigmeat products (see table D.10).










’000 t ’000 t ’000 t ’000 t ’000 t $m
1989–90 6.37
c 0.04 1.07 7.48 29.4
1990–91 2.03 3.41 0.02 1.26 6.72 23.0
1991–92 1.60 3.44 0.05 1.10 6.19 22.6
1992–93 2.82 4.15 0.13 1.81 8.91 34.4
1993–94 2.52 3.33 0.21 1.28 7.34 28.3
1994–95 2.48 2.98 0.16 1.48 7.10 27.0
1995–96 2.67 2.98 0.36 1.03 7.04 32.9
1996–97 2.52 4.15 0.32 1.62 8.61 36.9
1997–98p 2.30 9.91 0.15 2.04 14.4 55.4
a ABARE and NSW Farmers’ Association estimates. b Preserved pigmeat exports and pigmeat offal.
c Breakdown between wild and farmed pigmeat not available. p Preliminary data.
Source: ABS (unpublished data).
Table D.10 Exports, by destination





Japan Rest of Asia Rest of
world
 a
1990–91 2 088 0 1 416 803 1 476 935
1991–92 1 677 0 953 1 074 1 529 959
1992–93 3 025 28 1 368 997 1 672 1 823
1993–94 2 631 241 1 605 375 1 251 1 240
1994–95 2 417 63 1 767 294 2 550 795
1995–96 2 658 979 847 215 2 173 170
1996–97 2 519 1 015 1 164 784 2 932 201
1997–98 2 303 2 219 1 734 4 676 3 276 241
Value ($m)
1990–91 8.3 0.0 5.3 5.6 4.2 3.5
1991–92 6.9 0.0 3.0 7.6 4.4 3.2
1992–93 16.0 0.1 3.9 8.4 4.2 5.1
1993–94 13.3 0.3 5.7 2.5 3.5 2.9
1994–95 13.1 0.2 5.4 2.2 6.0 1.5
1995–96 21.7 2.1 2.7 1.2 4.9 0.3
1996–97 18.9 1.9 4.7 4.0 6.9 0.5
1997–98 14.2 4.7 5.8 23.3 6.8 0.6
a Includes the Middle East.




Before July 1990, quarantine regulations prohibited the import of pigs and fresh or
processed pigmeat except for canned hams and some imports from New Zealand.
Since then, imports of frozen, uncooked pigmeat from Canada have been allowed
provided they are processed upon arrival in Australia. Since late 1997, uncooked
pigmeat imports from Denmark have been allowed but no uncooked imports from
Denmark have arrived to date.
Imports more than doubled to 10 000 tonnes in 1996–97. This corresponded with a
world increase in supply of pigmeat relative to demand. In 1997–98, imports
remained at similar levels (see table D.11). Canada supplies around 80 per cent of
Australian imports.

















bone in Other Various volume value
’000 t ’000 t ’000 t ’000 t ’000 t ’000 t $m
1989–90 - - - - 0.73 0.73 2.9
1990–91 - - 0.20 0.81 1.71 2.72 12.8
1991–92 0.01 0.07 0.34 3.61 1.07 5.10 19.9
1992–93 0.02 0.09 0.06 1.42 1.03 2.62 11.4
1993–94 0.02 - - 2.12 0.83 2.97 13.0
1994–95 0.01 - - 3.47 0.82 4.30 16.4
1995–96 0.03 - - 3.13 1.01 4.17 15.6
1996–97 0.05 - - 8.55 1.39 9.99 41.2
1997–98 0.10 - - 7.99 2.09 10.18 39.9
a Processed pigmeat imports (preserved, salted, dried, smoked, canned, etc.).
Source: ABS (unpublished data).
While the volume of imports fluctuates substantially from month to month, there is
a general increase in the latter half of the year. Imports peaked in 1996 and 1997
during the months of September, October and November. This is due to processors
importing pork legs for the Christmas peak in ham consumption.
After lower levels of pigmeat imports during the first half of 1998, levels rose in
June before falling to low levels in August and September (see table D.12).D16 PIG AND PIGMEAT
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Table D.12 Monthly imports of pigmeat by volume and value
1996 1997 1998
tonnes $’000 tonnes $’000 tonnes $’000
January 269 985 458 1 848 531 2 075
February 224 803 1 020 4 397 618 2 363
March 250 913 971 4 454 649 2 478
April 320 1 131 1 068 4 099 584 2 156
May 479 1 727 682 2 712 687 2 461
June 370 1 363 776 2 924 1 034 3 813
July 682 2 658 957 3 669 932 3 313
August 593 2 429 876 3 507 305 1 190
September 992 4 159 1 032 4 117 575 2 123
October 1 218 5 583 1 420 5 896
November 1 052 4 186 1 075 4 465
December 472 1 732 703 2 852
Source: ABS (unpublished data).
Canadian imports arriving under tariff sub-heading  0203.29 are boned and,
therefore, the tonnage cannot readily be compared to Australian pigmeat production
which is calculated on a carcass weight equivalent basis (head-on, not boned). To
convert to a comparable basis, boned imports are converted to their carcass weight
equivalent. Industry estimates suggest that between 80 and 100 per cent of imports
under tariff sub-heading 0203.29 are boned pork legs. Processors have indicated that
there is approximately a 59  per  cent meat yield by weight from a boned leg
(although yield is lower for the carcass as a whole) giving a conversion factor of
1.69 (1 tonne of Canadian boned leg import equates with 1.69 tonnes on a carcass
weight equivalent basis).
Australian production can be further adjusted to remove Australian pigmeat destined
for the fresh market which does not directly compete with frozen imports (around
40 per cent).
A comparison with Australian pork leg production for manufacturing requires the
removal of processed pigmeat from shoulders and middles (around 66 per cent).
While imports were 4 per cent of Australian production on carcass equivalent basis
during 1997–98, their share of the processed leg market was substantially higher at
over 19 per cent. This had increased from 8 per cent in 1994–95 (see table D.13).AUSTRALIAN PIG AND
PIGMEAT INDUSTRIES
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Table D.13 Share of production of imports under tariff sub-heading 0203.29
1994–95 1995–96 1996–97 1997–98
Australian pigmeat production
a (t) 351 298 333 967 325 914 343 131
- Fresh meat production
b (t) 140519 133587 130366 137252
Pigmeat production for processing (t) 210779 200380 195548 205879
- Middles and shoulders
c (t) 139114 132251 129062 135880
Leg production for manufacturing (t) 71665 68129 66486 69999
Assumption 1: imports 100% legs
Leg imports under 0203.29 (100% legs) (t) 3 470 3 130 8 546 7 985
cwe import volume
d (t) 5 881 5 305 14 484 13 534
Share of Australian production % 1.7 1.6 4.4 3.9
Share of Australian leg production for
manufacturing
% 8.2 7.8 21.7 19.3
Assumption 2: imports 80% legs
Leg imports under 0203.29 (80% legs) (t) 2 776 2 504 6 838 6 388
cwe import volume
d (t) 4 705 4 244 11 590 10 827
Share of Australian leg production for
manufacturing
% 6.6 6.2 17.4 15.5
a ABS pigmeat production data are used. b Assumed to be 40 per cent of production. c Assumed to be
66 per cent of carcass. d Carcass weight equivalent volume of imported legs is 1.69 times landed volume.
Source: ABS (Cat. No. 7215.0 and unpublished data) and Commission estimates.
D.6 Prices
Historically, pig prices followed a seasonal pattern, falling through the first half of
the year, then rising to peak in November and December as processors increase
demand in anticipation of the Christmas consumption of hams (see section D.3). In
1997, prices began their usual upward trend in June. However, from the end of
September prices declined for the rest of the year. This pattern was very different to
previous years (see figure D.3).
During 1998, pig prices have been at their lowest level since 1990. Baconer contract
prices (under which the majority of pigs are sold) reached as low as 154c/kg in the
second week of June. Since June, baconer contract prices have recovered to around
190c/kg in September and October (see table D.14).
However, the average price can mask significant variation in prices received by
individual producers. For example, in June 1998 prices received by producers in the
PCA survey averaged 164c/kg but ranged from below 160c/kg to above 250c/kg
(sub. 55, appendix 4, p. 5). Industry sources have also indicated that female pigs
receive a premium to male pigs because of boar taint in the latter.D18 PIG AND PIGMEAT
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Pork retail prices are less volatile than pig prices as retailers absorb short-term
fluctuations in wholesale pork prices. However, retail prices do trend with long-term
pig prices. During the March and June quarters of 1998, retail prices began to
decline for both pork loins and legs. Beef retail prices remained stable during these
quarters (see figure D.4).
Table D.14 Pig contract and saleyard prices



















cents/kg cents/kg cents/kg cents/kg cents/kg cents/kg
1989 1994
January 221 231 225 January 205 232 204
February 216 226 220 February 194 221 192
March 210 220 214 March 192 211 194
April 208 218 212 April 190 211 191
May 206 219 211 May 188 213 185
June 208 223 216 June 182 211 182
July 212 226 226 July 187 213 200
August 223 242 230 August 195 217 202
September 224 248 227 September 202 222 210
October 219 242 224 October 207 230 216
November 214 234 230 November 217 233 225
December 220 234 229 December 217 236 226
1990 1995
January 201 227 208 January 209 227 212
February 191 214 200 February 207 221 212
March 182 204 187 March 195 214 197
April 170 198 173 April 188 209 186
May 167 191 173 May 182 207 195
June 174 195 188 June 182 207 193
July 192 206 201 July 193 215 194
August 203 219 210 August 204 227 219
September 207 221 212 September 213 235 226
October 211 226 216 October 223 246 234
November 221 237 228 November 231 254 240
December 216 236 220 December 233 247 243






















cents/kg cents/kg cents/kg cents/kg cents/kg cents/kg
1991 1996
January 211 228 217 January 230 243 237
February 213 225 217 February 229 244 237
March 214 224 216 March 233 248 241
April 205 218 209 April 234 250 241
May 200 219 205 May 235 253 246
June 201 221 205 June 239 257 245
July 208 226 213 July 245 263 246
August 208 230 214 August 250 270 247
September 209 231 215 September 254 279 252
October 212 236 215 October 260 284 256
November 218 238 221 November 268 293 260
December 218 238 223 December 269 292 261
1992 1997
January 210 231 213 January 266 287 259
February 206 225 207 February 245 272 243
March 205 223 205 March 228 253 224
April 194 214 196 April 209 240 193
May 181 207 181 May 203 228 195
June 166 197 166 June 208 237 205
July 172 198 174 July 215 253 218
August 179 204 184 August 220 259 226
September 194 213 194 September 223 260 221
October 204 225 210 October 219 262 214
November 218 238 216 November 216 257 216
December 217 233 210 December 212 250 210
1993 1998
January 214 232 213 January 206 237 202
February 206 222 206 February 198 228 194
March 205 221 204 March 186 217 180
April 198 214 201 April 170 199 157
May 195 216 197 May 160 188 150
June 197 220 198 June 156 186 147
July 206 226 209 July 166 194 169
August 210 227 213 August 184 211 192
September 217 237 222 September 187 219 191
October 223 247 227 October 188 220 191
November 228 252 234
December 227 250 231
Source: ABARE (unpublished data) and QPPO (unpublished data).D20 PIG AND PIGMEAT
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Figure D.3 Seasonal contract price patterns for baconers

















Average 1990-96 1997 1998
Source: QPPO (unpublished data).
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The major component of pig production costs is the cost of feed. Between 1990–91
and 1996–97 the purchase of fodder varied between 53 and 63 per cent of non-wage
variable costs (see table  D.15). Other significant costs included the purchase of
livestock, repairs and maintenance, marketing expenses and veterinary services.
Table D.15 Pig production industry non-wage variable costs, by share
1990–91 1992–93 1994–95 1996–97
%%%%
Marketing expenses 6.5 6.4 7.0 4.6
Purchases of livestock 8.8 5.2 7.3 6.8
Payments for seed 0.6 0.4 0.7 0.7
Payments for fodder 58.5 63.0 53.0 60.0
Payments for fertiliser 1.2 1.2 1.6 1.3
Payments for crop and pasture chemicals 1.0 0.8 1.1 0.9
Payments for vet supplies and services 2.8 3.0 5.7 3.1
Payments for electricity 2.6 2.8 1.9 1.8
Payments for fuel 4.4 3.5 3.2 2.4
Water and drainage charges 0.3 0.8 0.5 0.4
Payments to contractors 1.8 1.9 1.9 3.5
Repairs and maintenance 7.3 7.7 6.8 7.5
Rent and leasing expenses 0.6 0.3 0.4 0.7
Other selected expenses 3.7 2.9 8.8 6.3
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Source: ABS (Cat. No. 7507.0).
Total costs were estimated for a sample of 26 pig farms for PigStats 97 (APC 1998).
Feed costs made up between 49 and 64  per  cent of total costs in 1996–97, the
weighted average being 56 per cent (see table D.16).
Table D.16 Pig production total cost structure, 1996–97
$/sow $/pig $/kg Live Weight Cost share
$$$ %
Feed costs 1 548.87 88.87 0.950 56.5
Herd costs 195.89 11.24 0.120 7.1
Shed costs 140.00 8.03 0.086 5.1
Labour costs 419.02 24.04 0.257 15.3
Overhead costs 439.34 25.21 0.270 16.0
Total costs 2 743.12 157.40 1.683 100.0
a APC survey data weighted by each piggery’s contribution to total production.
Source: APC (1998).D22 PIG AND PIGMEAT
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The price of feed grain and protein supplements is a major factor in pig production.
These prices are determined largely by Australian climatic conditions. Thus, grain
prices were high during the 1994–95 drought, but eased considerably during the
record harvests of 1996 and 1997 (see figure D.5).
Figure D.5 Feed grain prices







































































































































Source: ABARE (unpublished data).
The ABS produces cost data for the meat processing industry. These data are used
by the Commission to calculate the major costs borne by the pigmeat processing
sector on the assumption that it is likely to have a cost structure similar to meat
processing as a whole.
ABS input-output tables record the linkages between different industries in the
domestic economy. The tables specify whether the output of an industry is used as
an intermediate input, for final consumption, for investment or for exports. The
tables also show the inputs used by each industry. The most recent input-output data
are for 1993–94.
The input-output classification, meat and meat products (2101), includes red meat
processing, poultry processing, smallgoods manufacturing and by-product
manufacturing. The Commission weighted the data, apart from beef cattle, pigs and
sheep, by 0.58 to remove the inputs and sales of poultry processing, smallgoods
manufacturing and by-product manufacturing from the meat processing sector. The
sheep sector is weighted by 0.23 to exclude sheep used in wool production.AUSTRALIAN PIG AND
PIGMEAT INDUSTRIES
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The largest input costs for the meat processing sector were livestock — beef cattle,
pigs and sheep — which collectively accounted for around 65 per cent of total costs
in 1993–94. Labour was the next largest cost, with wages and salaries accounting
for around 10 per cent of total costs in 1993–94. Other significant costs were road
transport, gross operating surplus (cost of capital), and goods purchased from the
wholesale sector (see table D.17).
Major costs for the pigmeat processing sector will be similar to processing as a
whole. The major cost will be livestock, followed by labour costs, transport costs
and the cost of capital.
Table D.17 Major meat processing industry inputs, 1993–94
Input Value
 a Share of production
$m %
Livestock 4 938.6 66.0
Wages, salaries and supplements 790.5 10.6
Road transport 310.3 4.1
Gross operating surplus 280.1 3.7
Wholesale trade 151.4 2.0
Other property services 86.8 1.2
Other 931.0 12.4
Total 7 488.7 100.0
a Values are weighted to remove poultry processing, smallgoods manufacturing and by-product
manufacturing from the meat and meat products sector.
Source: ABS (Cat. No. 5209.0) and Commission estimates.
D.8 Profitability
In the decade to 1996–97, average profitability for pig production before
depreciation and income tax, has been higher than for agriculture as a whole. The
return on assets and return on net worth provide broad measures of the profitability
of an industry. Between 1987–88 and 1996–97, returns have averaged around
25 per cent higher in pig farming than returns on all agriculture (see table D.18).
Depreciation and amortisation charges were calculated from 1991–92. Allowing for
the impact of depreciation over this period, reported profits on average were
reduced by around 35 per cent for both pig farming and the agricultural sector as a
whole. However, the relative profits remained roughly the same, pig farming returns
remaining 25 per cent above average agricultural sector returns.D24 PIG AND PIGMEAT
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Grain prices have a strong influence on returns. For example, there was low
profitability for 1994–95 as grain prices were increased by drought conditions. In
contrast, profitability was high in 1996–97 partly as a result of lower grain prices.




 b Return on net worth
 c
Year Pig production All agriculture Pig production All agriculture
1987–88 3.9 5.1 4.6 5.8
1988–89 5.1 4.7 5.9 5.3
1989–90 7.8 4.6 9.6 5.2
1990–91 6.8 3.1 8.3 3.6
1991–92 4.3 2.9 5.2 3.3
1992–93 3.4 3.7 4.2 4.3
1993–94 6.3 3.9 7.6 4.5
1994–95 3.5 4.1 4.3 4.7
1995–96 5.9 5.0 7.3 5.9
1996–97 8.3 4.4 10.1 5.1
Average 1988–89 to
1996–97
5.5 4.2 6.7 4.8
a Calculation of asset values and net worth use the realisable value of land, buildings and assets on 30 June
and the realisable value of stock equal to the number of stock on June 30 times the average June price.
b Cash operating surplus/average total assets. c Cash operating surplus/average net worth.
Source: ABS (Cat. No. 7507.0).
While official data on profitability are not available for 1997–98, evidence for this
period was submitted by participants. This indicates that profitability decreased as a
result of low pig prices, particularly since March 1998.
The Pork Council of Australia (PCA) survey (covering 6 per cent of producers and
36 per cent of production) shows that, across the sample, profitability fell from a
7.6  per  cent return on capital employed in 1996–97 to a negative return of
3.5 per cent in 1997–98 (sub. 55, p. 21).
D.8.1 Debt
Debt levels in pig farming have fluctuated over the last decade between
$107 million in 1988–89 and $265 million in 1993–94. Generally, more profitable
years allow debt levels to be reduced. The record high profit level of 1996–97
coincided with a debt level in that year lower than for any of the previous seven
years (see table D.19). The debt to equity ratio has also fluctuated over this period.
The industry’s ability to service debt is measured by interest cover.AUSTRALIAN PIG AND
PIGMEAT INDUSTRIES
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Table D.19 Pig farm debt
Net Debt Net worth Interest cover
 a Debt to equity
 b
$m $m
1987–88 108.8 981.5 2.95 0.17
1988–89 107.1 1 057.6 3.25 0.17
1989–90 244.3 1 000.2 3.63 0.28
1990–91 199.1 1 429.7 3.99 0.16
1991–92 197.1 1 182.7 2.89 0.25
1992–93 165.4 1 070.4 3.64 0.19
1993–94 265.7 1 379.8 4.77 0.23
1994–95 215.5 1 228.3 3.11 0.26
1995–96 220.9 1 281.1 4.91 0.23
1996–97 138.3 1 144.6 9.04 0.22
a Cash operating surplus/interest paid. b Gross debt/net worth.
Source: ABS (Cat. No. 7507.0).
While official data on debt levels are not available for 1997–98, evidence for this
period was submitted by participants.
The PCA survey shows that, across the sample, debt levels rose by 15  per  cent
between 1996–97 and 1997–98. If the PCA sample is representative of the whole
industry, this indicates the net debt would still have remained low relative to most
of the previous decade.
Debt owed to financial institutions rose by 13  per  cent from $57  million to
$64.3  million, while debt owed to feed suppliers increased by 82  per  cent from
$3.7 million to $6.7 million (sub. 55, p. 21).
D.9 Employment
The PCA estimated there were 2136 persons employed by the 3337 producers in
June 1996–97. By June 1998, 200 producers had left the industry and estimated
persons employed had declined by 7  per  cent (approximately 200 people).
(sub. 55, p. 21)
Among the 1500 non-specialist producers it can be assumed that labour is divided
among many farming activities. Employed persons consist of full-time, part-time
and casual labour.
A commonly accepted industry figure is that it takes one full-time person to run a
100 sow piggery, with another person needed for every additional 100 sows. ThisD26 PIG AND PIGMEAT
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suggests that there around 3000 to 3500 full-time equivalent employees in pig
farming in Australia in 1998, including working owners/proprietors.
It is likely around 3000 people are employed in pigmeat processing (see section D.1,
table  D.2). In addition, over 6000 people are employed in bacon, ham and




Figure D.6 Location of pig producers throughout Australia, June 1997
Source: APC (1998).D28 PIG AND PIGMEAT
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Figure D.7 Location of the top 20 abattoirs, June 1997
a
a Some abattoirs have changed ownership or closed since 1996-97.




E.1 World pigmeat production and consumption
Pigmeat is the meat of choice for the majority of the world’s population. World
production of pigmeat was over 80 million tonnes in 1997, accounting for
60 per cent of total meat production, excluding meat from poultry. (AMLC 1997)
World pigmeat production was dominated by China (accounting for 53 per cent),
the European Union (20 per cent) and the United States (10 per cent). Other large
producers included Russia, Brazil, Japan and Canada (see table E.1).
Table E.1 World pigmeat production
Million tonnes carcass weight
1994 1995 1996 1997p
United States 8.03 8.10 7.76 7.84
Canada 1.23 1.28 1.24 1.25
Mexico 0.90 0.95 0.90 0.94
Total North America 10.16 10.33 9.90 10.03
Brazil 1.30 1.45 1.60 1.54
European Union 15.99 15.91 16.20 16.18
Other Western Europe 0.25 0.25 0.22 0.22
Total Western Europe 16.24 16.16 16.42 16.40
Eastern Europe 3.34 3.32 3.56 3.49
Russia 2.10 1.87 1.70 1.50
Other Former Soviet countries 0.92 0.81 0.79 0.75
Total Eastern Europe 6.36 5.99 6.05 5.74
China 32.05 36.48 40.37 42.50
Taiwan 1.20 1.23 1.27 1.01
Japan 1.39 1.32 1.27 1.27
South Korea 0.79 0.80 0.87 0.88
Other Asia 1.00 1.03 1.12 1.19
Total Asia 36.43 40.86 44.90 46.85
Australia 0.34 0.35 0.33 0.34
Other Countries na na na na
Total
a 70.83 75.14 79.20 80.87
a Individual figures may not add to totals due to rounding.  na Not available. p Preliminary figures.
Source: USDA Foreign Agricultural Service (1998).E2 PIG AND PIGMEAT
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These regions and countries also dominated world consumption in 1997. Australian
per capita pigmeat consumption was low relative to most other countries (see
table E.2).
Table E.2 Pigmeat consumption, selected countries and total
Carcass weight
1996 1997p
Total Per capita Total Per capita
’000 t kg/person ’000 t kg/person
North America
Canada 912 30.7 900 30.1
Mexico 914 9.9 960 10.2
United States 7 618 28.3 7 629 28.1
European Union
Denmark 345 65.9 340 64.8
France 2 031 34.8 2 040 34.8
Germany 4 471 54.6 4 375 53.2
Italy 2 007 35.1 2 007 35.1
Netherlands 690 44.3 669 42.7
Spain 2 201 55.5 2 220 55.9
United Kingdom 1 381 23.8 1 440 24.7
Eastern Europe
Poland 1 592 41.2 1 459 37.8
Russia 2 149 14.5 1 943 13.2
Asia
China 40 185 32.6 42 353 34.1
Japan 2 119 16.9 2 061 16.4
South Korea 871 19.2 878 19.2
Taiwan 897 41.0 843 38.2
Australia 330 18.3 332 18.2
Total
a 78 331 80 199
a Selected countries consumption figures do not add to totals. p Preliminary figures.
Source: USDA Foreign Agricultural Service (1998).
E.2 World pigmeat trade
Over 2.4 million tonnes of pigmeat was traded in 1997, equal to 3 per cent of world
pigmeat production. In comparison, over 10 per cent of beef, veal, lamb and mutton
production was traded in the same year.WORLD MARKETS E3
The major exporters of pigmeat in 1997 were the United States, Denmark, Canada,
Poland and China (see table  E.3). Major importers of pigmeat included Japan,
Russia, the United States, Hong Kong, South Korea and Canada (see table E.4).
The effect on pigmeat trade flows of disease outbreaks in Taiwan and the
Netherlands (which had almost doubled exports between 1995 and 1996) during
1997 can be seen in the fall in exports from those countries between 1996 and 1997
and concurrent rise in exports from the United States, Denmark and Canada. It can
also be seen in the fall in Japanese imports in 1997.
Trade is highly regional in nature with most exporters heavily reliant on a few close
neighbours for markets. Hence, the majority of European Union exports went to
fellow European Union member countries, Taiwan exported predominantly to Japan
and China, Canada and the United States traded between themselves, and China
predominantly exported to Hong Kong.
The major exception is trade with the largest import market, Japan. Countries from
all regions export significant amounts of pigmeat to Japan. More recently, other
Asian markets, such as South Korea, and Russia have emerged as potentially large
import markets.
Table E.3 Top ten pigmeat exporters
Thousand tonnes carcass weight
1994 1995 1996 1997p
United States 241 350 440 474
Denmark 503 402 401 470
Canada 298 356 369 410
Poland 27 81 160 200
China 181 230 192 150
France 116 147 138 140
Hungary 42 54 103 85
South Korea 11 18 46 70
Taiwan 331 381 388 69
Netherlands 50 50 91 65
Other 375 282 285 329
Total 2 175 2 351 2 613 2 462
p Preliminary figures.
Source: USDA Foreign Agricultural Service (1998).E4 PIG AND PIGMEAT
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Table E.4 Top ten pigmeat importers
Thousand tonnes carcass weight
1994 1995 1996 1997p
Japan 705 829 933 733
Russia 324 454 450 444
United States 337 301 280 287
Hong Kong 224 160 145 178
South Korea 26 45 49 77
Canada 27 27 39 54
Mexico 80 61 32 41
Bulgaria 8 1 0 35
Poland 99 47 39 32
Singapore 26 25 24 26
Other 106 104 133 123
Total 1 962 2 054 2 124 2 030
p Preliminary figures.
Source: USDA Foreign Agricultural Service (1998).
E.3 Country profiles
North America
North America accounted for around 12 per cent of world pigmeat production in
1997.
United States
The United States is the third largest producer of pigmeat after China and the
European Union. It is the largest exporter of pigmeat in the world on a country basis
although smaller than the European Union. Its major export markets are Japan,
Canada, Russia and South Korea.
In the pigmeat processing sector, the top five establishments accounted for around
5 per cent of national kill in 1997. The average slaughter capacity in these plants
was over 1 million head/year. (National Pork Producers Council 1998)
As in Australia, rationalisation has occurred in pig production. The number of pig
farms fell by 80 per cent between 1976 and 1997. (USDA 1998)WORLD MARKETS E5
Canada
While Canada is a relatively small producer of pigmeat, around a third of Canadian
production is exported, making it the third largest exporter of pigmeat after the
United States and European Union. Its major export markets are the United States,
Japan, Russia and South Korea. Around 2 per cent of 1997 pigmeat exports were
destined for Australia. (Canada Pork International 1998)
Pigmeat is a major export supported by a mature infrastructure of trading houses,
transport and processing facilities. In 1996, the top 14 Canadian pigmeat processing
establishments slaughtered 73 per cent of the national kill (average throughput was
780  000  head/year). The top five establishments slaughtered 35  per  cent of the
national kill (average throughput was 1 050 000 head/year).
Rationalisation in pig production saw the number of pig farms fall by 66 per cent
between 1976 and 1996. (Canadian Pork Council 1998)
Asia
Asia accounts for around 55 per cent of world pigmeat production.
Japan
Japan is one of the largest producers of pigmeat and the largest importer of pigmeat.
In 1997, the majority of imports came from the United States, Canada and Denmark.
Japan offers significant protection to its domestic pig producers by using a standard
import price to keep domestic producer prices stable. Pork products imported below
the set price are assessed a duty to bring the value of the product up to the
nominated price. A duty of 4.8 per cent is then levied on all products entering at the
standard import price. Various measures are also used to prevent surges in imports.
(Canadian Pork Council 1998)
Taiwan
Taiwan withdrew from the international pork market in April 1997, after an
outbreak of foot and mouth disease. Prior to the outbreak, Taiwan was exporting
almost 400 000 t of pork annually, including 250 000 t to Japan. It will be absent
from most of the world market until at least 2002.
Quotas and high tariffs severely limit pork imports. (USDA 1998)E6 PIG AND PIGMEAT
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China
China was the largest producer and consumer of pigmeat in the world in 1997.
China’s only substantial export market was the live pig trade with Hong Kong.
Imports have increased as trade has been liberalised. Tariffs on frozen/fresh/chilled
pork and offal were decreased from 45 to 20  per  cent and the processed pork
products tariff was decreased from 55 to 30 per cent in 1997. (USDA 1998)
European Union
Collectively, the European Union is the second largest pig producing area in the
world accounting for 20  per  cent of world production in 1997. While European
Union members are collectively the biggest exporters in the world, the majority of
this trade is with other members. Nonetheless, the European Union is still the
largest exporter of pigmeat in the world net of intra-European Union trade.
The major pig growing areas in the European Union are in Denmark, the
Netherlands, northern Germany and Brittany in France. The Spanish industry is
growing rapidly.
The European Union pork industry is supported by high tariff barriers protecting
domestic markets and extensive export subsidies.
Europe is subject to intermittent outbreaks of Classical Swine Fever, the most recent
in the Netherlands during 1997.
Denmark
Of the members of the European Union, Denmark is the major exporter of pigmeat
outside the European Union. Excluding intra-European Union trade, Denmark is the
second largest exporter of pigmeat in the world. Around 80 per cent of domestic
production is exported. However, environmental regulation will make further
expansion difficult.
Denmark’s pigmeat industry is extensively integrated and concentrated. Almost the
entire national kill is processed through 26 plants operated by four large
co-operatives. The average kill per plant is more than 800 000 head/year.
The industry has seen much rationalisation with the number of farms falling by
70  per  cent between 1980 and 1994. The number of processing plants fell by




The Australian Quarantine and Inspection Service (AQIS) implements Australia’s
quarantine legislation.
AQIS handles import access requests according to the WTO Agreement on Sanitary
and Phytosanitary Measures. This agreement establishes rules designed to allow
countries to implement quarantine restrictions appropriate to their conditions but to
minimise the use of these measures as trade protection devices. It aims to ensure
that any import restrictions are based on an assessment of scientific evidence of the
risk to humans, animals or plants, and are not disguised restrictions on international
trade.
Imports of cooked pigmeat are allowed from all countries provided that the meat is
hermetically sealed in cans and that various other conditions are met. Non-
hermetically sealed (uncanned) imports of cooked pigmeat are allowed only from
Canada. Denmark has requested similar access.
New Zealand, Canada and Denmark are the only countries from which Australia
currently accepts imports of uncooked pigmeat. The protocols operating with each
country are outlined below. Import access requests have been received from the
European Union on behalf of several member states, the United States, South Africa
and Mexico.
Due to the number of access requests, AQIS is conducting a generic risk analysis
which will consider the importation of pigmeat from any source. The import risk
analysis will include assessment of all potential disease agents that may be
introduced into Australia, via the importation of pigmeat. Generic import conditions
which may be developed would be applied to countries seeking access, as
appropriate to their pig health status.
New Zealand
Since May 1990, imports of uncooked pigmeat have been allowed from the South
Island of New Zealand. These imports do not have to be frozen nor do they have to
be processed upon arrival in Australia.F2 PIG AND PIGMEAT
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Imports from the North Island are not permitted due to the Island’s exposure to
Aujeszky’s disease.
Canada
Since July 1990, imports of uncooked pigmeat have been allowed from Canada.
Under the quarantine protocol, the imported pigmeat was required to be frozen for
at least 30 days prior to importation to inactivate Trichinella spiralis, a nematode
parasite which infests pig muscle tissue.
In late 1992, regulations were amended to require the imported pigmeat to be boned
(bone out) prior to export and processed on arrival in Australia. Processing could be
by cooking (to prescribed criteria), or by exposing the meat to a pH of 5.2 or less (a
fermentation process). These requirements were added to guard against the possible
transmission of the PRRS virus (porcine reproductive and respiratory syndrome
virus) from Canada to Australia, as the virus is not killed by freezing.
In May 1996, a new protocol was agreed with Canada to allow the importation of
uncooked unfrozen pigmeat provided that it was processed by cooking in Australia.
The cooking process destroys the parasite, Trichinella spiralis, if present in the
meat. Meat to be processed by fermentation would still need to be frozen before
importation. The option of processing by fermentation was suspended in February
1997.
In November 1997, a new protocol was agreed with Canada to allow the
importation of cooked pigmeat.
Denmark
Since November 1997, imports of uncooked pigmeat from Denmark have been
allowed under a similar protocol to that operating with Canada. Meat must be boned
and must be processed by cooking upon arrival in Australia. The imported pigmeat





G.1 About the consultants
Two consultants were commissioned to analyse the effect of imports on the
domestic industry: the Institute for Research into International Competitiveness
(IRIC) and Muresk Institute of Agriculture (at Curtin University of Technology) and
Dr Garry Griffith (NSW Agriculture, Armidale).
The IRIC group comprised Professor Peter Kenyon, Dr Garry MacDonald,
Dr Martin Bent, Dr Fay Rola-Rubzen and Mr Paul Koshy.
Both consultants used time series modelling techniques.
The Commission also appointed an independent referee, Dr Brett Inder, a Senior
Lecturer in Econometrics at Monash University, to assess both of the studies
undertaken for the Commission as well as studies conducted for the Department of
Primary Industries Queensland by Mr Tim Purcell and Associate Professor Steve
Harrison (sub 49) and Mr Tim Purcell and Mr Rodney Beard (sub. 63).
This appendix reprints the concluding sections of each consultant’s report and
extracts from Dr Inder’s report. Copies of all reports are available on request or on
the Commission’s website (http://www.pc.gov.au).
G.2 Analysis by Dr Garry Griffith (NSW Agriculture)
Dr Garry Griffith analysed the impact of pigmeat imports on the NSW pig industry,
essentially updating evidence prepared for the 1995 Industry Commission report
(IC 1995a). Dr Griffith used Granger and Sims (pairwise) causality models as well
as a more general Vector Autoregressive (VAR) model designed to capture the
effects of several key factors. His conclusions are reprinted in box G.1.G2 PIG AND PIGMEAT
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Box G.1 Extracts from Dr Griffith’s report
… With so many options covered in the analysis, it could have been difficult to come to
some conclusion about what may be the preferred results.
Fortunately, the results are basically consistent when viewed over the full period since
Canadian imports have been allowed into Australia. It is evident that Canadian imports of
pigmeat have no consistent causal effect on farm, wholesale or retail pigmeat prices in
NSW. The pairwise Granger and Sims causality tests suggest that farm prices cause
imports over longer lag periods; that imports may have some causal effect on wholesale
prices over longer lag periods if the Sims results are used, but that this effect is a joint
one if the Granger results are used; and that there is no effect on retail prices. Neither of
the two VAR analyses suggest any causal influence of imports on domestic prices. Note
also that many of the estimated significant test statistics are only significant at the
10 per cent level. In terms of differences if any across methods, the Granger model and
the F test have tended to provide less evidence of causality flowing from imports to
domestic prices. In fact if the Granger model was chosen as suggested in the literature
and the standard F test of restrictions was the only test employed, there would be no
evidence of any impact by imports on domestic prices.
However, when only the most recent six years data are examined, a wider range of
causal impacts are found. The pairwise Granger tests suggest some joint relationships
between farm price, import volumes and import values at longer lag lengths, but for all
other prices the causation is from domestic prices to import volumes. The pairwise Sims
tests also suggest some joint relationships between farm and wholesale prices and
import volumes and unit values, but in addition there is evidence of imports causing farm
price changes and retail price changes. The more general VAR models confirm a
significant effect of imports on retail prices but there is no evidence for a significant effect
on farm prices. The evidence on wholesale price and production are mixed in the VAR
models.
If a position had to be taken, it would be to favour the more general VAR model results
which take account of the simultaneous causal relationships shown in the pairwise
Granger and Sims model results. In this case, the evidence is that retail leg prices and
maybe wholesale prices have been significantly influenced by Canadian imports over the
past 6 years. Other prices may have been influenced by imports in recent months, but





The IRIC/Muresk team also used VAR techniques but with a different model of the
industry and a different data set (Australia-wide for the period 1985 to 1998).
Conclusions are set out in box G.2.
Box G.2 Extracts from IRIC/Muresk report
…This report has examined the impact of imports on the Australian pig and pigmeat
industries in a time series framework. Time series modelling requires the data generating
processes of the series and /or the structural relationships described by the model to be
invariant with respect to time. As the quarterly series available for modelling the domestic
pigmeat market were seasonally unadjusted, tests for the presence of seasonal unit
roots in the data were undertaken. Failure to take into considerations the effects of
seasonal fluctuations could generate spurious results and misleading inferences.
To examine the demand and supply relationship in the domestic pigmeat market,
appropriate econometric techniques were used to test for the existence of a linear long-
run relationship. A simple model specification based on past studies was used to allow
for some degree of comparability. The four variables considered in the vector
autoregressive (VAR) model were the saleyard prices of baconer (PS) and beef (BS),
production of pigmeat (PP) and retail price of pigmeat (PR). Using the Johansen
estimation method, a linear long-run cointegrating relationship was found between these
four variables over the period 1985:2 to 1998:2. This result is further supported by the
FM-OLS estimation. As the imports of Canadian pigmeat commenced only in 1990:3,
estimation of a VAR(3) model using the post-1990 data would encounter the problem of
insufficient degrees of freedom. Hence, the effects of imports in the early 1990s that led
to evidence of instability in the estimated long-run relationship were examined. The
results indicate that the imported pigmeat have no statistically significant effects on both
the long-run and short-run relationships of the estimated models. Of the variables
modelled in the short-run, the only influence on the dynamics of saleyard prices was the
dynamics of domestic production, which has a sensible negative sign.
Whilst the above results are the findings of our econometric investigation we feel that a
number of caveats are in order:
Firstly, we are unhappy about the theoretical specification of the model we have
estimated, what we have is the result of the data limitations we encountered in the study.
We feel that if the Commission and the Industry want to model the saleyard price of
pigmeat in Australia, a key issue for the future would be the establishment of a database
which would allow modelling using a reasonable theoretical framework. In this context a
clear lack is that of data on the costs of production.
(Continued on next page)G4 PIG AND PIGMEAT
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Box G.2 (continued)
Secondly, whilst we find no statistically significant effect on the pigmeat industry due to
imports, we feel that the issue of significance the Commission is considering is probably
different to statistical significance. Econometrically an effect could be found to be
statistically significant but of small magnitude, and it is clear that such distinctions should
be borne in mind by the Commission.
Thirdly, it is also clear that most of the action in the data is at the end of the sample. This
places severe restrictions on the econometric models ability to make sensible statements
about the effects of the changes occurring in the market. Our tests for structural stability
(the Hansen 1992 tests) must, for theoretical reasons … be based on a trimmed sample.
In implementing the test we could not calculate the test statistic using the first 15 or last
15 per cent of the sample. Whilst we believe this is a better procedure than carrying out
tests which are biased by arbitrary selection of the breakpoint they are clearly,
nevertheless, limited in their applicability here. More generally, it is our view that, at this
stage the econometrics must remain somewhat agnostic about the events at the end of
the sample. Whilst they are not entirely without precedent in the data, it is, we feel,
impossible to say whether they represent temporary aberration or a significant shift in the
data generation process.
Given that the domestic supply of pigmeat is a major factor determining the saleyard
price of pigmeat, it would seem reasonable to assume that imports could have a
significant role only if the volume of their increase is substantial. However, it has been
noted that the Canadian imports comprise a relatively small fraction of the overall
pigmeat market, with the most significant impact on the industry being felt in the ham and
smallgoods market. Furthermore, Australia has been a net exporter of pigmeat over the
1990s with the exception of 1996–97 (prior to the current price slump). It is likely that the
lags between the issuing of contracts and the arrival of imported products may have led
to the over supply of pigmeat in certain quarters, which in turn, affect the pigmeat prices.
A review of the pigmeat industry indicated that there does not appear to be an over
supply of domestic produce compared with past 5 to 6 years. Given the stable
consumption patterns for pork, it seems likely that substitute prices have had a large
effect on pork prices, and our test results also indicated that the saleyard price of beef
has a negative long-run effect on the saleyard price of pigmeat. On the basis of our data
analysis, it would seem that it is the domestic conditions rather than the imports that
affect the saleyard price of pigmeat in Australia. However, it is important to bear in mind
that the conventional time series regression might not be able to capture the dynamics of
imports on the saleyard prices due to the seasonal fluctuations, small sample size and




Box G.3 reprints Dr. Inder’s summary remarks about each of the studies reviewed.
Box G.3 Extracts from Referee’s report
Griffith report
… The last paragraph of the Griffith report suggests that “if a position had to be taken”,
the VAR results would provide the most reliable guide. I would agree with this for the
reasons given in the report, but also because the second set of VAR results are the only
results which do not use first differences, as explained above. The misspecification
implied by first differencing is likely to have a serious and unknown effect on the results.
Based on the levels VAR, then, the results indicate a strong possibility that imports affect
prices. The Griffith report suggests that this is only on retail prices, and maybe on
wholesale prices. The above discussion on interpreting causality analysis in multivariate
systems indicates that the result is stronger than this — imports most likely affect all
prices, some directly, and some through the other pricing levels.
It is difficult, given the results included with the report, to quantify these effects with
elasticity estimates; however, indications are that the effects are not substantial. If
effects were particularly strong, then significant results would tend to show up more
consistently with the other sampling period, and even with the misspecified differenced
models — strong effects are unlikely to simply disappear because of a partly
misspecified model.
IRIC/Muresk (Curtin University of Technology) Report
… Is there anything wrong with the empirical work undertaken in the Curtin University
report? Basically, No. The work is competent, uses good, up-to-date techniques, and is
quite thorough.
Does the empirical work get to the bottom of what drives the domestic pigmeat market
and hence allow a fair assessment of the possible impact of imports? In my view, No.  A
number of questions still hang over the empirical results which lead me to strongly
suspect that there are other important factors to take into account in the model. The most
compelling concern is best seen from Figure 5.1 — this “cointegrating” error term
appears to be non-stationary (an observation consistent with the formal hypothesis
tests). The estimates of the parameters of the cointegrating vector and the subsequent
tests on the impact of imports are all thus going to be affected by a possible “spurious
regressions” problem, which biases results and distorts findings of test procedures.
There are enough counter-intuitive aspects of the cointegration parameter estimates and
test results to suggest that this problem is real with the results presented in this report.
(Continued on next page)
Box G.3 (continued)
In terms of the question of the impact of imports on the domestic market, the findings of
this report indicate strongly that there is no causal link from import volume to domesticG6 PIG AND PIGMEAT
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prices. I believe, however, that there are enough concerns about the results to suggest
that we should treat this “negative” result with a great deal of caution.
Purcell and Harrison report (see sub. 49)
… The submission contains a vast array of results using all sorts of techniques. Many of
the results are, for various reasons, misleading or unhelpful to the questions at hand.
However, some results — especially chapter 13 — suggest potential effects of import
volume on the domestic market, primarily prices. However, the work would need to be
undertaken more thoroughly and many of the unanswered questions resolved before
one could state any firm conclusions from these results.
Purcell and Beard report (see sub. 63)
… I think initially it is important to point out that the use of a state space formulation and
Kalman filter is in essence not qualitatively different to using a standard VAR analysis.
The state space equations in the report — equations (2.1) and (2.2) — can easily be
rearranged to give a VAR representation, where the only difference is in the treatment of
the deterministic/exogenous terms — constant, time, seasonal dummies.  We thus do
not expect any qualitatively different results.
There are a number of serious concerns with the estimation of the model. First, the use
of differencing to make all variables stationary is not a good approach. I have discussed
this earlier, in most detail in section 2. The problem is accentuated here by using first
differences for some variables, and fourth differences for others. The misspecification
problems will be nontrivial. Secondly, the state space model seems to have been
estimated in such a way where only one lag of the variables enters - equivalent to a
VAR(1). Earlier work suggests that a higher order VAR is necessary to capture all the
dynamics. This underspecification will certainly corrupt the results.  Third, I note from the
footnote on page 10 that estimation of the model was problematic, and the seasonal
dummies and trend had to be omitted. Omission of the trend is probably a good thing, as
there seems to be no justification for it anyway.  However, the seasonal dummies would
be important to the analysis — there is clearly a seasonal pattern to the market. Failure
to account for this may well lead to spurious results. Fourthly, there are no diagnostics
with the results. All we see are graphs of model fit. Whilst this looks okay, would, for
example, the residuals pass simple tests for autocorrelation? Without such information,
we cannot really judge the adequacy of the model.
(Continued on next page)
Box G.3 (continued)
Turning to the results and the implication of them, the authors do make much of the good
fit in the models. However, my impression is that the fit is nothing special
— without some benchmark to compare against. Further, with the first differenced data,
fit of the levels (which is what the graphs represent) will always be pretty reasonable
within sample and one step ahead. Differenced models are kept ‘on track’ in levels, as
they are simply a generalisation of a random walk, where next period’s prediction isECONOMETRIC
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simply today’s value of the series. One is never likely to be too far wrong with such an
estimate.
In terms of the finding of a structural change, the authors make much of the ability of the
model to capture this when a change dummy is included. They may well be right, but I
consider their conclusion to be far too strong, given that we have very little data after the
alleged structural break. Only time will tell whether the break is permanent or temporary.
Overall then, there are several serious questions to be asked about this work. Whilst the
raw data suggests that there does indeed seem to be a hint of some significant change
in the market in late-1997/early-1998, there are too many questions surrounding this
study to say that it reliably sheds light on the statistical significance or causes of any
such possible change.
Concluding summary
Overall, this review of the reports exposes a number of methodological problems with
much of the work. The different approaches seem to lead to a wide variety of
conclusions. Some of the reported work has serious deficiencies which can only suggest
that the conclusions drawn from them cannot be relied on. On the other hand, most of
the results reviewed can be viewed as giving clues as to the role of imports in the
domestic pig market. No particular set of results is definitive.
If a judgment had to be made, one would have to say that it is unlikely that imports have
played a dominant role in affecting domestic prices or production. Many results fail to find
any significant effect, and only a few questionable results show a particularly strong
effect. On the other hand, the evidence also suggests that imports are not completely
irrelevant to the domestic market. They do show up as significant a number of times —
too often for this result to be entirely spurious.
It is clear that much of the ambiguity in the results is due to conflicting and at times
inappropriate choice of methodology. However, even if one focused only on those results
which use “acceptable” methodology, the outcome is not clear cut. Two possible reasons
exist for this: first, that there simply has not yet been enough data for the effect of
imports to be adequately measured. I believe this is a valid observation
— whilst we do have five years or more of data where imports have been entering the
market, they have comprised a relatively small share of the market, and thus their impact
would be hard to measure.
(Continued on next page)G8 PIG AND PIGMEAT
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Box G.3 (continued)
The second reason would be that the econometric methodologies have not yet been
executed to their full potential. By this I mean that with more investigation, some results
could be developed further, and I believe a clearer picture could emerge. It is apparent
from even the “best” of the results reviewed that an adequate quantitative model of the
workings of the pigmeat market has not been achieved. Only in the context of such a
model can we measure with some confidence the role imports have played in shaping
this market.REFERENCES
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